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Section A.  Introduction
By the late 1970s, it seemed environmental protection was widely accepted by the public
and most leaders as a proper goal of government.  Concern about degradation of the environment
appeared to be a permanent part of the political landscape at the federal level and, in the larger
states and in urban areas, at the state and local levels of government as well.  Environmental
activists had become an established and influential presence in national policymaking.
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However, the evolution of US environmental law has not been one of triumphal advance. 
The law has achieved major successes, particularly in decreasing pollution levels and in
safeguarding some natural lands and species.  But the pace of environmental damage continued
to accelerate, many environmental problems remained unsolved, and the environmental
regulatory apparatus became mired in rigidity.  Environmental policymaking at the federal level
was stymied by political gridlock.  Overall, during the period 1981 to 1997, the goal of
environmental protection became more uncertain and disputed.
Indeed, a coherent anti-environmental movement developed in step with environmental
successes.  Hostility to environmental aspirations has existed throughout American history, for
example, in the mining and timber industries.  In the modern era, as noted in Chapter 4, the
conservative backlash began in the 1970s.  In the words of one historian: “Opposition to
environmental objectives has been continuous and intense.  It evolved from separate and at times
sporadic reactions into a more integrated and coherent opposition.  That opposition was
persistent, profound, and effective.  It succeeded in turning back, muting, [or] restraining many
an environmental effort.”  Samuel P.  Hays, BEAUTY, HEALTH, AND PERMANENCE:
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1955-1985, 10 (1987).
Corporate interests affected by environmental laws – manufacturers, agriculture,
commodity producers, and others – not only lobbied legislatures effectively and used litigation
to challenge new statutes and government regulations, but also set about to change public
attitudes about environmental protection.  Conservative leaders created new think tanks to
support these business efforts, such as the Heritage Foundation, the Cato Institute,  and the
American Council on Science and Health.  (Recent publications of the Cato Institute include
Two the Cheers for the 1872 Mining Law, Out of Bounds, Out of Control: Regulatory
Enforcement at EPA, and Why We Shouldn’t Worry about Global Warming.)  Politically
conservative foundations also funded law firms to compete with Environmental Defense Fund
and the Natural Resources Defense Council, most notably the Mountain States Legal Foundation
and the Pacific Legal Foundation.  In addition, at the urging of Henry Ford III, the Ford
Foundation ended funding for the public-interest organizations it helped established in the early
1970s.  Pro-business foundations, such as the Olin and Mellon Foundations, sponsored
sympathetic research and scholarship.
One attack on the basic premises of the environmentalism was Resourceful Earth: A
Response to Global 2000, published in 1984.  Edited and in part written by Julian L. Simon, a
business professor who later became a senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation, and Herman
Kahn, a futurist, the book was a direct challenge to the views presented in the Carter
administration’s 1980 report, briefly excerpted in Chapter 4, Section E.
A Response to Global 2000
JULIAN L. SIMON AND HERMAN KAHN, THE RESOURCEFUL EARTH 1 - 3 (1984)
The original 1980 Global 2000 Report to the President is frightening.  It received
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extraordinarily wide circulation, and it has influenced crucial governmental policies.  But it is
dead wrong.  Now The Resourceful Earth, a response to Global 2000, presents the relevant
reliable trend evidence which mainly reassures rather than frightens. . . .
To highlight our differences as vividly as possible, we restate [the first two paragraphs of
Global 2000] . . . with our submissions in italics:
If present trends continue, the world in 2000 will be less crowded (though more
populated), less polluted, more stable ecologically, and less vulnerable to
resource-supply disruption than the world we live in now.  Stresses involving
population, resources, and environment will be less in the future than now . . . The
world’s people will be richer in most ways than they are today . . . The outlook
for food and other necessities of life will be better . . .  life for most people on
earth will be less precarious economically than it is now.
The high points of our findings are as follows:
(1) Life expectancy has been rising rapidly throughout the world, a sign of
demographic, scientific, and economic success.  This fact – at least as dramatic
and heartening as any other in human history – must be fundamental in any
informed discussion of pollution and nutrition. . . . 
(3) Many people are still hungry, but the food supply has been improving since at
least World War II, as measured by grain prices, production per consumer, and
the famine death rate.
(4) Trends in world forests are not worrying, though in some places deforestation is
troubling.
(5) There is no statistical evidence for rapid loss of species in the next two decades. 
An increased rate of extinction cannot be ruled out if tropical deforestation is
severe, but no evidence about linkage has yet been demonstrated. . .  .
(10) Water does not pose a problem of physical scarcity or disappearance, although the
world and U.S. situations do call for better institutional management through
more rational systems of property rights.
(11) The climate does not show signs of unusual and threatening changes. . . .
(13) There is no persuasive reason to believe that the world oil price will rise in
coming decades.  The price may fall well below what it has been. . . .
(17) Threats of air and water pollution have been vastly overblown; these processes
were not well analyzed in Global 2000.
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We do not say that all is well everywhere, and we do not predict that all will be rosy in
the future.  Children are hungry and sick; people live out lives of physical and intellectual
poverty, and lack of opportunity; war or some new pollution may do us in.  The Resourceful
Earth does show that for most relevant matters we have examined, aggregate global and U.S.
trends are improving rather than deteriorating.
In addition we do not say that a better future happens automatically or without effort.  It
will happen because men and women – sometimes as individuals, sometimes as enterprises
working for profit, sometimes as voluntary non-profit making groups, and sometimes as
governmental agencies – will address problems with muscle and mind, and will probably
overcome, as has been usual throughout history.
We are confident that the nature of the physical world permits continued improvement in
humankind’s economic lot in the long run, indefinitely.
Notes and Questions
1.  Did Resourceful Earth accurately predict the state of the world today?  Consider, for
example, the current facts regarding species loss, food and oil prices, freshwater supplies,
poverty, and climate change.  Information about most of these is set forth in Chapter 10.
2.  Resourceful Earth is part of a long tradition in American environmental thought,
sometimes referred to as the “cornucopian”view.  A more recent version of a similar perspective
– that "[o]ur doomsday conceptions of the environment are not correct" –  is offered in BJORN
LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST: MEASURING THE REAL STATE OF THE WORLD
(1998).  This book received wide attention and generated considerable controversy.  Among the
many critique's of Lomborg's work is Symposium on Bjorn Lomborg's THE SKEPTICAL
ENVIRONMENTALIST, 53 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW 249 (2002).
__________________
This chapter describes a period with a recurring theme – opposition to environmental
protection or the methods proposed to achieve it – but one marked by divergent trends. 
Describing the period 1981 to 1997 as a sort of natural ebb and flow of differing viewpoints is
much too mild.  Chapters 3 and 4 related how environmental policy became politicized.  In this
chapter it becomes apparent why changes in control of the three branches of government are
pivotal events in U.S. environmental affairs.  Further, we will see how environmental policy is
caught up in the broader struggle between supporters of strong government and those who seek
to reduce the authority and capability of the federal government.  An overview of the conflicts
between environmentalists and their opponents is contained in the following reading.
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Environmental Politics
Samuel P. Hays, Three Decades of Environmental Politics,
in MICHAEL J. LACEY, ED., GOVERNMENT AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS:
ESSAYS ON HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE WORLD WAR TWO 43-49(1991)
. . . [A] drama . . . lay in the intensity of debate over rival claimants for public policy:
those who wanted to expand material production rapidly and those who wanted to expand the
environmental benefits of the advanced consumer society.  A striking case of that drama lay in
the Rocky Mountain West, where the old and the new competed vigorously for a claim to turf. 
The traditional developmental institutions there, such as stockraising, lumbering, and hard rock
mining, were now augmented by a range of new energy activities.  But that region now
expressed some of the strongest environmental objectives in the nation.  The new order made
claims of its own for wilderness, wildlife, environmental forestry, outdoor recreation, cleaner
water and air, and in-stream water flows; it contributed much to the defeat from within the
region of both the Sagebrush Rebellion and the Reagan administration’s asset management
program.  The old order fought back with its own claims, seeking to use the power of the federal
government to restrain the environmental forces from within the West.
One can chart the environmental opposition through confrontations in state and federal
legislatures, administrative agencies, and the courts.  The fight was intense and persistent.  Many
have sought to argue that the passage of federal environmental legislation reflected fundamental
agreement on public environmental values and objectives and that disagreement was secondary
and concerned with differences over implementation of goals rather than of goals themselves. 
This view is more of an argumentative contrivance that a faithful recording of the facts.  Many
decisions by administrative agencies and courts expressed fundamental disagreements over
objectives.  Often it was the debate within the agencies and the courts that revealed most fully
the intensity of the controversy.  The opposition to environmental objectives in each arena of
politics was more than relentless; it constituted a strategy of maximum feasible resistance and
minimum feasible retreat. . . .
A major strategy of containment by the environmental opposition was to restrict both in
numbers and in geographical territory the identification of natural resources that were valuable
environmental assets subject to potential management for environmental objectives.  Mere
listing of specific areas of high environmental value, such as wilderness, wetlands, barrier
islands, estuaries, parks, and wildlife species, became crucial, because such listing could well be
the first step toward action.  Hence, classification of wilderness under the three wilderness
inventory programs, or state inventories of “areas of critical environmental concern” in the
coastal zone, became targets of contention.  By the same token, pollution sources sought to
restrict the identification of sources of harm, such as toxic waste dumps or chemical carcinogens,
in order to minimize the range of environmental controls to which they might be subject.  As
was the case with [pollution] standards, identification of environmental assets or environmental
problems involved fundamental debates over goals.  They were not simply issues of
implementation of agreed-on policies. . . . 
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It is important to emphasize the high degrees of success enjoyed by the environmental
opposition.  The main theme of recent environmental history has emphasized the environmental
triumphs.  A careful assessment calls for a mixed review.  There were significant, though less
publicized, failures, which in the customary legislative record are forgotten.  Significant attempts
to add to the range of publicly owned and managed natural environment areas were turned back:
a program of national estuarine areas as extensive as the lakeshore and seashore program was
transformed into a small set of research areas; the drive to protect barrier islands in a similar
manner . . .  was restricted to control of federal activities on such islands; the marine sanctuary
program advanced at a snail’s pace; purchase of inholdings within the national parks moved
equally slowly; the drive for urban national parks met little success beyond the initial choices in
the early 1970s. . . .
 
Two subtle but vastly important realms of success for the environmental opposition have
been little noticed.  One was the degree to which it was able to shape the terms of environmental
debate.  There was hardly a realm of public thought in which those who feared and struggled
against environmental action did not take the initiative to dominate the definition of
environmental issues.  In doing so they described environmental affairs in terms of what they
were not rather than what they were: antitechnology, bad science, single-issue politics,
adversarial strategy, the environment versus the economy, no-risk philosophy, hostility to cost-
benefit and cost-effective analyses, housewives’ data, pollutant of the week, elitism, and
populism.  These words and phrases and the ideas they implied often structured the way in which
the public media and the professional media defined the discussion.  Most of the intellectual
efforts of the environmentalists, therefore, were channeled into acts of self-defense defined by
their opponents rather than into positive initiatives they themselves had shaped.  This gave the
opposition considerable leverage with the nation’s political intelligentsia.
The opposition’s second success was a marked shift in the drift of scientific opinion and
assessment toward an acceptance of the demand for higher levels of proof of harm.  In the 1960s,
scientific experts were more likely to talk approvingly about the need to act in the absence of full
knowledge, to work in terms of “reasonable anticipation of harm,” to bring frontier knowledge
more quickly into the realm of public policy.  Much of the early pollution control program in air
and water was worked out under the assumption of a forceful role for this kind of scientific
inference.  But over the years, pollution sources demanded higher levels of proof and singled out
frontier scientists for special – and often massive – attack.  Scientists have seen the professional
careers of a number of their colleagues severely damaged . . . .  Most scientists have not been
willing to take such professional risks.  In the face of such criticism, often sharpened by attempts
from the environmental opposition to define all such issues in terms of “good science versus bad
science,” the self-images of scientists have worked a powerful influence on those less self-
confident.  A special focus of this growing influence of the demand for higher levels of proof of
harm was the weakened role of the “margin of safety,” that nebulous area of plausible inference
that is the heart of every decision about standards.  While the “margin of safety” still remained
by 1984, over the years it had become severely bruised and battered.
The response of traditional production sectors to the environmental impulse was not
uniform.  Agriculture, for example, had played a major role in the earlier conservation
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movement; when the issue now could be defined either as soil erosion or as the loss of
productive cropland, some of the older players reached a common ground with
environmentalists.  Nevertheless, a host of issues about farming methods – from pesticides to
commercial fertilizers, from the destruction of fence rows to the use of no-till agriculture, from
non-point water pollution to field burning, as well as land use planning and the use of the
countryside for recreation – all served to divide farmers from environmentalists.  Within the
states, rural legislators provided the strongest environmental opposition, objecting both to
carving out natural environment lands and programs within the countryside and to imposing on
rural areas pollution controls really meant, they argued, for the cities.  Only when it came to
siting large-scale industrial and waste facilities in rural areas, or the massive impacts of raw
materials extraction, did farms and environmentalists reach common ground. . . .
Cooperation between environmental groups and organized labor was more frequent.  In
this case, one must distinguish between the construction unions and the industrial unions.  The
former were often at odds with environmentalists over siting and federal funding for large-scale
projects.  With industrial unions it was different; they had joined with environmentalists in the
early 1950s in opposing the construction of the Echo Park dam in western Colorado.  The United
Steelworkers of America held the first nationwide citizen conference on air pollution in
Washington, D.C., in 1969.  As the 1970s wore on, environmental ties with the Industrial Union
Department of the AFL-CIO grew on such joint interests as occupational health, community air
pollution, toxic chemicals, and the “right to know.”  There were major controversies between
environmentalists and the steel workers over such issues as the bottle bill, and though coal
miners joined the antinuclear drive, they still sided with the coal companies on sulfur dioxide
control and (especially) acid rain.  The relationships were mixed, but in general they provided
more opportunities for cooperation than for conflict.
With industry, in contrast, such opportunities for cooperation were limited; industry
provided most of the leadership and the resources for the environmental opposition.  There was
nothing mysterious about this; the two groups had mutually exclusive interests.  Lands managed
as wilderness were not available for mining and lumbering.  Waste treatment added new
production costs.  Chemical companies wanted to increase the use of pesticides, and
environmentalists wanted to reduce them.  These normal conflicts between those who produce
and those who consume, those who adversely affect others and those adversely affected by them,
ran through much of the economy.  Many such conflicts could be resolved by adjusting prices in
the private market, but others inevitably led to public action.  This was especially the case where
the resource itself was widely shared or publicly owned, such as the public lands, water in
streams or lakes, or air. . . .
All the actors in the environmental opposition came together on one objective: to slow
down the pace of environmental advance.  Attempts to enhance natural environment
management should be restricted; there was already too much wilderness, there were too many
parks, there were too many protected wetlands, those that existed were too restricted as to use. 
“Multiple use” became the battle cry of those who sought to enhance development on
environmental lands.  The drive for pollution control had gone too far; more time should be
spent on accepting the existing levels of pollution – they were not harmful at all – and on
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protecting human and biological life from the impact rather than on preventing emissions in the
first place.  Light technologies should not be allowed to impede the growth of more important
heavy ones.  Notions about limits to physical resources were simply either a result of
misinformation or a result of preoccupation with the future.  There was a distrust of the
expanded influence of the public on environmental decision making, and especially on scientific
and technical questions about which only the better-informed were capable of making sound
judgments.  As the environmental opposition grew in numbers and political strength throughout
the 1970s and into the 1980s, it attacked on a wide front.  Its influence rose in the latter years of
the Carter administration, and with the Reagan presidency, it succeeded beyond its wildest
hopes.  The alacrity with which it took advantage of the new opening backfired, but even with
the adjustments that the administration made in response to political protests from
environmentalists, the opposition still scored high.  Despite its growth in numbers and resources,
by 1984 the environmental movement could maintain little more than a holding action against its
opposition.
__________________
The rather long and decidedly mixed era of Resistance, “Revolution,” and Reassessment
may be divided into three phases, each of which is described in more detail in succeeding
sections of this chapter.  During the first phase, from 1981 to 1989, President Ronald Reagan
and his appointees waged a broad assault on environmental law.  Reagan and his supporters
considered environmental laws and institutions to be the paradigm of government overreaching
and agency regulations to be excessive and a threat to economic growth.  While many Reagan
administration anti-environmental efforts became high-profile controversies, many others were
low-level, indirect attacks.  One such action, and the legal bookmark for the beginning of the
period covered in this chapter, was the issuance of Executive Order 12,291 in February 1981,
which mandated that many proposed agency regulations be subject to cost-benefit analysis and
review by the Office of Management and Budget.
Reagan’s attempts to roll back environmental gains largely failed, however.  Ironically,
several environmental laws were strengthened during his administration, such as RCRA in its
1984 amendments and CERCLA through the Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act of
1986 (SARA).  Before Reagan’s own judicial appointments had a noticeable impact on the
federal judiciary, other Reagan policies were successfully challenged in court.  For example, in
Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA (1983) the District of Columbia Circuit reinstated the
hazardous-waste permit program under RCRA.
In the second phase, the years from 1989 to 1994 marked a relative lull following the
attempted Reagan “revolution.”  Some reinforcement of environmental law did occur, notably
the ambitious Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 and enactment of the Oil Pollution Act (OPA)
in the same year.  George H. W. Bush (1989 - 1993) famously campaigned to be “the
environmental president,” for example, pledging to adopt a policy of “no net loss” of wetlands. 
Upon taking office, Bush appointed the then-president of the World Wildlife Fund, William
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Reilly, to be EPA Administrator and declared large areas of the Outer Continental Shelf off-
limits to oil and gas development.  In the end, however, President Bush apparently concluded
that the political benefits of his environmental policies were not sufficient to risk alienating his
core business constituency, and his positions changed accordingly.  For example, in his last two
years in office, George H. W. Bush proposed opening the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to oil
and gas exploration and supported his vice president’s Council on Competitiveness review of
environmental regulations for detrimental impacts on the regulated community.
During this phase, the two decade pattern of regular and extensive amendments to the
major environmental statutes ended.  With the exception of the CAA Amendments and OPA
mentioned above, and the modest Pollution Prevention Act of 1990, there were only minor
statutory amendments of any federal environmental laws during the 1990s.
With Bill Clinton’s election in 1992, the Democrats controlled the executive branch for
the first time in twelve years.  Clinton chose as his running mate Senator Al Gore, the author of
Earth in the Balance: Ecology and the Human Spirit published earlier in the election year.  In it 
Gore wrote:
. . . [W]e must not forget the lessons of World War II.  The Resistance
slowed the advance of fascism and scored important victories, but fascism
continued its relentless march to domination until the rest of the world finally
awoke and made the defeat of fascism its central organizing principle from 1941
through 1945. . . .
The world is once again at a critical juncture.  A relentless advance is
again claiming victims throughout the world, and again courageous men and
women are standing in the path of destruction and calling upon the rest of the
world to help stop the invasions.  But this time we are invading ourselves and
attacking the ecological system of which we are a part.  As a result, we now face
the prospect of a kind of global civil war between those who refuse to consider
the consequences of civilization’s relentless advance and those who refuse to be
silent partners in the destruction.  More and more people of conscience are
joining the effort to resist, but the time has come to make this struggle the central
organizing principle of world civilization. . . .
. . . Our ways of thinking and perceiving, our desires and behaviors, our
ideologies and traditions – all are inherited in significant measure from our
civilization.  We may suffer the illusion from time to time that we are going to go
our own way, but it is genuinely hard to break out of patterns of thought and
action that are integral in our culture.  Meanwhile, civilization now rushes ahead
with tremendous momentum, and even the individual who believes we are on a
collision course with the global environment will find it difficult to separate his or
her course from that of the civilization as a whole.  As always, it is easier to see
the need for change in the larger pattern than to address the need for it in oneself. 
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Nevertheless, with personal commitment, every individual can help ensure that
dramatic change does take place.
I have therefore come to believe that the world’s ecological balance
depends on more than just our ability to restore a balance between civilization’s
ravenous appetite for resources and the fragile equilibrium of the earth’s
environment; it depends on more, even, than our ability to restore a balance
between ourselves as individuals and the civilization we aspire to create and
sustain.  In the end, we must restore a balance within ourselves between who we
are and what we are doing.  Each of us must take a greater personal responsibility
for this deteriorating global environment; each of us must take a hard look at the
habits of mind and action that reflect – and have led to – this grave crisis.
The need for personal equilibrium can be described in an even simpler
way.  The more deeply I search for the roots of the global environmental crisis,
the more I am convinced that it is an outer manifestation of an inner crisis that is,
for lack of a better word, spiritual.  As a politician, I know full well the special
hazards of using “spiritual” to describe a problem like this one. . . .  But what
other word describes the collection of values and assumptions that determine our
basic understanding of how we fit into the universe? . . . 
When considering a problem as large as the degradation of the global
environment, it is easy to feel overwhelmed, utterly helpless to effect any change
whatsoever.  But we must resist that response, because this crisis will be resolved
only if individuals take some responsibility for it.  By educating ourselves and
others, by doing our part to minimize our use and waste of resources, by
becoming more active politically and demanding change – in these ways and
many others, each one of us can make a difference.  Perhaps most important, we
each need to assess our own relationship to the natural world and renew, at the
deepest level of personal integrity, a connection to it.  And that can only happen if
we renew what is authentic and true in every aspect of our lives. . . .
AL GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE: ECOLOGY AND THE HUMAN SPIRIT 12, 294, 366 (1992).
As president, Clinton initially seemed willing to assert strong environmental positions
and gave Gore more authority than most other vice presidents.  Clinton also appointed prominent
environmental advocates to key policymaking positions in his administration, notably Florida
environmental protection chief Carol Browner as EPA Administrator, former Arizona Governor
Bruce Babbitt as Interior Secretary, former Senator Tim Wirth as Assistant Secretary of State for
Environment, and former Wilderness Society President George Frampton as an assistant
secretary in the Interior Department.  Clinton promised and in 1993 successfully negotiated an
“environmental side agreement” – the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation – to supplement the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  Although
U.S. environmental groups split over the adequacy of the side agreement, it did mark the first
time that environmental obligations and procedures were made explicitly a part of an
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international trade accord.
In order to promote energy conservation and reduce the federal deficit, President Clinton
proposed a broad-based tax on energy use (which he quickly withdrew in the face of strong
congressional opposition), ordered federal agencies to purchase energy-efficient and recycled
products, and launched an initiative to promote innovation and exports of “green” technology. 
Clinton also offered legislation to make the EPA a cabinet-level department (which was blocked
by Congress).  His administration launched several negotiation processes to address high profile
environmental controversies, one on federal grazing management, another on the old-growth
forests of the Pacific Northwest, and a third on habitat conservation plans for endangered
species.  Two of these efforts to reach consensus among the various stakeholders are explored in
other chapters, habitat conservation planning under the ESA and Chapter 6 and the Northwest
forest planning effort in Chapter 7.  Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt and the department’s
Solicitor, John Leshy, took significant and highly controversial  actions to reform federal mining
laws administratively.
The third phase within the larger period, 1994 to 1997, begins with the election of the
104  Congress and the resulting dramatic political realignment.  For the first time in forty years,th
the Republican Party held majorities in both the House and Senate, markedly changing the
political playing field in environmental policymaking.  The 1994 election also brought to power
an extraordinarily ideological group of new members whose radical anti-government views were
most often directed at environmental programs.  The Republican Congressional leadership
proposed “reforms” intended to make it more difficult to promulgate environmentally protective
regulations and the “devolution” of more environmental responsibility to state governments. 
These proposals were opposed by virtually all environmental organizations.
Section D in this chapter details such efforts, including Congress’s increased use of anti-
environmental “riders” attached to budget bills.  One of the most notorious was a provision that
suspended the National Forest Management Act, the ESA, and “[a]ll other applicable Federal
environmental and natural resource laws” in order to increase timber harvesting in the national
forests.  This “Timber Salvage Rider” expired by its own terms on September 30, 1977, and
was not renewed by Congress; its expiration is the legal bookend which closes this period.
President Clinton faced a storm of public protest for signing the appropriations bill
containing the Timber Salvage Rider.  But such legislative maneuvers continued, often denying
funds to existing environmental programs or partially rolling back environmental laws.  Both out
of conviction and sensing political opportunity, Clinton and his top officials all publicly
condemned Congress’s attempts to undermine public health and environmental protection.  For
example, at a press briefing by Al Gore and Bruce Babbitt in September 1995, the Vice President
said:
. . . I would like to announce today that if Congress sends the President the
Fiscal 1996 Interior Appropriations bill as approved by the Conference
Committee, he will veto it.  This bill takes dead aim on this nation’s most
cherished natural resources, [and] it will benefit special-interests at the great
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expense of taxpayers.
Since the bill does not include the administration-proposed moratorium on
hard rock mining patents, it gives away billions of dollars in federally-owned land
and mineral deposits to a single industry. . . .
The bill would allow logging to occur in some of the most
environmentally sensitive areas of the Tongass National Forest in Alaska.  This
bill also includes a sneak attack on the newest addition to the national park
system – California’s incomparable Mojave National Preserve – by transferring
funding and responsibility for the preserve from the National Park Service to the
Bureau of Land Management, and completely undermining implementation of the
1994 California Desert Protection Act.
In addition, the bill would cut 47 percent from the President’s request for
energy conservation and efficiency programs that would save more oil than could
be obtained by drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge.  Congress is also
proposing to block an important project . . . in the Columbia River Basin . . .  . 
This shortsighted action would threaten the protection of salmon and other
endangered species and would guarantee more endless court battles and gridlock
for years to come.
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Press Briefing by the Vice President and
Secretary of the Interior, Bruce Babbitt (September 22, 1995).  Rather than sign such budget
legislation, Clinton allowed the federal government to shut down twice due to lack of funds.
The American public responded with hostility to any weakening of the environmental
laws.  Rather suddenly, the “reforms” advanced in the 104  Congress were discredited.  Theirth
repudiation prompted the Clinton administration to push a range of new environmental
initiatives.  At EPA, Carol Browner strengthened CAA regulations for particulates and ozone.  In
1998, Clinton announced a major effort to address water pollution from agriculture and urban
storm water, the TMDL program described in Chapter 4, Section B. 3.  Under the leadership of
Forest Service Chief Michael Dombeck, the administration instituted new national forest
planning regulations and banned roads and other development in currently roadless areas of the
national forests.  Both of these developments are examined in Chapter 7.  Perhaps the most
lasting environmental legacy of the Clinton presidency was brought about by Secretary Bruce
Babbitt.  Babbitt’s insistent prodding persuaded the president to protect millions of acres of
public lands as national monuments, including the Grand Staircase-Escalante National
Monument in southern Utah which was considered in Chapter 2.
During this time, international environmental law continued to develop; the U.S.
sometimes contributed to its progress and at other times was an obstacle.  President Reagan
opposed multilateral policy making in general and international environmental lawmaking in
particular.  He completely disregarded the Carter administration's Global 2000 report and
rejected the proposed Law of the Sea Convention.  The United States was the only nation to vote
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against the U.N. World Charter for Nature in 1982; the charter is excerpted in Chapter 9.  One
important exception was the Reagan administration’s constructive role in formulating the
international regime to protect the ozone layer which led to the Montreal Protocol in 1987.
Early in the administration of George H. W. Bush, the U.S. endorsed the 1990 London
amendments to the Montreal Protocol and allowed the EPA and other federal agencies to
promote research and technical cooperation on climate change.  Later, however, Bush
equivocated on whether or not he would even attend the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. 
Ultimately he did attend but refused to sign the Biodiversity Convention approved by other
nations at Rio and led opposition to binding targets and timetables for cuts in greenhouse gas
emissions.  The U.S. also sided with the opponents of binding international forest protections. 
At Rio, the senior Bush also refused to commit financial support for the new Global
Environmental Facility created to provide multilateral funding for action on ozone depletion,
biodiversity conservation, and climate change.
In marked contrast, President Clinton signed both the Law of the Sea Convention and the
Biodiversity Convention shortly after his inauguration.  (Neither of these treaties had been
ratified by the U.S. Senate as of early 2008.)  In pursuance of the Rio Declaration – considered
in Chapter 10 – he appointed a high level President’s Commission on Sustainable Development
to produce recommendations for advancing sustainable development domestically.  Under the
leadership of Vice President Al Gore, the United States was instrumental in negotiating the 1997
Kyoto Protocol, which committed developed countries to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by
five percent below 1990 levels by 2012.  Clinton signed the Kyoto Protocol despite fierce
political opposition, but he declined to submit it to the Senate where it faced certain rejection. 
(The international climate change regime is examined in Chapter 9 section B. 2).  In February
1998, Clinton proposed $6.3 billion in funding for tax incentives and research to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions through increased energy efficiency, but this proposal was vigorously
attacked by Republicans in Congress as well. 
In retrospect, the most significant outcome of the 1980s and 1990s was that
environmental law endured.  It largely survived repeated and fervent challenges.  While the goal
of the environmental protection persisted, the law did not keep pace with accelerating
environmental harm and emerging environmental problems.  Much time was lost.
Section B.  Resistance in the West
The Property Clause
U.S. Constitution, Article IV, § 3, cl.  2.
“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States . . . .
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__________________
As noted in Chapter 1, federal land policy gradually shifted during the 20th-century from
disposition to permanent retention and management.  The result was that the federal government
remained the owner of about one-third of the nation’s surface area as of the 1960s.  Today, that
figure is 28.8 percent for the nation as a whole, but these lands are concentrated in the western
states and Alaska.  For example, slightly less than fifty percent of Wyoming and slightly more
than fifty-two percent of Oregon is owned by the federal government.  The figures for Idaho and
Utah are sixty-two percent and sixty-four percent respectively.  When Alaska became a state in
1959, it was almost entirely federal land.  Following the passage of the Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act of 1971, millions of acres were granted to Alaska Natives and the State of
Alaska.  As a result, federal lands now comprise sixty-eight percent of the state.  This leaves
Nevada with the highest percentage of federal ownership of any state – eighty-three percent.
The Sagebrush Rebellion
John D. Leshy, Unraveling the Sagebrush Rebellion:  Law, Politics and Federal Lands
14 U.C. DAVIS LAW REVIEW  317, 341-348 (1980)
The “sagebrush rebellion” burst onto the Western scene in 1979, when the Nevada
legislature began considering a bill to claim ownership of the “unappropriated” federally
controlled public lands in the state.  Since that measure was enacted in June 1979, other Western
states have passed similar bills.  Thus the stage appears to be set for a legal test of continued
federal management of much of the land in the West. . . .
Although it might be argued that the rebels have, by spurning the legislative for the
judicial remedy, chosen to forego raising the ownership issue in Congress, at least a few
congressmen have proposed to have that body address it.  Therefore, let us briefly examine that
issue on its policy, as opposed to its legal merits.  The first thing to note is that only recently has
Congress addressed the issue of federal public land policy once more, resolving it in favor of
continued federal retention and management of most public lands, while at the same time setting
forth uniform standards and procedures by which some lands may be sold.
If a single development may be said to have triggered the rebellion, in fact, it is
Congress’ enactment of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976.  That Act was
the culmination of a congressionally inspired re-evaluation of federal public land management
given impetus by the report of the Public Land Law Review Commission (PLLRC) six years
earlier. . . .
It is especially worth noting, in the current climate of rebellion, that the primary
proponents and shapers of both the PLLRC and the FLPMA were Westerners.  The region that
would most feel the impact of the law thus played the biggest role in writing it.
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What, then, are we to make of the sudden rise of the sagebrush rebellion so soon after
this latest national debate appeared to have determined, once and for all, that the bulk of the
remaining public lands should be retained in federal ownership and managed in the national
interest? Did the PLLRC and the Congress misread Western public sentiment on the issue so
seriously that a grassroots “rebellion” spontaneously arose to protest this alleged “selling out” of
Western interests? I think not.  Instead, I suggest that the rebellion has several disparate roots
which are not easily reconciled with each other, but which can teach us several things about
politics and values in the modern West.
First, the rebellion obviously feeds at the trough of national disaffection with government
regulations and bureaucracy.  With its extensive landholdings giving it a highly visible,
pervasive presence throughout the West, the federal government naturally feels the brunt of anti-
government feeling there.  Moreover, the FLPMA goes well beyond mere retention of the public
lands.  It and other recent laws have placed new restrictions on the private exploitation of the
public lands, especially their forage and minerals.  As the reality of such restrictions has become
apparent, those most affected – graziers and miners – have begun to chafe at this reduction in
their freedom of exploitation. . . .
Also at work here is the increasing realization that man’s abilities to make nature over in
his own image are not unbounded.  Natural limitations in the West, most obviously its aridness,
have long been obstacles to development.  But in many areas they have been, at least for the time
being, successfully surmounted by man’s ingenuity, often aided by federal funds.  But now
Westerners find themselves facing resource shortages which are not only fractious but, more
important, appear to defy the solutions of the past.  Part of the frustration provoked by that
realization has undoubtedly tarnished the image of the federal government as problem-solver. 
At the same time, ironically, the resources of federal lands are increasingly being viewed as
providing a safety net to help solve local or regional problems in the West.
Another factor is an idea long basic to the Western system of values – that man not only
can but must exploit and tame nature into submission in order to survive and prosper in the
sometimes harsh Western environment.  Part of the FLPMA’s regulatory scheme is designed to
achieve environmental restoration and protection on all the public lands and, beyond that, to
preserve parts of the public lands in their natural condition.  This does not go down easily with
those who, by experience or cultural inculcation, regard the natural environment as their enemy.
A fourth root of the rebellion is found in the greatly increased competition for public
lands and resources.  “Multiple use” is the well worn phrase which describes the fundamental
management principle for most public lands in this country. Yet until recently, overt competition
for use of specific areas of public lands was the exception rather than the rule.  Livestock
graziers, miners, lumbermen, hunters and fishermen generally coexisted peacefully, and few
other demands were placed on these lands.  Now, however, growing numbers of off-road vehicle
fanciers, wilderness advocates, endangered species and other wildlife protectionists, white-water
enthusiasts, cultural and archaeological resource investigators, hikers, campers, skiers,
photography buffs and rockhounds have combined with the sometimes increasing demands of
more traditional users (especially those seeking to exploit domestic energy resources) to place
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unprecedented strains on the poor land managers who must give concrete meaning to the lordly
dictate of “multiple use.” Increasing competition inevitably means increasing regulation and red
tape for all public lands users, most dramatically illustrated, perhaps, by the increasing need to
require permits for foot access into wilderness areas.  Needless to say, such regulation does not
please those whose private pursuits are regulated in order that the public’s resources may be
preserved for use by others, including future generations.  It takes a certain maturity or breadth
of perspective to appreciate the common good which flows from this kind of regulation, and at
least the initial reaction to its imposition is likely to be hostility.  In this sense the current
rebellion once again shows how history tends toward repetition, since earlier efforts to strip the
federal government of much of its remaining land holdings were also sparked by increasing
federal regulation.
Another factor which explains why the rebellion has advanced as far as it has and as fast
as it has is the lag between demographic changes and political power shifts.  Many are surprised
to learn that the modern West has become, by generally accepted standards of measurement, the
most urban region in the country.  The availability of nearby public lands for recreation and the
value that open spaces provide the human spirit are important parts of the lifestyle that most
Westerners lead from their urban oases.  Recreation and tourism are major sectors in the
economies of most Western states, sometimes even outstripping more traditional pursuits such as
mining, grazing and farming.  But in many areas of the West, the interests of urbanites and
suburbanites have not yet been effectively translated into political power in state legislatures. 
Where public lands are concerned, traditional agricultural, stock-raising and mining interests still
tend to hold sway, though the situation is changing.
Related to this lag in the shift of political power is the generally perceived weakness in
the rebels’ legal claim, for the rebels’ political case in the state legislatures might well have been
considerably weaker if their legal case had been stronger.  Many may have voted for the bills not
so much out of belief in the wisdom of the program to transfer lands out of federal ownership,
more because the measure was a legally ineffective, and therefore harmless, gesture of
displeasure against Washington.
Finally, the rebellion partakes of the current movement to return to states and localities
greater responsibility over their affairs.  While that movement extends far beyond federal land
management policies, it has certainly been felt in that area. . . .
__________________
The County Supremacy Movement
Robert L. Glicksman, Fear and Loathing on the Federal Lands,
45 UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS LAW REVIEW 647-649, 653-655, 659-661, 663-665 (1997)
On July 4, 1994, Dick Carver, a rancher and a Commissioner of Nye County, Nevada,
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climbed aboard his twenty-two-ton D-7 Caterpillar and began bulldozing open a road in the
Toiyabe National Forest.  The county had asked the United States Forest Service, an agency
within the Agriculture Department responsible for managing the national forests, to reopen a
former stagecoach trail, but the agency said an archaeological survey was needed first.  Without
waiting for Forest Service approval, and with the consent of his fellow Commissioners, Carver
drove the bulldozer to the road and began plowing a roadbed outside the existing right-of-way. 
In front of him stood an armed agent of the United States Forest Service, who held a hand-
lettered sign ordering Carver to halt.  The agent stumbled to his hands and knees, but Carter
drove on, waving his pocket-sized copy of the United States Constitution, as his son-in-law stood
by and sang the national anthem.  Spurred on by a local rancher who argued that the United
States had been won by "fighting men and bloodshed," and that peaceful solutions were no
longer sufficient, a crowd of about 200 onlookers, many waving guns, cheered.  The Nye County
Commission subsequently requested that criminal charges be brought against the two Forest
Service employees.
This story is not unique.  Similar incidents have occurred in other parts of the West in
recent years.  The most recent example took place on lands in Utah, which, in the fall of 1996,
President Clinton included within the newly established Staircase-Escalante National
Monument.  Officials of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), while conducting an
inventory in October 1996 of undeveloped lands inside the national monument for possible
wilderness designation, noticed that hundreds of miles of trails had been bulldozed and graded
without agency approval.  It turned out that the counties in which the lands are located, which
asserted ownership of the graded roads, ordered the bulldozing in an attempt to disqualify the
areas from further consideration as wilderness.   They did so despite warnings by the BLM that
they lacked the authority to engage in those acts on lands under the BLM's jurisdiction.  Instead
of resorting to legal means of resolving the dispute first, the counties began leveling.  They
stopped only when the federal government filed suit alleging trespass by the counties and a
federal district court issued an injunction to stop the unauthorized work.  Even after the suit was
filed, Garfield County officials declared that they would "not be beholding" to the federal
officials who brought suit.  One Utah rancher's response to the creation of the national
monument may have summarized the feelings of many when he declared that he would "like to
secede from the nation. I'd like to go to war."
Recent dissatisfaction with ownership and management of the federal lands has
manifested itself in more ominous forms as well. Pipe bombs have appeared in the Gila
Wilderness in New Mexico.  An unknown assailant shot at a Forest Service biologist in
California.   A bomb was thrown onto the roof of the BLM's state headquarters in Nevada on
Halloween night in 1993.  School children have been beaten because their parents work for the
Forest Service.  In August 1995, the family van of a forest ranger in Carson City, Nevada, was
blown up while parked in his driveway.  That episode marked the second time within a year in
which violence was directed at the ranger, who previously supervised Forest Service lands in
Nye County. 
Incidents of civil disobedience involving the disruption of lawful activities on the federal
lands have not been confined to those who oppose restrictions on development that stem from
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environmental and natural resource protection laws.  Radical environmentalists, for example,
have spiked trees and otherwise sought to disrupt logging in the national forests.  The difference
between those protests and the ones [discussed here] is that only the latter have occurred under
the sponsorship of local governments.  . . .
The successor to the Sagebrush Rebellion was the Wise Use Movement, born around
1988 in reaction to the increased emphasis placed on preservation of federal lands and resources.
The movement's adherents argued that federal land management policy should subordinate
recreational and preservation-oriented uses to economic and commodity uses of public
resources.  The Wise Users focused on the threats posed to western communities by
environmentalists and the need for stronger protection of private property rights.  Their goal, like
that of the Sagebrush Rebels, was the transfer of undeveloped federal lands in the West to the
private sector for commercial exploitation.
At some point, the former Sagebrush Rebels and their ideological allies realized that
large-scale transfer of federal lands to state or local ownership might be financially disastrous for
the western states.  Counties with substantial federal land holdings, for example, typically
receive greater federal revenue sharing and other aid than counties without such lands.  The
same private interests who steadfastly oppose federal land ownership and management are often
the ones who protest most vociferously even modest steps to reduce the availability of these
kinds of government-sponsored benefits.  Robert Glennon captured the schizophrenic attitude of
many westerners toward the federal government most succinctly in describing their plea as: "Get
out!  And give us more money!"  The upshot was a revised strategy, often labeled the County
Supremacy Movement, whose aim was to reap the benefits of controlling allocation of federal
lands and resources without being subjected to the burdens of ownership.
The County Supremacy Movement was born in Catron County, New Mexico, which in
1991 passed the first so-called "custom and culture" ordinance.  It purported to require that the
federal government coordinate and consult with the county and consider its custom and culture
before making management decisions concerning federal lands within its borders.  At least
thirty-five counties in Arizona, New Mexico, Nevada, and California have since declared
themselves to be in control of federal lands within their boundaries.  The ordinances adopted by
these counties typically require that current levels of grazing, farming, and timber harvesting on
federal lands continue and that the federal land management agencies refrain from taking any
action that would make those activities financially infeasible.  Some ordinances purport to place
control over these activities in the hands of the county and prohibit implementation of federal
land use management plans or acquisition or disposition of federal lands without county
approval.  They may prohibit the government from designating federal lands as wetlands or
wilderness, override federal statutory provisions that require a permit to dredge or fill wetlands,
or require county approval of plans to protect endangered species.  The ordinances often
criminalize violations, which explains the criminal charges brought by Nye County against the
Forest Service employees who stood in Dick Carver’s way.
The County Supremacy Movement has justified these custom and culture ordinances
primarily on the basis of the so-called equal footing doctrine.  The initial premise is that all states
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  See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1934 (1995) (declaring the Gun-Free School Zones1
Act of 1990 unconstitutional). . . .
admitted to the Union are entitled to the same rights of sovereignty as the original thirteen.  The
eastern states were permitted to retain title to the unappropriated dry land within their borders. 
By retaining a large percentage of land in the western states, the United States has improperly
relegated these states to second-class status.  As a result, the government’s ownership of lands in
these states is unconstitutional.  . . .
The recent attacks on federal land ownership and management policies are part and
parcel of a broader effort to scale back the regulatory powers of the federal government.  This
effort to decrease the role of the federal government is a significant component of an ongoing re-
evaluation of environmental policy that is taking place in Congress, the administrative agencies,
the courts, and the halls of academia.  The movement has borne legal fruit in the form of a
Supreme Court decision that, for the first time in decades, invalidated a federal statute as beyond
the scope of the Commerce Clause.   Thus far, similar attacks on the laws that govern federal1
land and resource management have not succeeded.  
Even where federal power undoubtedly exists, those who oppose its exercise have
contended that it is less “democratic” than the exercise of state or local authority.  The Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 is an example of recent reforms that are designed to restore
governmental accountability.  The County Supremacy Movement obviously builds on the notion
that governmental authority exercised at the local level is somehow more legitimate than power
wielded by federal bureaucrats. Proponents of custom and culture ordinances claim that their
purpose is to promote the "American tradition of self-government" by reducing bureaucracy and
increasing economic stability.
Another prominent theme in the recent movement to reform environmental policy is the
charge that the exercise of federal regulatory power results in unwarranted infringements on
private property rights.  Hostility to regulatory constraints on the use of private property is
particularly strong in some areas of the West.  Nye County, for example, has no zoning laws. 
Advocates of enhanced protection of private property have introduced legislation that would
require the federal government to compensate private property owners when regulation results in
a decline in the market value of their land.  A slew of lawsuits have been filed in which property
owners have charged that the implementation of federal environmental and natural resources
legislation has taken their property, entitling them to the payment of just compensation under the
Fifth Amendment’s takings clause.  Some of these lawsuits have been financed by the same
interests responsible for the Wise Use and County Supremacy Movements.  If the federal
government is required to compensate regulated property owners to a much greater extent than
has been the case to date, either because of new legislation or an expansive reading of the
takings clause by the courts, the result is likely to be a greater reluctance on the part of the land
management agencies to use the regulatory tools at their disposal.  . . .
The federal government has provided a convenient scapegoat for . . . pent-up frustrations.
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Westerners have provided a receptive audience for the steady stream of incendiary, anti-
government rhetoric that comprises the third factor responsible for the more volatile forms of
protest represented by the Nye County incident.  The Chairman of the Resources Committee of
the House of Representatives has referred to environmentalists as a self-centered, despicable,
"waffle-stomping, Harvard-graduating, intellectual bunch of idiots. "  More to the point, he has
accused the National Park Service of engaging in Gestapo tactics.  A member of Idaho's
congressional delegation seems to direct a torrent of inflammatory bombast at the federal land
management agencies, their resource allocation policies, and the values these policies reflect. 
Environmental policies, she has declared, "are driven by a kind of emotional spiritualism that
threatens the very foundation of our society, by eroding basic principles of our Constitution."
They amount to "a war on the West," of which the President's policy on resource-allocation
issues like salvage timber sales is "only one of the battles that we will fight, but we will fight.  I
can tell you, Mr. Speaker, the West was not settled by wimps and faint-hearted people, and we
will not give it up easily."  The custom and culture ordinances backed by the County
Supremacists clearly echo these sentiments.  One Oregon county's ordinance stated that:
"Federal and state agents threaten the life, liberty, and happiness of the people of Klamath
County.  They present a clear and present danger to the land and livelihood of every man,
woman, and child.  A state of emergency prevails that calls for devotion and sacrifice."
These diatribes have been enthusiastically received in some comers of the West because
of a combination of resentment over the disappearance of longstanding traditions and practices
and fear of what the future will bring.  Until fairly recently, those who wanted to use the federal
lands typically did so without opposition by federal land managers.  Issuance of permits to
ranchers who wanted to graze on land managed by the BLM, for example, was virtually
automatic.  It also was cheap, as grazing fees were set far below market value, and relatively
condition-free.  But as federal land managers belatedly began to impose constraints on federal
land use (such as reduced animal unit months for grazing allotments) to protect the environment,
these historic users found access to federal resources to be more difficult and costly.  One source
attributes Catron County, New Mexico's trend-setting custom and culture ordinance to the
influence of local cattlemen, "angered by threatened reductions in grazing allotments on federal
lands," who "saw their traditional control over the local United States Forest Service and the
[BLM] slipping away."   The traditional consumptive users also now face more competition for
the right to use the federal lands than they did previously.  Recreational use of the federal lands
by hikers, campers, hunters, and boaters is heavier than ever before.  Westerners such as
ranchers who want to graze their animals on federal lands and developers incensed about
restrictions placed on their access to water are simply fed up with federal "intrusion" into their
lives and livelihoods.
The upshot is that "economic dislocation in the rural West is now more widespread [and]
more persistent" than it has been in the past.  Some of this dislocation has nothing whatsoever to
do with the policies of the federal government that dictate use of the federal lands.  It has instead
been induced by changes in the national economy that have made it more difficult for small,
marginally successful users of public resources, such as ranchers, to compete with larger
corporate conglomerates, and that have contributed to a shift in the economies of many western
states away from resource extraction and toward tourism.  The West, surprisingly, is now the
most urbanized section of the country, and traditional industries such as farming, mining,
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ranching, and logging contribute less to state economies than they used to do.  But the federal
land management agencies provide a convenient target for the unhappiness, confusion, and rage
that sometimes accompanies such changes.
__________________
Notes and Questions
1.  More on the “Wise Use” Movement.
With $1 million in industry backing, People for the West has formed
dozens of groups in 13 Western states.  One of many efforts to “put people back
into the environmental equation,” . . . the campaign is a sign of the changing tenor
of environmental controversy. . . .
. . . [A]t a recent national conference of the “wise use” movement in
Denver. . . organizers claimed that more than 25 million people were represented
by the sponsors, including trade groups for miners, loggers, farmers, ranchers,
dirt-bikers, and oil-drillers, as well as lobbying groups like the National Rifle
Association and conservative think tanks like the Mountain States Legal
Foundation. . . .
[Chuck] Cushman heads the Multiple Use Land Alliance, a newly formed
network of some 1.2 million holders of permits to use public lands for cabins,
wood gathering, mining and grazing livestock. . . .
“I see our role as a tactical guerrilla force on the side of the ranchers and
other federal land users,” Cushman said. . . .
“Preservationists are like a new pagan religion.  They worship trees and
sacrifice people,” said . . . Cushman.  “What we’re facing is a holy war between
fundamental religious differences.”
Jon Christensen, People for the West Launches a ‘Holy War’ Against Enviros, HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS 3 (June 3, 1991).
__________________
United States v. Nye County, Nevada
U.S. District Court
920 F. Supp. 1108 (D. Nev. 1996)
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GEORGE, Chief Judge.
Plaintiff United States of America renews its motion for partial summary judgment (#87)
(Plaintiffs Renewed Motion) on Counts I and IV of its complaint.  In its complaint, the United
States alleges that it owns and has authority to manage certain public lands within Nye County. 
By statute, Defendant State of Nevada claimed ownership of this public land in 1979.  In late
1993, Defendant Nye County passed Resolution 93-48, declaring that Nevada owns the disputed
public lands in Nye County and that only the state and the county have authority to manage the
land.  At the same time, Nye County, passed Resolution 93-49 asserting that, with limited
exceptions, Nye County owns the rights-of-way for all roads and corridors crossing the public
lands.  Importantly, Nye County acted upon its denial that the United States owns and has
authority to manage the public lands.  On July 4, 1994, Nye County reopened the Jefferson
Canyon Road, straying from the right-of-way onto national forest land, ignoring an order of a
forest service agent to stop.  Following this action, a Nye County Commissioner filed an
affidavit against the federal officer, stating that the officer lacked any jurisdiction.  In Count I,
the United States seeks a declaration that it owns and has authority to manage the disputed
public lands within Nye County, Nevada.  Pursuant to Count IV, the United States seeks a
declaration that Resolution 93-49 is preempted to the extent it purports to apply to roads and
corridors for which no valid right-of-way exists.  As Nevada and Nye County have filed their
oppositions, this matter is submitted for consideration.  The court also requested and received
supplemental memoranda, and heard oral arguments. . . .
Background
On February 2, 1848, following the Mexican American War and pursuant to the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo, 9 Stat. 922, Mexico ceded lands, including the area comprising present day
Nevada, to the United States.  On March 21, 1864, the United States Congress enacted the
Nevada Enabling Act, 13 Stat. 80 (1864), authorizing a convention to draft a state constitution
for ratification by the residents of the Nevada Territory.  As a condition of statehood, the Nevada
Enabling Act required that the convention adopt an ordinance agreeing and declaring that
Nevada would “forever disclaim all right and tide to the unappropriated Public lands lying
within said territory, and that the same shall be and remain at the sole and entire disposition of
the United States.” Id., at § 4.  In July 1864, the convention adopted the Nevada State
Constitution and passed the Ordinance of the Constitution disclaiming all right and title to
unappropriated public lands.  The President of the United States, Abraham Lincoln, then
proclaimed Nevada admitted to the Union on October 31, 1864.  See 13 Stat. 749.
Presently, the United States asserts ownership of nearly 87% of the lands in Nevada.  In
Nye County, the United States’ assertion of ownership increases to nearly 93% of the lands. 
These federal lands include portions of the Humboldt and Toiyabe National Forests
(administered by the Forest Service, Department of Agriculture), a portion of the Death Valley
National Monument, a part of the Nellis Air Force Range (Department of Defense), most of the
Nevada Test Site (Department of Energy), and the Meadows National Wildlife Refuge.  The
remaining federal lands are public lands administered by the Bureau of Land Management,
Department of the Interior, pursuant to the Federal Land Policy and Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 43
U.S.C. § 1701.  The FLPMA formally ended the policy of transferring federal lands to private
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ownership and adopted a policy of retention of these lands by the federal government.
In 1979, and in response to enactment of the FLPMA, Nevada enacted a series of statutes
declaring ownership of and control and jurisdiction over all “public lands” within Nevada.
Nev.Rev.Stat. §§ 32l.596-32l.599.  As used in these statutes, “public lands” excludes land
located in congressionally authorized national parks and monuments, national forests, wildlife
refuges, lands acquired by the consent of the legislature, and lands controlled by the Department
of Defense and Department of Energy.
Nye County is a political subdivision of the State of Nevada, administered by an elected
Board of Commissioners.  Nye County has claimed that the United States does not own and that
it lacks authority to manage public lands within its exterior boundary. . . .  In claiming that the
public lands belong to Nevada, however, Nye County asserts that Nevada owns more land than
Nevada itself has claimed by statute.  For example, while Nevada does not claim ownership of
the national forests, Nye County has asserted that Nevada owns the lands managed by the
Department of Agriculture, which manages the national forests. . . .  Rather, Nye County
excludes, from the public lands, only the land ceded by Nevada to the federal government or post
offices and federal buildings, and the land within the Nevada Test Site [for testing nuclear
weapons]. . . . 
In addition to passing Resolution 93-48 declaring that Nevada owns all public lands, Nye
County passed Resolution 93-49.  This resolution declared that “all ways, pathways, trails, roads,
country highways, and similar travel corridors across public lands in Nye County, Nevada,
whether established and maintained by usage or mechanical means, whether passable by foot,
beast of burden, carts or wagons, or motorized vehicles of each and every sort, whether currently
passable or impassable, that was [sic] established in the past, present, or may be established in
the future, on public lands in Nye County, are hereby declared Nye County Public Roads.” The
resolution further declared that “All rights of way . . . across public lands that are declared Nye
County Public Roads are the property of Nye County as trustee for public users thereof.”
In June 1994, Nye County, through Commissioner Richard Carver, the Vice-Chairman of
the Nye County Board of Commissioners who acted with authority for and on behalf of Nye
County, declared that the Jefferson Canyon Road in the Toiyabe National Forest was a Nye
County Public Road. . . .  As the Jefferson Canyon road had been washed out in 1983, this letter
further notified the district ranger that Nye County Board of Commissioners intended to reopen
and maintain the road.  On July 4, 1994, Commissioner Carver accomplished the intent of the
Board by using a county-owned bulldozer to reopen the Jefferson Canyon Road.  Significantly,
the United States has offered uncontroverted evidence establishing that, in grading the road,
Commissioner Carver strayed from any possible right-of-way onto national forest land.  After
Commissioner Carver strayed from the right-of-way, Forest Service Special Agent Dave Young
stood directly in the path of the bulldozer and displayed a sign ordering the Commissioner to
stop.  Although Young continued to display the sign while the bulldozer was on national forest
land, Commissioner Carver did not stop his activities.  On July 6, 1994, Commissioner Carver
filed an affidavit with the County Sheriff requesting criminal charges be brought against Young
and another Forest Service employee.  The Commissioner asserted that the Forest Service
employees lacked any jurisdiction in Jefferson Canyon, which is clearly within the bounds of the
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Toiyabe National Forest.  The County Sheriff forwarded the affidavit to the Nye County District
Attorney, who has not yet acted upon the request for criminal prosecution.
In August 1994, Nye County informed the Bureau of Land Management by letter that the
BLM could not enforce its Final Multiple Use Decisions for the Razorback and Montezuma
Grazing Allotments because the BLM has not provided proof of ownership of the public lands or
proof of constitutional jurisdiction. . . . 
In August 1994, Nye County, again acting through Commissioner Carver, informed the
Forest Service that the San Juan and Cottonwood Canyon Roads, which were previously closed
by the Forest Service and which are located in the Toiyabe National, Forest, were Nye County
Public Roads. . . .  In October 1994, the Nye County Board of Commissioners voted to reopen
the San Juan and Cottonwood Canyon Roads. . . . On October 15, Commissioner Carver again
used a county-owned equipment to reopen San Juan Road.
The United States brought this suit against Nye County.  . . .
Ownership of the Public Lands within Nye County
The parties do not dispute that, prior to Nevada’s statehood, the United States held title to
the public lands within the territory that was to become Nevada.  Nye County argues that it does
not assert a claim of title to public lands, Nye County Opposition at 4, and thus its authority to
manage public lands derives from and is limited to the claim of title by the State of Nevada.  By
statute, Nevada has claimed title to all public lands within Nevada, and thus within Nye County,
excluding land located in congressionally authorized national parks and monuments, national
forests, wildlife refuges, lands acquired by the consent of the legislature, and lands controlled by
the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy.  Nev.Rev.Stat. §§ 321.596-321.599. 
Although Nye County has claimed that Nevada also owns certain of these excluded lands, it has
not offered any argument suggesting that Nevada has made that claim.  Accordingly, there is no
dispute that the United States owns the lands within the national parks and monuments, the
national forests, the wildlife refuges, the lands acquired by the consent of the legislatures, and
the lands controlled by the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy.  The
remaining question that this court must decide is whether title to the remaining public land
within Nye County passed to Nevada.  The court concludes that title did not pass to Nevada, but
remains within the United States.
As noted earlier, while Nevada has statutorily claimed the public lands within Nye
County, it now concedes that this claim is constitutionally untenable.  While this concession is
tantamount to a consent to judgment, the court also concludes that the statutory claim is
unsupported, unconstitutional, and fails as a matter of law.
Equal Footing Doctrine
In claiming ownership of the public lands within its outer boundaries, the Nevada
legislature asserted that title to the unappropriated lands passed from the federal to the state
government under the equal footing doctrine.  Nev.Rev.Stat. § 321.596(2).  “The equal footing
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doctrine ensures that each state shares ‘those attributes essential to its equality in dignity and
power with other states.’” Nevada v. Watkins, 914 F.2d 1545, 1555 (9th Cir.1990).  According to
findings embodied in Nevada’s statute, Nevada asserts that the original states obtained
ownership of the unappropriated dry land as an attribute of their sovereignty at the time of the
Revolution.  Since Nevada was admitted on an equal footing to the original thirteen states, title
to all unappropriated lands necessarily transferred from the federal to the state government as an
attribute of local sovereignty.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that certain types of property – specifically lands
submerged by navigable or tidal waters – must pass to the states as a circumstance of
sovereignty.
Dominion over navigable waters and property in the soil under them are so
identified with the sovereign power of government that a presumption against the
separation from sovereignty must be indulged, in construing either grants by
sovereign of the lands to be held in private ownership or transfer of sovereignty
itself.  For that reason, upon the admission of a state to the Union, the title of the
United States to lands underlying navigable waters within the state passes to it, as
incident to the transfer of local sovereignty, and is subject only to the paramount
power of the United States to control such waters for purposes of navigation in
interstate and foreign commerce.
United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935).  The question before this court, however,
is not the lands submerged by navigable waters passed to the states pursuant to the equal footing
doctrine, but whether the dry lands also passed to the states pursuant to the equal footing
doctrine. . . .
“[T]his rule represents the American decision to depart from what it understood to be the
English rule limiting Crown ownership to the soil under tidal waters.” Id., (emphasis added). 
Thus, states do not gain title to lands submerged by waters that are navigable-in-fact because the
original thirteen states gained those lands at the time of the revolution.  The original states could
not have gained title to these lands as an attribute of sovereignty since this American rule was
not developed until after the revolution.  Instead, all states gained title to lands submerged by
navigable waters because the Supreme Court decided that this was an appropriate extension of
what it understood to be the English rule of sovereign rights to submerged lands.
Briefly looking to the Supreme Court’s decisions indicates that it has held that tidal and
navigable waters pass to the states because it understood that, under the English common law,
the sovereign owned these lands as a public trust. . . . 
The Court extended this holding to the new states in Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S.
(3 How.) 212 (1845).  At issue in Pollard’s Lessee was whether, subsequent to Alabama’s
admission, the federal government could transfer title to lands that had been submerged by
navigable waters at the time of statehood.  Citing Martin v. Waddell’s Lessee for the proposition
that the original thirteen states owned the submerged lands for common use in their character as
sovereigns, the Court held that Alabama was also entitled to this attribute of sovereignty.  Id., 44
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U.S. (3 How.) at 229.  As this attribute of sovereignty, and its concomitant, title to the
submerged lands, transferred to the new states upon their admission, the federal government
could not subsequently transfer the underlying title to the submerged lands.  As in Martin v.
Waddell’s Lessee, the Court’s conclusion arose from its interpretation of the public trust imposed
on the sovereign, a trust requiring the sovereign to hold the navigable waters and submerged
lands open for public access.
In sum, these cases identify a coherent principle set forth by the Supreme Court that this
court must acknowledge.  Specifically, the attribute of sovereignty that is so identified with title
to submerged lands, the attribute of sovereignty that passed to the original thirteen states, is the
public trust to these lands. . . .
At least as important as this general principle underlying the Supreme Court’s decisions,
however, is that the Supreme Court has held that, title to lands that are not submerged navigable-
in-fact or tidal waters, including dry and fast lands, did not pass to the states upon admission.  In
addition to holding that “if the waters are not navigable in fact, the title of the United States to
land underlying them remains unaffected by the creation of the new state,” United States v.
Oregon, 295 U.S. at 14, the Supreme Court expressly held that title to dry lands does not pass to
states upon admission in Scott v. Lattia, 227 U.S. 229 (1913). . . .
As in Scott, the dry lands within Nye County are neither submerged by navigable nor
tidal waters.  Nye County has failed to offer any evidence suggesting that, at the time of
statehood, lands within Nye County were submerged by navigable or tidal waters.  The Court
has not held that the ownership of drylands, or lands submerged by non-navigable and non-tidal
waters, was an attribute of the original thirteen states’ sovereignty.  Rather, it has held that these
lands do not pass to states upon admission.  In sum, the entire eight of the Supreme Court’s
decisions requires a finding that title to the federal pubic lands within Nye County did not pass to
the State of Nevada upon its admission pursuant to the equal footing doctrine. . . .
More recently, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the broad power of the federal government
to retain and regulate public lands in Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976).  In that matter,
the Court stated that “while the furthest reaches of the power granted by the Property Clause
have not yet been definitively resolved, we have repeatedly observed that the power over the
public land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations.’” Id., at 539, (citing United States
v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940).  Given this interpretation, the court must conclude that
such a broad power to regulate land owned by the United States necessarily includes the power
to own the regulated public lands.
Authority to Manage the Public Lands
Prior to this suit, Nye County denied that the United States had any authority to manage
the public lands within its boundaries. . . . All parties, including Nye County, now agree with the
Supreme Court that
[a]bsent consent or cession a State undoubtedly retains jurisdiction over federal
lands within its territory, but Congress equally surely retains the power to enact
Ch 5 -27
legislation respecting those lands pursuant to the Property Clause.  And when
Congress so acts, the federal legislation necessarily overrides conflicting state
laws under the Supremacy Clause.
Kleppe, 426 U.S. at 543.  . . . 
Nye County argues, however, that merely recognizing that the local and federal
governments have concurrent jurisdiction of public lands is virtually meaningless.  The court
would tend to agree but for Nye County’s actions establishing that, prior to this suit, Nye County
refused to acknowledge the holding of Kleppe.  Those actions indicate that, as to Nye County, a
declaration is required to establish that the federal government has jurisdiction over the public
lands.  For example, Commissioner Carver, acting in his official capacity, filed an affidavit to
support a criminal complaint against the forest service employees, alleging that they lacked any
jurisdiction at a location within the boundaries of a congressionally-established national forest. 
On another occasion, the Nye County Board of Commissioners required the BLM to offer proof
that the federal government owns and has authority to manage public lands.  At the Jefferson
Canyon road reopening, Commissioner Carver drove the county bulldozer outside of the right-
of-way, damaging plant-life, disrupting the national forest, and ignoring the direct order of a
federal employee to stop.  That Nye County now voluntary concedes that the federal government
has authority over this land is insufficient to moot a question created by Nye County’s conduct,
although the court will consider the concession as tantamount to a consent to judgment. 
Accordingly, a declaration that the federal government has power to manage and regulate the
public lands within Nye County, just as it has power to regulate the public lands within New
Mexico, will not be meaningless.  Rather, it will resolve a dispute initiated by Nye County de-
spite clear law to the contrary. . . .
Constitutionality of Resolution 93-49
In Count IV, the United States seeks a declaration that Nye County Resolution 93-49 is
unconstitutional and preempted to the extent it applies to roads and other corridors for which no
valid right-of-way exists under federal law.  Nye County opposes the claim, asserting that
Resolution 93-49 is nothing more than a statement of opinion by the Board of Commissioners of
Nye County creating neither legal rights, duties nor obligations. . . .
Although Nye County now asserts that Resolution 93-49 created neither legal rights,
duties nor obligations, Nye County plainly intended that the resolution would have the effect of
law.  As an attempt to formally express the opinion or will of the Board of Commissioners, the
resolution offers only an example of poor writing.  Other than its title, the resolution does not use
any language suggesting it is an opinion, view, idea, or but employs language attempting to
create a legal right of Nye County in public roads.  It declares all ways, trails, roads, and
highways on public lands in Nye County to be Nye County Public Roads, declares the rights-of-
way for these Nye County Public Roads to be the property of Nye county, requires that the width
of all roads be as established by other ordinances, ratifies historic practice as a method of
establishing roads, and precludes any action against Nye County or its officers for damage
suffered on unmaintained roads.  And other than the last sentence indicating an ordinance would
follow, the resolution lacks any language of future intent or will.
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Neither is the subject of the resolution simply an alteration of administrative rules, a
censure, a vote of thanks, or a note of recognition, or an expression of intent to take future
actions.  Rather, the subject of Resolution 93-49 is one of general applicability, declaring County
ownership of existing federally recognized rights-of-way and declaring County ownership of
new rights-of-way that are not federally recognized.
In addition, Nye County has relied upon Resolution 93-49 in its chosen field of battle: the
reopening of roads.  On July 4, 1994, Commissioner Carver used a County-owned bulldozer to
reopen Jefferson Canyon road within the national forest.  A month prior to the reopening,
Commissioner Carver, apparently on behalf of Nye County, informed the forest service:  “As
you know, on December 7, 1993 the Board adopted Resolution 93-49 which declares certain
public travel corridors across public lands within Nye County as Nye County roads.  Jefferson
Canyon Road is one of the roads considered to be a Nye County public road.” . . .  This
statement and Commissioner Carver’s later actions to reopen the road on behalf of the County
strongly show that the County did not intend Resolution 93-49 to be merely a statement of
opinion. . . .
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff United States of America’s Renewed Motion for
Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to Count I and as to Count IV;
IT IS DECLARED that, as set forth, in this Court’s decision, the United States owns and
has the power and authority to manage and administer the unappropriated public lands and
National Forest System lands within Nye County, Nevada.
IT IS FURTHER DECLARED that Nye County Resolution 93-49 is invalid and
unenforceable to the extent, and only to the extent, it applies to ways, pathways, trails, roads,
county highways, and similar public travel corridors across public lands in Nye County, Nevada,
for which no valid right-of-way exists or is recognized under federal law.
__________________
Notes and Questions
1.  Place yourself in the position of a rancher who has a grazing allotment on BLM land
in Nevada and a CEO of a mining company with an unpatented mining claim within a national
forest in Colorado.  How would you feel about privatizing these federal lands?
2.  Preemption of State Law.  Kleppe v. New Mexico, relied upon by the judge in the Nye
County case, involved a state challenge to the constitutionality of the federal Wild Free-Roaming
Horses and Burros Act of 1971.  The statute declares that unbranded and unclaimed wild horses
and burros are “an integral part of the natural system of the public lands” and that their
management was necessary for “achievement of an ecological balance on the public lands.” 16
U.S.C. § 1331.  The act protects such animals on public lands of the U.S. from capture,
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harassment, and death.  After receiving a complaint from a rancher that numerous burros were
interfering with his livestock operation conducted on BLM land under a permit issued pursuant
to the Taylor Grazing Act of 1943, the New Mexico Livestock Board rounded up 19 burros on
federal land and sold them at public auction.  In upholding the 1971 act in Kleppe, the Supreme
Court said:
The Federal Government does not assert exclusive jurisdiction over the public lands in
New Mexico, and the State is free to enforce its criminal and civil laws on those lands
But where those laws are in conflict with the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act,
or with other legislation passed pursuant to the Property Clause, the law is clear: the state
laws must recede.
What development in the evolution of public land policy portends the result in Kleppe?  After
Kleppe, under what circumstances can states establish hunting seasons and require licenses for
hunting deer and ducks on federal lands within their borders?
__________________
2.  Collaborative Efforts
The shortcomings of litigation as a means of resolving environmental disputes spurred a
wide range of alternative approaches.  A very common one is place-based collaboration.  Such
undertakings have numbered in the hundreds and ranged from semiformal grassroots groups to
government-sponsored advisory councils.  While such efforts are quite diverse, almost all seek to
reach a consensus solution through deliberations that involve all stakeholders who are equally
empowered and fully informed.
For example, the Willapa Alliance is a nonprofit organization formed in 1992 to achieve
sustainable economic development of Washington State's Willapa Bay; its board includes timber
interests, anglers, members of the Shoalwater Tribe, and environmentalists.  The Animas River
Stakeholder Group was formed in 1994 to address toxic contamination of the Animas River in
southwestern Colorado; its members include representatives of mining corporations, federal,
state and local agencies, landowners and water users.  The New Mexico Water Dialogue is a
network of water management councils that grew out of a state directive to use local expertise in
water planning; representatives from Indian tribes, industry, private water companies, and
utilities sit on the Dialogue's board.
Many of the collaborative efforts concern public lands management.  The Applegate
Partnership in Oregon, the Flathead Forestry Project in Montana, and the Ponderosa Pine
Partnership in Colorado are notable examples.
The following selections present divergent views on such consensus-based efforts.
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Questioning Collaboration
Michael McCloskey, The Skeptic: Collaboration has its Limits,
28 HIGH COUNTRY NEWS 7 (May 13, 1996)
A new dogma is emerging as a challenge to us.  It embodies the proposition that the best
way for the public to determine how to manage its interest in the environment is through
collaboration among stakeholders, not through normal governmental processes.
Further, it proposes to do this at the community level through a consensus process. 
Advocates of this notion believe collaboration must be place-based, preferably at the scale of
natural units such as watersheds.  This idea is being applied both to managing natural resources
(national forests) and in determining allowable levels of pollution from industrial plants. . . .
Many community activists like these proposals; they see them as empowering.  Many
academics praise them, too.  And industry likes them.  They prefer dealing with community
representatives to having to duel with EPA experts at the national level, or with representatives
of national environmental groups.  One company spokesman recently told an audience:  “I don’t
want bureaucrats telling me how to run my business; I would far prefer to take my chances with
people from the community.”
At a recent conference I attended on this subject, I heard community activists from
Oregon’s Rogue River Valley complain bitterly that the national environmental groups were
cold-shouldering this process and missing a great opportunity.  Apparently we [the Sierra Club]
stayed out of the Applegate Partnership because of concerns over the implications of adaptive
management proposals for the national forest there.  But of six case studies examined, the Sierra
Club was not formally involved in any, nor were most other national environmental groups.
There are reasons for this.  Industry thinks its odds are better in these forums.  It is ready
to train its experts in mastering this process.  It believes it can dominate them over time and
relieve itself of the burden of tough national rules.  It has ways to generate pressures in
communities where it is strong, which it doesn’t have at the national level.
Some academics see the situation differently.  They draw a contrast between what they
call “solution-oriented” community groups that welcome this trend, and the national-level
environmental groups that they call “concern-oriented” groups, which they see as disagreeing
and holding back.  Obviously they imply that we resist solutions and only want to perpetuate
conflicts.
Enthusiasts make the case for reliance on stakeholder collaboration in these terms: 
Community-based stakeholder collaboration, they claim, will produce more creative and
acceptable solutions.  Participants will have a superior understanding of local site conditions and
will bargain with each other to produce “win/win” solutions.  Thus, they will overcome problems
with government by remote control, “one-size fits all” prescriptions, and unimaginative
bureaucratic responses.  By actively participating in finding solutions, buy-in by the community
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will be obtained; the ideas they forge will have political momentum.  This, they assert, adds up
to empowerment of communities that were formerly kept in a submissive position by agency
bureaucracies.
By moving beyond “failed adversarial approaches,” they argue, polarization and stress in
communities will be reduced and working relationships improved.  Trust among sectors of the
community will be increased.  Agencies will act more as facilitators and come to be trusted
more, too.  Community environmental activists also believe that the solutions will be better and
more sustainable.
However, many in our ranks have a different take on the impact of moving too far in this
direction.  They want to know whether these collaborators are acting in an advisory role with
respect to public resources or whether they are being given power.  The literature is obscure on
this key point.  The situation may be quite different where we are talking more about private
land (which timber companies don’t want to talk about).
A fundamental problem also lies in the disparate geographical distribution of
constituencies.  This re-distribution of power is designed to disempower our constituency, which
is heavily urban.  Few urbanites are recognized as stakeholders in communities surrounding
national forests.  Few of the proposals for stakeholder collaboration provide any way for distant
stakeholders to be effectively represented.
While we may have activists in some nearby communities, we don’t have them in all of
the small towns involved.  It is curious that these ideas would have the effect of transferring
influence to the very communities where we are least organized and potent.  They would
maximize the influence of those who are least attracted to the environmental cause and most
alienated from it.
Even in places where local environmentalists exist, they are not always equipped to play
competitively with industry professionals.  There may be no parity in experience, training, skills
or financial resources; parity is important both during negotiations and in follow-on phases
focusing on watchdogging agreements.  And we should all be mindful of the fact that these
processes are very time-intensive; they consume huge amounts of time, wear people down, and
leave little for regular environmental activism.
It is troubling that such processes tend to de-legitimate conflict as a way of dealing with
issues and of mobilizing support.  It is psychologically difficult to simultaneously negotiate and
publicly attack bad proposals from the other side.  This tends to be seen as acting in bad faith. 
Too much time spent in stakeholder processes may result in demobilizing and disarming our
side.
And, instead of hammering out national rules to reflect majority rule in the nation,
transferring power to a local venue implies decision-making by a very different majority – in a
much smaller population.  But it gets worse.  By then adopting a consensus rule for that
decision-making, small local minorities are given an effective veto over positive action.  Thus,
the process has the effect of disempowering both national as well as local majorities.  Those not
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represented by any organized interest in a community may be totally disempowered, and if the
status quo is environmentally unacceptable, this process gives small minorities a death grip over
reform.  Any recalcitrant stakeholder can paralyze the process and defy the popular will.  Only
lowest common denominator ideas survive the process.
__________________
The Limits of Confrontation
Ed Marston, Squishy-soft Processes – Hard results,
32 HIGH COUNTRY NEWS 9 (August 28, 2000)
In Nye, Mont., and in Paonia, Colo., two difficult disputes were recently resolved by
people sitting together at a table.  In Montana, the fight was about hardrock mining and 1,000
jobs.  In Colorado, it was about coal mining and several hundred jobs.  Each dispute involved
tens of millions of dollars in investment capital, public land and ways of life.
This is hardball stuff.  But an approach usually portrayed as squishy-soft – collaboration
– resolved the conflicts without lawsuits.  Moreover, the settlements added to the prestige and
clout of the two relatively small, local environmental groups that signed the agreements.
Coincident with these agreements, former executive director and chairman of the Sierra
Club, Michael McCloskey, now retired, has warned again, in recent talks and papers, that
widespread adoption of collaboration would betray democracy.  He said in one talk that wide use
of collaborative processes “would effect a massive transfer of power, a repudiation of the
progress of the past century, a collapse in environmental gains, and a grievous wound to the
practice of democracy.”
He says that collaborative processes also try to paper over what he sees as a vast chasm
between urban and rural people.  “It (the Sierra Club) knows that the rural-urban split has not
gone away – that the views, interests and aims of rural and urban populations will diverge
sharply.  It is not ready to surrender national interests in the environment to rural, local
interests.”
These attitudes do not just come from national groups.  The July 2000 newsletter of the
very local, very grassroots Hells Canyon Preservation Council also attacks collaboration. . . .
McCloskey and the Hells Canyon group both see loggers, miners and ranchers using the
Trojan Horse of collaboration to grab control of the West. . . .
What did the [two collaborations mentioned above] . . . just achieve?  In Montana,
politics prevents state environmental agencies from protecting water quality.  In Colorado, the
federal Bureau of Land Management and the Forest Service lacked the will to deal with railroad
noise and road blockage and other problems caused by underground coal mining.  In response to
this failure of government, two different environmental groups worked out direct agreements
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with the mining companies.  Both are hard-nosed contracts involving bonds, extra expenditures
by the companies, and long-term monitoring.
The mining companies didn’t lightly incur the added expense and the anger of their
fellow corporations.  They signed because they otherwise faced costly delays from appeals or
lawsuits brought by these groups based on state and federal laws.
But financial pain wasn’t enough to bring the two sides together.  These agreements were
possible because the environmentalists were worried not just about air and water and wildlife,
but also about jobs for those they live among.  In both cases, environmental passion was
intertwined with broader community concerns.
Despite the fact that local needs were met, no national or state laws were undercut, and if
anything, democracy was strengthened.  In Montana, the environmental standards were raised by
the contract between the four-decade-old Northern Plains Resources Council and a palladium
mining company.  (Palladium is used in automobile catalytic converters.)  In Colorado, the
Western Slope Environmental Resource Council negotiated an agreement with two coal
companies to ameliorate the off-site impacts.  (The coal in question is very low in sulfur, and
therefore desirable under air-quality standards.)
But legalities are not the only issue here.  McCloskey and the Hells Canyon group also
charge that collaboration undercuts the desires of the national owners of the federal lands.  They
have a point.  Most members of environmental groups, whether local or national, would
probably prefer to see no mining.  They want the federal lands to be pristine, as shown by the
Sierra Club vote demanding an end to logging on federal land.  This is probably where the
urban-rural divide is deepest, and where local environmental groups trying to bridge the divide
still find the most difficulties.  In addition, for ease of communication, it is easier for some
groups to  paint rural Westerners as all straining at the federal leash that prevents them from
cutting down the last trees, damming the last streams and overgrazing the last public grasslands.
. . . 
But there are also places where local environmental groups have learned what they can
and cannot win from warfare.  They also have a somewhat different view of the Interior West
than most of those who are only able to visit.  They understand that little of the rural West is
“pristine”; most of it, even beautiful places, has been burned and grazed and logged and plowed
in the past.  And because they live here, and have become attached not just to the land but also to
their neighbors, they are probably more willing to strike a different balance than those who love
the region but who do not live here.
So there’s an element of ingratitude.  For decades, local groups depended almost solely
on the national clout wielded by the major environmental organizations.  And now a few of
them, operating under the umbrella of this protection, are making their own arrangements.
It may be ungrateful, but it is also very healthy.  It means the West is maturing.  It is no
longer everywhere split into two warring camps where solutions can come only from Congress
or courts or the White House.  Agreements are possible on the ground.  One can argue over the
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details of those agreements.  But it’s a mistake to raise the stakes by saying that extractive
interests are grabbing control of the West, that environmental gains are being lost, and that
democracy is in peril.  Instead, in a few Western communities blessed with local leadership and
the right circumstances, citizens and companies have overcome personal and ideological
antipathy to strike an agreement well within our laws and practices and values.
Notes and Questions
1.  Which of the two views on collaborative processes, McCloskey’s or Marston’s, is
more persuasive to you?
2.  The Quincy Library Group.  Perhaps the best known of all the collaborative efforts is
one that began at the local library in Quincy, California, in the early 1990s.  Environmental
lawsuits to stop timber sales on national forests throughout the Sierra Nevada led to the adoption
of new forest management guidelines to protect the California Spotted Owl.  The guidelines
reduced timber harvests and seriously impacted the timber-dependent economy of the Quincy
area.  Local environmentalists, a county supervisor, and Sierra Pacific Industries – the largest
private landowner in the state –  gathered to hammer out an agreement.  The U.S. Forest Service
sent observers to meetings of the Quincy Library Group, but was not invited to participate in the
negotiations.  National environmental groups, such as the Natural Resources Defense Council
and The Wilderness Society, were also absent.  Timothy P. Duane, Community Participation in
Ecosystem Management, 24 ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY 771 (1997).
Since the Forest Service did not agree to QLG's final plan for management of the affected
national forests, it was necessary for Congress to act.  But the bill reported out of the House
Resources Committee included a provision not anticipated by the QLG: it exempted logging on
2.5 million acres from most federal environmental laws, including the National Forest
Management Act and the Endangered Species Act.  When Congressman George Miller (D-CA),
a strong environmentalist, objected, this "sufficiency language" was deleted.
Reportedly, the Quincy Library Group did not know about this effort to significantly
change their plan.  One leader, attorney Michael Jackson, was quoted as saying, "We just started
with a Republican bill because the Republicans control Congress."  One veteran political
reporter responded as follows:
Assuming sincerity, this betrays extraordinary naivete.  Miller, who has
been around Capitol Hill for a while, said there was nothing improvised about the
way the bill went through committee.  "It was a very carefully drafted piece of
legislation." he said.  According to Miller, the folks who put it together didn't
intend for it to be amended on the [House] floor.  They intended to pass it as it
came out of committee.
So Michael Jackson and his allies are the collaborationists who had to go
to Congress because they couldn't collaborate, who when they got to the big city
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were almost snookered out of their BVDs by the sharpies, who finally got their
behinds saved by the folks who annoy them most, and who haven't yet figured
that out.
Jon Margolis, How a Foe Saved the Quincy Library Group's Bacon, 115 HIGH COUNTRY NEWS
13 (Sept. 29, 1997).
3.  A participant in the complicated San Francisco Bay-Delta negotiations has observed,
"[C]onsensus works best when fear is equitably distributed."  Often the necessary "fear" is
generated by a species listing under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, examined in Chapter 6. 
One study of 105 instances of cooperative ecosystem management found that 81 percent
involved a listing of a local species under the ESA that generated uncertainty and a strong
incentive to reach agreement.  STEVEN L. YAFFEE, ET AL., ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES: AN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT EXPERIENCE 7 (1996).
4.  Often these collaborations utilize negotiation or mediation.  One author has pointed
out the shortcomings of these methods for the environmental stakeholder as follows:
One of the most seductive aspects of environmental mediation is its
apparent straightforwardness.  Negotiations give the appearance of being
something that any relatively intelligent person can do well.  In reality,
negotiating is a highly sophisticated and complicated art.
For the inexperienced, it is easy to get the impression that negotiation
simply involves sitting at a table and trading concessions with one’s opponents in
a relatively civilized manner.  In fact, however, good negotiators often view the
process as something akin to a long military campaign, where the side with the
most resources and the best strategies and tactics will come out the winner. 
Importantly, experienced negotiators have at their disposal a large number of
negotiating tricks and ploys designed to encourage their opponents to make poor
decisions.
On balance, environmental mediation is a process that should be
approached with much caution and skepticism.  In spite of the extravagant claims,
mediation’s potential is modest and its problems are many.  It is an intensely
political phenomenon – it contains its own political biases and it is inseparably
linked to all the power-plays and struggles over principles and values that
characterize environmental politics as a whole.
The fundamental flaw underlying any attempt to rely on dispute resolution
to resolve public policy conflicts is that such well-meaning efforts ultimately rest
on a false understanding of what politics is all about.  Politics is not simply about
communication, it is also about power struggles.  It is not only about common
interests, but about conflicting interests as well.  And it not only involves horse-
trading, but competition between conflicting values and different moral visions.
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DOUGLAS J. AMY, THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION (1987)
__________________
Section C.  The Reagan Assault
The Reagan Antienvironmental Revolution
SAMUEL P. HAYS, BEAUTY, HEALTH, AND PERMANENCE:
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1955-1985, 491 - 494, 497 (1987)
The presidential administration of Ronald Reagan brought a new era in environmental
affairs. . . .  Earlier Democratic and Republican administrations had responded to environmental
objectives with some degree of favor.  But the Reagan administration began with a pervasive and
determined commitment to turn the environmental tide.  Environmentalists were rejected as
legitimate participants in the give-and-take of public affairs.  The administration set out to undo
the environmental work of the preceding two decades of Republican and Democratic leadership.
Implicit in this radical thrust was an assumption that environmental objectives were not
deeply rooted in American society and politics but were the demands of a few environmental
leaders rather than of the greater public.  The environmental phenomenon, it was thought, could
be swept aside by vigorous presidential leadership.  The resulting drama tested the strength of
popular support for environmental objectives, which proved to be much greater than the
administration had anticipated. . . .
The direction of the Reagan antienvironmental drive became clear in the last few months
of 1980.  During the presidential campaign Reagan had made some strong antienvironmental
remarks that his campaign managers feared would alienate a substantial portion of the voting
public.  An advisory committee was formed of Republicans who had been prominent
environmental leaders in the early 1970s, many of them officials in the Nixon administration. 
Among them were Russell Train, who had been head of both the Council on Environmental
Quality and the Environmental Protection Agency; Nathaniel Reed, who had been assistant
secretary of the interior in charge of the national parks and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service;
and William Ruckelshaus, whom Train had succeeded as EPA administrator.  This group
provided the Republican campaign with a more positive environmental image.  It advised the
campaign managers and, after the election, started to shape an environmental program for the
new administration.
But the Reagan victory brought to the fore a set of advisers, who looked forward to an
opportunity to make extensive changes in public policy.  They viewed these former Republican
environmental leaders as “radical extremists,” turned aside their recommendations, and
established a new committee to redirect the future administration’s policies.  The new advisers
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cut off relationships not only with the leaders of citizen environmental organizations but with
these “moderate” Republican leaders as well.  Only later, after the new policies had created a
vigorous backlash, did Reagan’s advisers turn to them again.
There were three closely related aspects of the Reagan antienvironmental revolution:
ideology, the business community, and executive power.  The administration spoke through an
ideology intended to reduce governmental action and enhance the private economy.  The most
extensive expressions of this view came from the private enterprise “think tanks,” the American
Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation.  Regulatory activity and public landownership,
for example, were to be sharply reduced in order to promote private enterprise as a matter of
principle.  It would be difficult to identify in the American past so thorough an attempt on the
part of a presidential administration to apply a political ideology directly.
The business community was an equally important ingredient in the administration’s
antienvironmental drive.  For two decades it had led the opposition to environmental policies,
but it had been frustrated by the persistence of environmental objectives.  It had been galvanized
especially by the favorable environmental attitudes of the Carter administration, so that by 1981
it was primed to carry out a counteroffensive.  As the administration leaders clarified their
antienvironmental attitudes, leaders of the business community rushed to take advantage of the
opportunity.  The haste led to actions that generated a political backlash against business.  By
1984, opinion studies indicated that the public considered the business community to be less
reliable than environmentalists as a source of information and public policy.  Leaders in
Washington ranked business groups far below environmental ones in their effectiveness.
Enhanced executive power was also central in the Reagan antienvironmental revolution. 
If the administration were to forge rapid and fundamental change, it would do so not through
Congress or the courts but through executive action.  New policymakers would bring about new
policy and enhance executive authority in the face of the courts, Congress, and the agencies. 
One of the least observed of the changes in governance during the Reagan administration was
the growth of the power of the Executive Office of the President vis-à-vis other branches of
federal and state government.  The key to that change was the Office of Management and
Budget, which lay beyond the reach of agencies, courts, and Congress and sought to change
policy by both budgetary and nonbudgetary means.
  The central strategy in this drive was to change policy by changing policymakers. 
Hence Reagan’s advisers insisted that new appointees in the environmental agencies share in the
administration’s ideology.  In this they often relied on advice, and even lists of favorable and
unfavorable candidates, provided by those sympathetic to their objectives, such as a Heritage
Foundation and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. . . . 
   
While the Reagan administration attacked on a wide front in attempting to change
environmental policies, the central focus of its actions was the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB).  This agency had, over the years, been modified from an instrument largely to
shape budget presentations to Congress into a general tool of executive authority. . . .  The OMB
came to exercise approval over proposals to gather information, annual reports, initial
recommendations for agency action, and final regulatory proposals.  Although its actions were
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related to federal expenditure in some way, in a broader context they served primarily to provide
more centralized executive control.
. . . Throughout the Reagan administration, the implication of this remarkable long-term
constitutional change aroused some concern and comment in Congress and the media but did not
lead to major public debate.  Yet it constituted one of the most significant elements of the
Reagan antienvironmental revolution.
__________________
1.  Presidential Appointees and Policies
Law is, of course, critically important in protecting and restoring the environment.  But
the effectiveness of the statutes depends greatly on the individuals chosen to implement them. 
The next selection describes some of these officials who held positions in the first two years of
the Reagan presidency.  The second excerpt, by Professor Richard Lazarus, recounts their
legacy.
The Counterrevolution
PHILIP SHABECOFF, A FIERCE GREEN FIRE:
THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 203-210 (1993)
Whatever his motives, however, Reagan’s policies and especially his appointments
constituted the most organized, sustained, and virulent opposition ever encountered by the
environmental movement.  In effect, he gave a free hand to the many political appointees in key
positions throughout his administration who regarded environmental laws and values as an
impediment to the free-market system.  The tradition of bipartisanship in protecting the nation’s
environment was brought to an abrupt halt, at least in the executive branch – Congress for the
most part continued to cling to the environmental values it had discovered in the 1970s.  The
democratization of public lands and resources that had begun with Theodore Roosevelt and the
Progressive movement was thrown into reverse.  The counterrevolution had found its leader.
The Reagan environmental counterrevolution was made manifest in . . . one James Gaius
Watt.  . . .  Appointed by the newly elected President Reagan as Secretary of the Interior, Watt
had led a right-wing legal foundation [the Mountain States Legal Foundation] that represented
businesses in fights against government regulation.  He quickly became the leader and symbol of
the new administration’s efforts to halt and roll back federal activism in protecting the
environment. . . .  [H]e introduced policies aimed at transferring control of public lands and
resources to private entrepreneurs at a rate that had not been seen since the great giveaways of
the nineteenth century.
Like the administration he represented, Watt described himself as a conservative but
acted as a radical – radical since his actions marked a sharp departure from the national policies
Ch 5 -39
of previous decades.  Environmentalists, he frequently asserted, had caused the “pendulum” of
public policy to swing too far toward conserving and away from making efficient use of the
nation’s resources.  He questioned their motives, suggesting at one point that their real goal was
to overthrow the political system of the United States.  To assure continued economic growth
and protect national security, he repeatedly insisted, it was necessary to inventory all public
holdings and then transfer potentially productive holdings to the private sector so they could be
developed for the good of the nation. . . .
Mr. Watt, a Christian fundamentalist . . . was serenely confident that he was carrying out
the bidding of the Almighty.  Testifying before the House Interior Committee about why he was
speeding development of public lands and resources, he replied that there was no point in
conserving resources for posterity because “I do not know how many future generations we can
count on before the Lord returns.”  To members of another congressional panel he asserted that
he was changing land and resource policies so drastically because “failure to know our potential,
to inventory our resources, intentionally forbidding proper access to needed resources, limits this
nation, dooms us to shortages, and damages our right as a people to dream heroic dreams.” . . . 
Aggressive, bold to the point of recklessness, and clothed in impregnable self-
righteousness, Watt did not seek to build a consensus for his policies . . . .  Within weeks of
taking office in 1981, he announced that he would open the entire billion acres of the Outer
Continental Shelf to bidding, exploration, and drilling by oil companies.  He offered millions of
tons of publicly owned coal to mine operators at what an investigative commission later
determined were giveaway prices.  He did little to enforce the strip-mine law.  He tried,
unsuccessfully, to open wilderness areas to energy development and encouraged economic
activity in the federal wildlife refuges.  Consistent with his views that property is best used in
private rather than public hands, he declined to spend money authorized by Congress to buy
additional land for the National Park System.  He tried to make the National Park Service
subservient to political control and sought to give the private concessionaires who ran the hotels,
restaurants, and gift shops increased authority in operating the parks and making park policy.  He
pitched in enthusiastically to make a success of President Reagan’s “privatization” program – an
effort to sell off as much as 30 million acres of public lands as well as other property in order to
raise billions to lower the national debt.  When real estate operators made it clear that they did
not want so much property dumped on the market, and the privatization effort foundered, Mr.
Watt said he had never been in favor of the program.  He purged the Interior Department of civil
servants he considered ideologically out of step and boasted that he was forcing the bureaucracy
to “yield to my blows.”
. . . Watt’s agenda was also Reagan’s agenda.  His policies were faithfully tailored to
carry out the President’s plans for shifting the balance of power away from the public interest to
the private interest.  But Watt’s provocative style brought him wide notoriety and made him the
focus of much of the unhappiness and anger generated by the Reagan administration’s
environmental policies.  Within months, the National Wildlife Federation, the biggest and one of
the most cautious of the national conservation groups, whose membership included a large
proportion of Republicans, was calling for his resignation.  The Sierra Club and Friends of the
Earth circulated a nationwide petition for his removal, which attracted millions of signatures. . . . 
Although he had allies among the big western mining, ranching, and energy interests – the
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Sagebrush Rebels – and was supported by some western state governments, and although he was
popular among the ultraconservatives of the Republican Party, it was soon clear that Watt was a
political liability to the President.  By October 1983, he was forced by the White House to resign
amid a fire storm of criticism.
James Watt was only one of many Reagan appointees who had represented the interests
of the very industries they were intended to regulate and were ideological or financial allies of
those industries.  The environmentalists repeatedly charged that the President’s environmental
appointees were “foxes guarding the henhouse.”
As head of the EPA, Reagan installed Mrs. Anne M. Gorsuch – later Anne Burford after
she married Robert Burford, a rancher and mining engineer who came to Washington at the same
time to take over the Interior Department’s Bureau of Land Management.  Both had been
members of a clique, self-styled “the crazies,” within the Colorado state legislature, which
consistently fought against federal environmental regulation.  Both of them, along with Watt,
were recommended by Joseph Coors, the Colorado brewer, a friend of Reagan’s who had
extensive mining and energy interests in the West that made use of federal resources.  Coors was
a founder of the Mountain States Legal Foundation, which Watt had headed before taking over
the Interior Department.
A bright, articulate, and attractive woman with a manner that projected no-nonsense
efficiency, Mrs. Burford came to Washington with firm ideas about changing the environmental
policies of the federal government but virtually no knowledge about how the federal government
operated.  “She had no management experience, no experience in Washington, D.C., and no in-
depth knowledge of environmental policy,” said J. Clarence (Terry) Davies, an officer of the
Conservation Foundation who later became assistant administrator of the EPA for policy during
the Bush administration.  Upon assuming command of the EPA, Burford proclaimed that her
function would be to help advance the Reagan administration’s goal of “industrial
revitalization.”  She said that she wanted to ease the regulatory “overburden” that the
environmental laws had placed on industry and that she was not interested in how many cases
the agency filed against violators of the law because that amounted to no more than “bean
counting.”
Mistrustful of the career professionals on the agency’s staff, Mrs. Burford surrounded
herself with political appointees, many selected by the White House, who shared her ideological
perspective and, in many cases, came straight out of the industries the agency was intended to
regulate.  They included Robert M. Perry, who came from the Exxon Corporation, as general
counsel, and Frank A. Shepherd, a lawyer who represented General Motors, as associate
administrator for enforcement.  As special assistants she had Thornton Field and James
Sanderson, both lawyers who had represented the Coors interests.  Rita Lavelle, who had worked
as a public affairs executive for Aerojet General Corporation, which the agency was supposed to
be requiring to clean up its toxic wastes, was named assistant administrator in charge of the
agency’s toxic waste programs.  Many of the experienced career officials in the agency quit in
disgust or were forced to resign.  Those who remained hunkered down and tried not to do
anything that would arouse the ire of the political executioner.  A hand-lettered sign hanging in
the back of the office of a middle level official summed up the prevailing mood.  It said: “No
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Good Deed Goes Unpunished.”
Burford eventually came to appreciate the talent and dedication of the civil servants at
the EPA . . . .  By the time she did, however, it was too late.  Ideological arrogance, indifference
to due process, favoritism to industry, and the political appointees’ antagonism to regulation
soon led the agency into deep trouble.  Participants in a meeting in Burford’s office reported that
she had intimated to executives of an oil-refining company that they would not be prosecuted if
they ignored the rules requiring a reduction of lead in gasoline.  The agency planned to suspend a
regulation forbidding hazardous liquid wastes in landfills, allowing the disposal of such wastes
to continue, particularly in a landfill outside Denver which was heavily used by the Coors
Company to dump hazardous wastes.
In 1982, Congress began a series of investigations into the agency’s operations, most of
them concerning the Superfund law.  It found evidence of cronyism with industry, illegal private
meetings with representatives of regulated companies, and sweetheart deals in which chemical
waste dumpers were allowed to settle with the agency at a small fraction of what it would cost to
clean up the dangerous mess they had created.  When Mrs. Burford, acting on instructions from
the White House Office of Legal Counsel, refused to turn over documents sought by
congressional investigators, she was cited for contempt of Congress.
To borrow a phrase from the Watergate years, Mrs. Burford was left by the White House
to twist slowly, slowly in the wind.  The Justice Department told her it would not represent her
in the contempt proceedings, even though she had incurred the wrath of Congress by following
the orders of the President.  In March 1983, she resigned, at least temporarily broken in spirit. 
More than twenty other political appointees of the agency had to quit.  Rita Lavelle was
sentenced to six months in prison for lying to Congress, although of all the Reagan appointees at
the agency she was probably the most naive.  Burford and Lavelle both suspected that they bore
the brunt of the scandal because they were women.
By the time Burford departed, morale at the EPA was shattered.  Much of the
professional talent had left.  Its programs were in shambles.  Its credibility with Congress, the
media, and the public had evaporated.  The agency had certainly been taken off the back of in-
dustry.
But the dismantling of the environmental agency also produced a strong reaction from
Congress and from the American public, which continued to support environmental protection
even while it accepted other Reagan administration initiatives to reduce the size and scope of
government.  The scandal at the EPA proved to be the most serious political threat faced by
Reagan during his first term.  He was forced to bring William D. Ruckelshaus, the first EPA
administrator, back to the agency to restore order.  Ruckelshaus, who had resigned as Deputy
Attorney General rather than fire Watergate special prosecutor Archibald Cox during the 1974
“Saturday Night Massacre,” enjoyed a reputation for integrity and independence.  He managed
to bring a measure of stability to the agency and to reduce public distrust.  But serious, perhaps
permanent damage had been done to the EPA and its reputation.
Two years after she was forced from office, Anne Burford, still smarting from the shabby
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treatment she had received at the hands of the White House, said that the Reagan administration
“has no commitment to the environment and no environmental policy.”
It was not just the EPA.  In the Reagan years, most of the federal offices responsible for
the environment became foxes’ dens for profitmaking special interests.  These political foxes did
not have to sneak into the henhouses through a hole in the floor.  They were handed the key to
the front door and turned loose on the chickens. . . .
But it was the President’s power over the purse that proved most potent in bringing
environmental reform to a near standstill.  The Office of Management and Budget, presided over
in the early years of the Reagan administration by David Stockman, the “Wunderkind of budget-
cutting conservatives and mastermind of environmental deregulation,” enthusiastically set about
bleeding the already demoralized and undernourished EPA and conservation programs at other
agencies.  Denying the environmental regulators money and workers was sufficient to render
them weak and ineffective without changing the laws.
So enthusiastic was the budget office about slashing funds for the EPA that Anne
Burford, hardly a big-spending New Dealer, protested to the President.  In 1981, as the Reagan
administration was drawing to the end of its first year, Stockman and company proposed to hack
off more than a third of the environmental agency’s funds.  This was after Congress had just
given the agency a major new antipollution program to administer when it passed the Superfund
law.  Burford complained that a cut of that size would leave the agency incapable of carrying out
the programs mandated by statute and throw it into disarray.  By the end of Reagan’s first term,
the EPA budget, after discounting for inflation, was about where it had been a decade earlier
despite a much heavier work load required by new laws. . . . 
__________________
The Reagan Revolution That Wasn’t
RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 102 - 105 (2004)
Quite surprisingly at the time, the otherwise very popular President Reagan achieved
very little of his regulatory reform agenda in the area of environmental law. . . .
. . . Secretary Watt no doubt accomplished more of his agenda [than did Anne Burford] at
EPA.  He had previously worked at Interior and, therefore, knew how to accomplish bureaucratic
change more quickly.  Watt also knew that a secretary of the interior has a distinct policymaking
advantage over an EPA administrator because the relevant statutes had historically conferred on
the secretary considerable discretionary authority as manager of the nation’s public lands. 
Secretary Watt could accomplish substantial change without congressional agreement and often
in a less politically visible, decentralized fashion.  From this position, Watt expanded oil and gas
leasing on the outer continental shelf, accelerated mineral leasing of public lands, reduced land
acquisitions for national parks, and transferred more authority to private ranchers for the
management of federal rangelands.
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Watt did not achieve his more sweeping proposed reforms, however, because he failed to
anticipate the extent to which public land law had gradually changed during the decades
preceding his tenure, incrementally reducing the secretary’s discretionary authority.  By the time
Watt became secretary, the position no longer enjoyed virtually unchecked authority to manage
the public lands.  During the 1970s, Congress had added significant procedural and substantive
requirements to many public land laws, and the federal judiciary had displayed a willingness to
oversee the enforcement of those requirements.  As a result, although Watt certainly
accomplished more at Interior than [Burford] did at the EPA, his accomplishments, too, had a
surprisingly brief impact. . . .
Even more important, Congress enacted none of the Reagan administration’s proposals to
reduce the various federal environmental and natural resource laws.  Nor were any of the
administration’s formal efforts to reduce the reach of the environmental protection laws through
administrative and regulatory change enduring.  Many of these initiatives were so poorly
received when proposed that they were abandoned as soon as they were challenged.  Many other
policies resulted in lawsuits by environmental organizations and were ultimately struck down by
the courts.  The federal courts, especially in the years before Reagan’s own appointments to the
federal bench rose in their influence, included many judges generally sympathetic to the goals
furthered by the environmental laws of the 1970s.  These judges stood ready to guard against the
misdirection of environmental policies by the executive branch, striking down what they
perceived to be the Reagan administration’s flouting of federal environmental statutory
mandates.
To be sure, some of President Reagan’s proposed reforms survived political controversy
and formal legal challenge.  There was increased exploitation of natural resources on public
lands and on the outer continental shelf, and there were administrative changes to environmental
protection programs, including regulatory flexibility under the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts. 
The administration redefined the meaning of “source” under the Clean Air Act in a way that
permitted major sources of pollutants to increase some emissions without triggering the strictest
control requirements.  And the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers expanded the use of “nationwide
permits” under the Clean Water Act to allow for more development within wetlands in the
absence of individual permitting proceedings. . . .
Ironically, it might well be that more reforms intended to increase environmental law’s
flexibility and cost sensitivity would have been successfully adopted and implemented in the
absence of a Reagan presidency, because those measures could have been debated without the
tremendous political controversy surrounding Reagan’s environmental policies.  Even some
supporters of President Reagan have openly speculated that his environmental appointees
managed to retard any possible reform effort by discrediting their own initiatives. . . .
Simply put, officials in the Reagan administration struggled to sell any meaningful
reforms, regardless of their actual merits.  The mere association of the reform with the
administration tended to destroy its credibility, as both Watt and [Burford] further polarized
debates surrounding environmental matters.  No doubt for this reason, the harshest critics of the
early Reagan environmental policies were conservatives who had supported the significant
reforms that the administration itself had discredited.
Ch 5 -44
For these reasons, much of the last six years of the Reagan administration and the first
two years of the subsequent Bush administration, closing the 1980s, were marked by efforts on
the part of those administrations to distance themselves from the debacle of the first two years of
the decade.  To restore the credibility essential to the working of the EPA, President Reagan was
effectively compelled to turn to William Ruckelshaus in 1983. . . .  While Ruckelshaus was with
the timber industry when asked to return to the agency, he still possessed the stature and
credibility necessary for the position based on his successful term as the EPA’s first
administrator.  When Ruckelshaus quietly left the agency just before Reagan’s second
inauguration in January 1985, he was replaced by his deputy, Lee Thomas.  Thomas was not
nearly as well known as Ruckelshaus nationally, but he brought to the position a similar
reputation as a professional, nonideological administrator committed to responsible
implementation of the agency’s statutory mandates.
Secretary Watt’s successor, William Clark, was not nearly as well received as either
Ruckelshaus or Thomas, but he took care during his tenure at Interior to avoid the political
landmines both laid and set off by his predecessor.  The rhetoric of the Sagebrush Rebellion that
had dominated the 1980 campaign and the Reagan administration’s first heady months all but
disappeared.  Indeed, except as mere political rhetoric, such extravagant proposals lacked
substantial support even among many Republicans in the western United States.  Most
westerners enjoyed the substantial recreational opportunities offered on the public lands; those
opportunities, however, were at risk if those public lands either went into private ownership or
were managed pursuant only to state laws that lacked the kind of protection for recreational
interests found in federal law.  In addition, there was reason to believe that the federal
government’s selling off grazing lands might lead to less, not more grazing, because
environmental and recreational interests might be able to outbid ranchers for the property. 
Somewhat paradoxically, therefore, selling the public rangelands could have left ranchers worse
off, as they lost not only the subsidy of federal management, but even any possible right of
access.
__________________
Notes and Questions
1.  In your view, do the accounts by Shabecoff and Lazarus describe politics as usual – or
something more?
2.  The Land and Water Conservation Fund in the 1980s.  The Land and Water
Conservation Fund Act of 1965 was introduced in Chapter 1, Section C.  The following selection
describes how it fared under the Reagan administration.
. . . [T]he Fund is experiencing hard times.  Shortly after taking office in
early 1981, then Secretary of the Interior James G. Watt declared a moratorium
on spending moneys appropriated from the LWCF for further acquisitions,
despite a large backlog of tracts to be acquired pursuant to congressional
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authorization.  At the same time, the Reagan Administration unsuccessfully
proposed legislation to divert LWCF receipts into rehabilitation of park facilities. 
During 1983, the Administration continued its attempts to bar the states from
using any Land and Water Conservation funds and the moratorium confined
federal agencies' use of appropriated moneys to a limited range of emergency-like
situations.  In fiscal year 1983, the Department of the Interior failed to use $34.4
million that Congress had appropriated for purchase of national park lands alone. 
The Department's actions apparently fit a pattern of Reagan Administration
hostility to federal land ownership for public purposes.
Shortly after James G. Watt resigned as Secretary of the Interior in
November 1983, his successor, William P. Clark, announced that he was altering
the moratorium on acquisitions with LWCF money, but he did not repudiate it. 
Secretary Clark stated that he would request Congress to authorize spending $100
million to acquire national park inholdings and $57 million for national wildlife
refuges and wetlands.  The Secretary's brief announcement notwithstanding, the
available evidence indicates that the moratorium remains substantially in effect. 
Most notably, Secretary Clark has announced renewed acquisition activity for
only two of the four federal land systems that qualify for funds under the LWCF
Act, and then only for inholdings, although the LWCF can be used for additions
to existing units and for new units.  Moreover, the Secretary made no mention of
matching LWCF grants to the States, a major function of the LWCF program
before 1981.
Robert L. Glicksman and George Cameron Coggins, Federal Recreational Land Policy:  The
Rise and Decline of the Land and Water Conservation Fund, 9 COLUMBIA J. ENV'TL L. 125-127
(1984).
__________________
2.  Executive Office Oversight of Federal Agencies
The rapid growth of environmental regulation in the early 1970s prompted the Nixon
administration to institute a program to review federal agency rulemaking.  Every president since
has done so as well, and the breadth and stringency of such review has increased over time. 
These review programs consistently have been entrusted to the Executive Office of the
President, not the executive branch agencies themselves (although the latter may also have
separate internal review processes).  Under President George W. Bush, regulatory review
reached an unprecedented level.  Concerns have mounted that such oversight injects political and
ideological considerations into the process of rulemaking, thereby thwarting environmental
agency initiatives and congressional mandates requiring environmental protection.
To a greater or lesser extent, each president's executive review program incorporated
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cost-benefit analysis (CBA).  Cost-benefit analysis is widely used in public and private
decisionmaking and has been used for decades to evaluate projects and programs that have
environmental consequences, such as federal water resources projects.  Simply put, CBA
attempts to weigh the costs a policy, a proposed development project, or administrative rule is
likely to impose against the probable benefits of the policy, project or rule.  Under this
framework, those doing the evaluation rely on markets and hypothetical markets to put monetary
values on environmental and other affected resources.
Each administration has given its own name to its version of regulatory review. 
President Nixon sought to reassure the business community that environmental regulations
would be adopted only with its input.  In April 1970 – even before he formally proposed creation
of the EPA – Nixon issued an executive order creating the National Industrial Pollution Control
Council, comprised of sixty-three top corporate executives.  The Council was intended to allow
business to regularly communicate with the President, the new CEQ, and other officials
concerning environmental matters.  The Council regularly lobbied the White House to block or
weaken environmental regulatory proposals.
Nixon also created the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), renaming the former
Bureau of the Budget and assigning it the new role of conducting oversight of agencies.  He
established a “Quality of Life” (QOL) review program coordinated by the OMB that required
agencies to submit their proposed regulations for review by other federal agencies before
publication as draft rules.  The purpose was to ensure that consideration was given to the
economic impact of new regulations.  Although QOL review was supposed to apply more
broadly, only EPA regulations were actually subjected to such oversight.  President Ford
continued the QOL review program and, concerned about growing inflation in the economy,
broadened the type of analysis required to include “inflation impact statements.”
Under President Carter, the QOL program was discontinued.  It was replaced by a more
comprehensive regulatory review program established by Executive Order 12,044 issued in
March 1978.  This order required all executive branch agencies to prepare a “Regulatory
Analysis” for major regulations (usually those which would have an economic impact of $100
million or more).  OMB was given responsibility to ensure that agencies complied.  In contrast
to the QOL program, the Carter review process was designed to respect the rulemaking
procedures required by each agency’s statutory directives and the Administrative Procedure Act. 
Furthermore, under Executive Order 12,044, reviews occurred after publication of the proposed
regulation and summaries were available to the public.  The Carter administration program
emphasized consideration of alternatives – not unlike NEPA.  It encouraged agencies to choose
the least onerous regulatory approach, but did not mandate formal cost-benefit analysis.
In 1980, Congress enacted two statutes designed to reduce regulatory burdens on
business.  The Paperwork Reduction Act required that OMB review and approve all information
collection requests by agencies and created an Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA) within OMB.  The Regulatory Flexibility Act sought to reduce the impact of regulations
on small business.
Beginning with the Reagan Administration, executive office oversight of agencies
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expanded dramatically.  The following selection describes this more rigorous attempt to control
and reduce environmental and other regulation.
Checks without Balance
Robert V. Percival, Checks without Balance:
Executive Office Oversight of the Environmental Protection Agency
54 LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 127, 148-152 (1991)
. . . [Some observers] argue that the Reagan Administration’s hostility to federal
regulation was motivated by two principal ideas.  First, regulatory relief was perceived as a way
to stimulate the economy.  Second, President Reagan viewed government regulation as an
unwarranted intrusion into private conduct.  As a result, while previous regulatory review
programs had been motivated by concern for improving the quality of regulations, the Reagan
Administration’s principal objective was far more radical: to eliminate as much regulation as
possible.
On his first working day in office, President Reagan announced the formation of a
cabinet-level Task Force on Regulatory Relief chaired by Vice President George Bush.  The
Task Force was charged with developing a program to review new regulatory proposals,
reassessing existing regulations that were particularly burdensome to industry, and developing
legislative proposals “to codify the President’s views on the appropriate role and objectives of
regulatory agencies.”  Less than a week after its formation, the Task Force announced it was
suspending nearly 200 pending regulations.  Vice President Bush sent a letter to corporate
executives throughout the county asking them to identify existing regulations that were unduly
burdensome.  The Task Force used these responses during the next two years to develop a “hit
list” of 119 existing regulations identified as candidates for reconsideration.
On February 17, 1981, President Reagan issued an executive order that established the
basic structure of [his] regulatory review program . . . .  Executive Order 12,291 require[d]
executive agencies to submit all proposed rules and final regulations to OMB for prepublication
review.  Major rules, defined as rules with an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or
more, [were required to] be accompanied by a detailed cost-benefit analysis, known as a
regulatory impact analysis (RIA).  Agencies . . . submit[ed] RIAs and notices of proposed
rulemaking to OMB at least sixty days prior to publication of major rules.  For nonmajor rules,
all notices of proposed rulemaking and final rules [were] to be submitted to OMB at least ten
days prior to publication. . . . 
The Reagan program significantly departed from its predecessors in several important
respects.  First, it centralized power in OMB to an unprecedented degree.  Unlike previous
programs that authorized review only of selected regulations, the Reagan program required that
all proposed and final regulations be submitted to OMB for prepublication review.  Even more
significantly, the Reagan program purported to give OMB the authority to block publication of
regulations for an indefinite period of time while review was pending.  Unlike . . . reviews
[under President Carter’s program], which were conducted during the course of public
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rulemaking proceedings, the Reagan program directed agencies to “refrain from publishing” any
rule until OMB had completed its review.
Another significant feature of the Reagan program was that it established substantive
criteria for agencies to use in setting regulatory standards.  The criteria dictate that agencies
should not issue regulations unless their benefits exceed their costs, that agencies should choose
regulatory alternatives that involve “the least net cost to society,” and that regulatory priorities
should be set to maximize “aggregate net benefits to society.”  Unlike Reagan’s program, the
Carter Administration’s regulatory review program had encouraged agencies to develop cost-
effective regulations but had repeatedly emphasized that cost-benefit tests were not required.
Finally, the Reagan program was the first to attempt to effect a comprehensive relaxation
of existing regulations.  Agencies were instructed to suspend or postpone the effective date of
rules that already had been promulgated but not yet put into effect.  The majority of the 119
existing regulations on the “hit list” of regulations designated for reconsideration were
environmental or health and safety regulations.
Even more significant than the structure of the review program was the type of people
President Reagan appointed as agency officials responsible for implementing the “regulatory
relief” campaign.  By appointing persons philosophically hostile toward regulation, the President
ensured that his goal of “regulatory relief” would be zealously pursued.  It soon became apparent
that the new regulatory review process was well-designed to facilitate this goal because it gave
OMB unprecedented power over agency decisionmaking.
Despite the vigorous denials of its officials, OMB  . . . acquired virtual veto power over
regulations . . . .
Like the QOL preview process, the Reagan program sought to shield regulatory reviews
from public view.  By directing OMB to conduct its review prior to publication of proposed
regulations, the executive order deprived the public of an opportunity to learn the unfiltered
views of the agency.  Unlike the . . .  [Carter] program, which produced public reviews, under
the Reagan program documents reflecting OMB’s reviews were not incorporated into the public
record, even in rulemakings under the Clean Air Act where Congress had explicitly required it. .
. .
The Reagan Administration’s regulatory review program was, at the least, highly
controversial.  Former EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch Burford, originally an enthusiastic
promoter of the program, later testified that while presidential oversight of rulemaking is
appropriate, “there were some serious abuses” by OMB.  The Reagan Administration’s single-
minded emphasis on regulatory relief is now widely viewed as a critical mistake that forfeited a
rare opportunity for achieving truly beneficial regulatory reform.
Critics of the Reagan program charge that it illegally delayed EPA promulgation of
regulations, displaced EPA decisionmaking authority, subverted statutory standards, and
excluded the public from full participation in the regulatory process.  These and other criticisms
contributed to the atmosphere of scandal that surrounded EPA, culminating in the mass
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resignation of agency officials, including Administrator Burford, in 1983.  Burford was replaced
by former EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus.
In response to questions submitted during the confirmation hearings for his return to
EPA, Ruckelshaus emphasized that OMB would not interfere with his ultimate decisionmaking
authority.  While Ruckelshaus is generally credited with restoring some measure of public
confidence in EPA, he did not succeed in insulating EPA from OMB’s substantial influence.  For
example, Ruckelshaus’s plan to propose a modest acid rain control program was vetoed after
OMB Director David Stockman ridiculed it by arguing that it would cost several thousand
dollars per pound of fish saved.
While continuing opposition to new regulatory initiatives, the Reagan Administration
gradually abandoned its ambitious plans for regulatory relief.  On August 11, 1983, the Task
Force announced that it was disbanding, claiming that its actions would save business,
government, and consumers more that $150 billion over ten years.  Although the Task Force
announced that the Reagan Administration would not concentrate on changing the regulatory
statutes, the administration subsequently failed to pursue significant changes in the
environmental laws.  Later that year, an omnibus regulatory reform bill that would have codified
regulatory review procedures passed the Senate but died in the House.  This ended the
administration’s hopes for legislation endorsing its regulatory relief objectives.
__________________
Early in his administration, President Bill Clinton revoked the two Reagan-era executive
orders.  In September 1993, Clinton issued Executive Order 12,866 establishing a new and less
intrusive process for regulatory review.  This order limited OIRA’s review to “economically
significant” regulatory measures (those with an impact on the economy of $100 million or
more), rules which were inconsistent with action taken or planned by another agency, rules
which materially altered the budgetary impact of grants, loans, or entitlements, and rules that
raised novel legal or policy issues.  Under the Reagan orders, OIRA reviewed between 2000 and
3000 rules per year; under the Clinton order, it reviewed between 500 and 700 per year.
Executive Order 12,866 also streamlined agency rulemaking by requiring that OIRA
generally complete its review within 90 days.  The Clinton order also increased transparency in
the regulatory process by requiring both regulatory agencies and OIRA to disclose certain
information about the conduct of reviews.
The web of requirements governing federal regulatory processes expanded in the 1990s
through congressional action.  The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of
1996 amended the Regulatory Flexibility Act, noted above, by requiring EPA and the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to create review panels to assess the
impact of major rulemaking on small business; the panels include representatives from OMB and
the Small Business Administration.  Also in 1996, Congress enacted the Congressional Review
Act, which created a mechanism for Congress to veto new agency regulations.  Finally, the so-
called Stevens Amendment to the 1997 Treasury and Postal Appropriations Act directed OMB to
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submit to Congress an annual report on the total costs and benefits of federal regulatory
programs and to detail the impact of the rules on the private sector in all levels of government. 
OMB was also required to identify for Congress regulations it deemed ineffective.
During the administration of George W. Bush, the presidential role in managing agency
rulemaking increased significantly.  In January 2007, Bush issued Executive Order 13,422,
which substantially amended President Clinton’s 1993 order.  The Bush order requires that
agencies identify in writing a specific “market failure” or other problem that warrants each new
regulation, mandates that the regulatory review office in each agency be headed by a presidential
appointee to ensure that the president’s views are reflected in rulemaking, and requires agencies
to provide their best estimate of regulatory costs and benefits of all the rules they expect to call
promulgate during the coming year.  A bulletin issued at the same time expanded OIRA review
to include for the first time thousands of “significant guidance documents” issued by agencies
each year.  The Bush initiatives are debated in the following excerpt.
Perspectives on the Bush Executive Order
That Regulatory Review Order: Who Benefits, and at What Cost? 
Environmental Law Institute, THE ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM 46, 48-49 (March - April 2007)
Paralysis: Real Consequences, for Real People by Gary D. Bass, Executive Director of
OMB Watch, a nonpartisan, nonprofit government watchdog organization in Washington, D.C.:
More than just a power grab, the changes President Bush implemented with his newest
amendments to Executive Order 12866 and his bulletin requiring the Office of Management and
Budget to review agency guidance documents have larger consequences.  The requirement to
conduct market failure assessments adds more layers of analysis for agencies – a paralysis by
analysis.  The requirement to have political appointees oversee all steps in the regulatory process
allows politics to trump science and shape-shift the regulatory process in ways that can benefit
regulated interest.  The requirement for OMB review of thousands of agency guidance
documents means massive delay in providing advice to regulated industries and further shifts
agency discretion to the White House.  Each of these actions upsets the constitutional balance
between Congress and the presidency, in pursuit of the administration’s goal of a “unitary
executive.”
Congressional delegation of regulatory powers to agencies puts Congress in the role of
overseeing the implementation of legislation.  OMB’s review process is already so cumbersome
that the only real effect of requiring guidance documents to go through the same process is to
delay implementation and usurp congressional mandates by allowing OMB to decide which
actions go forward. 
The same impact results from placing presidential appointees in agency positions with
the power to quash regulations.  This also raises an interesting separation of powers question:
should these people be subject to Senate confirmation if they no longer report to the agency
heads but to OMB and thus the White House?
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Strikingly, the president is requiring a market failure analysis when agencies contemplate
whether to regulate, even though Congress has not required such criteria.  In fact, Congress often
imposes other criteria, such as best available technology.  While [in mid-2007] we must wait to
see what guidance OMB provides to agencies on how to implement this requirement, it is clear
that this will be one more barrier to issuing sensible safeguards.
We, the people, are the ones hurt most by this regulatory chokehold.  In the end, less
regulation means less protection.  Instead of having a regulatory cop on the beat, we will have
none.  Instead of addressing regulatory gaps, we will operate based on whether these gaps have
political consequences.  This will worsen an already untenable situation, where government
doesn’t act until there is national news about people being hurt, or even worse, dying.
There is real danger to our constitutional system from this arrogation of power.  Equally
significant, however, is the danger to the American public from the delay or refusal to regulate
dangerous activities.  Every year, foodborne illnesses kill an estimated 5,000 people and sicken
76 million.  Nearly 6,000 workers die from injuries on the job, with an additional 50,000 to
60,000 killed by occupational disease.  And asthma – linked to air pollution – is rising
dramatically, afflicting 17 million, including six million children.
There are real consequences from regulatory action and inaction.  Our government
should be doing more, not less, to protect the public.  The executive order amendments and good
guidance directive move us in the wrong direction.
Down with the Divine Right of Bureaucrats! by Bill Kovacs, Vice President,
Environment, Technology & Regulatory Affairs, at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in
Washington, D.C.:
President Bush’s executive order on guidance review draws hysterical cries from the so
called “public interest groups” who claim the nation’s chief executive is somehow abusing his
authority by interfering with the decisions of EPA to protect health and safety.  Moreover, by
exercising greater control over agency rules they reason somehow that democratic
decisionmaking is being harmed.  Such reasoning ignores the fact that we elected the president
to be our chief executive office and neither our Constitution nor laws provide veto power to
bureaucrats.
For decades the president through executive order and Congress through numerous
statutes have tried (and largely failed) to gain some control over the federal agency regulation
mill, which has spewed out over 110,000 regulations and 4,000 new regulations annually – and
hundreds of thousands of guidance documents.  The people who elected the president and
Congress have to deal with this massive amount of detail.  Imagine being a small business and
having every day to deal with hundreds of new pages of the Federal Register and worrying about
incomprehensible regulations, covering health care, pensions, environmental and labor
standards, the transportation of product, privacy, immigration, and taxes to name only a few
areas of federal regulation.  The bureaucrats have seized this mass of detail, claim it as their
domain, and along with their interest group supporters cry foul if an elected official attempts to
override their decision.
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If anything is a threat to democracy it is a legal system that is incomprehensible, for it
puts Kafka type powers in the hands of unelected persons and grossly distorts the nation’s ability
to prioritize the use of our resources to provide the greatest amount of health and safety.  When
all risk is equal and regulations so numerous and complex, we squander our resources on trivial
pursuits.
The president’s executive order merely requires employees of the federal government,
before issuing a new regulation, to identify the specific problem they intend to address and the
cost of the regulation and all other regulations issued by that agency, so as to enable the
president to assess if the new regulation is warranted.  And yes, the president is appointing a
regulatory policy officer for each agency to ensure that his executive order and guidance
requirements are carried out as he has set forth.
Last checked, our Constitution provides for an elected president to execute the laws of
the United States, including the appointment of inferior officers to help him execute the laws. 
The election of the president is a political process, and once elected the chief executive uses the
bureaucracy to execute the laws, which is a discretionary process, since it involves human
events.  For public interest groups to somehow claim that executive orders pervert the political
system implies that bureaucrats have some policymaking power that the president cannot
control.  This nation fought a revolution to eliminate the Divine Right of Kings and now is not
the time to establish the Divine Right of Bureaucrats.
Notes and Questions
1.  Who do you think makes the better argument, the director of OMB Watch or the vice
president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and why?
2.  Referring to OMB's Office of  Information and Regulatory Affairs during the George
W. Bush Administration, a Senior Attorney with the Natural Resources Defense Council has
said, "OIRA may be the most antidemocratic institution in government."  ROBERT F. KENNEDY,
JR., CRIMES AGAINST NATURE 59 (2004).  What is the basis for this claim?
3.  Cost-benefit analysis is a standard part of most environmental policy decisions today. 
For example, CBA is at the center of EPA decisions to ban products that contain asbestos or to
reduce the amount of lead in gasoline, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers proposals to build a dam
or navigation improvements, and Forest Service land management planning.
Yet cost-benefit analysis has been criticized for decades.  The principle critique is
capsulized as follows:
The basic problem with narrow economic analysis of health and
environmental protection is that human life, health, and nature cannot be
meaningfully described in monetary terms; they are priceless.  When the question
is whether . . . to destroy a natural resource . . . [and] when harms stretch out over
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decades or even generations . . . then we are in the realm of the priceless, where
market values tell us little about the social values at stake.
. . . [T]here are many useful insights about these questions from the field
of economics.  But there is no reason to think that the rights answers will emerge
from the strange process of assigning dollar values to human life, human health,
and nature itself, and then crunching the numbers.
FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING
AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 8 (2004).
Professor Jim Salzman and others have described the various methodologies used in cost-
benefit analysis to place a price on things not directly exchanged in markets:
. . . These include contingent valuation (asking how much people would
be willing to pay for various environmental goods and services, hedonic pricing
(assessing how particular environmental amenities, such as proximity to a
wetland, affect market prices), replacement cost (how much it would cost to
replace the degraded ecosystem service, etc.  All of these methodologies have
shortcomings.  In contingent valuation studies, for example, how the question is
framed can significantly change the values given and, more fundamentally, when
respondents are asked their willingness to accept a payment to degrade a
resources instead of their willingness to pay to protect the resource, the value for
willingness to accept is higher . . . .  Thus while all of these techniques provide
numbers, there is considerable debate over whether the numbers are accurate . . . .
JAMES RASBAND, JAMES SALZMAN, AND MARK SQUILLACE, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND
POLICY 20 (2004).
__________________
In late 2000, Congress quietly enacted the following statute as a two-paragraph rider
concealed in an appropriations bill.
The Information Quality Act of 2000
44 U.S.C. § 3516, note
(a) In General. – The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall, by not later
than September 30, 2001, and with public and Federal agency involvement, issue guidelines . . .
that provide policy and procedural guidance to Federal agencies for ensuring and maximizing the
quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity of information (including statistical information)
disseminated by Federal agencies in fulfillment of the purposes and provisions of . . . the
Paperwork Reduction Act.
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(b) Content of Guidelines. – The guidelines under subsection (a) shall – 
(1) apply to the sharing by Federal agencies of, and access to, information
disseminated by Federal agencies; and
(2) require that each Federal agency to which the guidelines apply –
(A) issue guidelines ensuring and maximizing the quality, objectivity, utility, and
integrity of information (including statistical information) disseminated by the
agency, by not later than 1 year after the date of issuance of the guidelines under
subsection (a);
(B) establish administrative mechanisms allowing affected persons to seek and
obtain correction of information maintained and disseminated by the agency that
does not comply with the guidelines issued under subsection (a); and
(C) report periodically to the Director – (I) the number and nature of complaints
received by the agency regarding the accuracy of information disseminated by the
agency and; (ii) how such complaints were handled by the agency.
__________________
The Origins and Implementation of the IQA
THOMAS O. MCGARITY, SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, RENA I. STEINZOR,
JOANNA GOGER AND MARGARET CLUNE, TRUTH AND SCIENCE BETRAYED:  
THE CASE AGAINST THE INFORMATION QUALITY ACT
Center for Progressive Regulation Publication #502, 2-3, 5-8, 10 (March 2005)
There were no hearings on [the IQA] . . . and no one referred to them during the debate
on the larger bill.  The terse statutory language and absence of legislative history support the
conclusion that Congress did not intend the IQA to serve as a kind of “uber statute” providing
OMB with the overarching authority to deflect agencies from their statutory responsibilities to
implement the country’s health, safety and environmental laws.
In February 2002, OMB issued guidelines to agencies regarding how to implement the
Act.  Even though the only explicit congressional directive was a mandate to issue guidelines on
agency implementation of data correction procedures, OMB read these ministerial
responsibilities extremely broadly, creating out of whole cloth a lengthy set of guidelines
defining terms, mandating that agencies adopt or adapt standards for risk information used for
purposes of the Safe Drinking Water Act for all health, safety, and environmental information,
providing assumptions about peer review, providing criteria for handling information deemed
“influential,” and creating an agency appeal procedure that is no where mandated in the statute. 
After seeking public input, agencies adopted their own guidelines to implement the rider.
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The IQA was sponsored by Representative Jo Ann Emerson (R-8th MO), but was the
brainchild of Jim Tozzi, a former OMB-official who parlayed an intimate knowledge of the
regulatory process and a willingness to advance the interests of risk-producing corporations in
the tobacco, plastics, and paper industries into a multi-million dollar conglomerate of consulting
firms and tax-exempt nonprofit “public interest” groups.  Tozzi frequently brags that he was the
author of the Act and has also publicly acknowledged broad industry support for its provisions,
which industry values as an effective mechanism for slowing or stopping expensive regulation.
. . . Over last two decades, [Tozzi’s] clients have included a broad spectrum of industries
who share a combined interest in reigning in regulatory agencies, including tire and auto
manufacturers, the lead industry, the plastics industry, the pharmaceutical industry, pollution
equipment manufacturers, and, most lucrative of all, the tobacco industry.
. . . After Congress passed the 1995 Paperwork Reduction Act Amendments and the 1996
Congressional Review Act, Tozzi created the Center for Regulatory Effectiveness (CRE) to
serve as a “shadow OMB” . . . .
[Tozzi prepared a data quality ruled that, after he sent to OMB after clearing it with his
client, the Phillip Morris Co.] . . . [However, t]he Clinton Administration’s OMB had no interest
in Tozzi’s rather officious attempt to prod it into unnecessary action.  Undeterred, Tozzi began at
the outset of the 2000 election year to press the initiative further, hoping that a new
administration would likely be more sympathetic if the Republican Party regained control of the
White House.  In a letter to Phillip Morris, Tozzi laid out a schedule for implementing this
strategy.  CRE would initiate discussions with industry stakeholders in February and with federal
agencies in July.  In December, the industry group would initiate discussions with the
“Transition Team of the New Administration” in anticipation of presenting new regulations to
the new OMB by February, 2001.  By July 2001 OMB would have adopted regulations or CRE
would begin “initiation of judicial action.”
Tozzi could, of course, greatly enhance his chances of success, whether or not the
Republicans won the election, by persuading sympathetic congressperson to include in the
appropriations bill for FY 2001 language explicitly requiring OMB and the regulatory agencies
to promulgate data quality guidelines and providing for a petitions process.  Tozzi did exactly
that.  He persuaded Rep. Jo Ann Emerson (R-Mo.) to insert language almost identical to the
language in the House Report for the 1999 appropriations bill itself.  Sandwiched between a
property acquisition appropriation for the Gerald R. Ford Museum and a provision relating to the
nonforeign area cost-of-living allowances, the so-called Information Quality Act came into
being.
President Clinton signed the appropriations bill on December 21, 2000.  Armed with
statutory language, . . . and looking forward to a much more sympathetic hearing from a new
Administration, Tozzi proceeded forward on almost precisely the schedule he had recommended
to Philip Morris and his other clients at the end of February the preceding year.  Tozzi probably
did not anticipate, however, the enthusiasm with which the new Administration would embrace
his brainchild.  As these suspicious origins reveal, the IQA was developed at the behest of
industry by an individual who founded an organization that now routinely files petitions under
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the Act.
Tozzi and his industry clients pushed for data quality legislation because of what they
perceived as a worrisome movement towards “regulation by information,” whereby government
agencies provide access to information on the activities of regulated entities through the Internet
and other media.  These concerns are best exemplified by the tobacco industry’s concerns . . .
that OSHA, other government entities, and even private entities would take measures to ban
smoking in public places as a result of the release of EPA’s risk assessment on second-hand
smoke.  According to CRE’s Legislative Working Papers maintained on its website, “[f]ederal
information dissemination has the potential to act as a type of indirect regulation by persuading
citizens and non-Federal political entities to take political action based on such information. 
Tozzi described the dissemination of information through the internet as a “backdoor Federal
Register,” and he proposed the IQA to ensure that risk assessments and other agency
disseminations would not improperly influence the regulatory process.
. . . [T]he Information Quality Act legislation was also viewed as a means to attack new
or cutting edge science, assumptions about uncertainty, and policy judgements that are
unfavorable to industry.  Directives to agencies regarding how to regulate in the face of
uncertain or incomplete information are contained in our health, safety, and environmental laws,
but direct attempts to weaken these statutes as well as efforts to pass legislation requiring peer
review of regulatory information and mandating other procedural requirements for agency
decisionmaking have failed in recent years.  Thus, the IQA was viewed as a necessary view
called to challenge the preventative assumptions set forth in our environmental, health, and
safety laws and attempts to take on those statutes directly or to impose other procedural hurdles
have failed. . . .
A Solution in Search of a Problem
At the time of its enactment, there was not, by any stretch, a consensus that the IQA was
necessary.  There was no evidence that existing mechanisms for the correction of information
were inadequate, nor was there any extensive evidence that agency information was flawed and
in need of correction.  In addition, the lack of any debate, hearing, or discussion regarding the
legislation make it impossible to suggest that members of Congress had reached any type of
consensus that the legislation was necessary.  The use of the best available data and analysis by
the federal government is crucial, especially when the government is disseminating information
to the public.  However, a statute that purports to achieve such a goal when there is a proven
need and where existing mechanisms are in place to ensure reliable information is, at best,
redundant and, at worst, another tool to limit public access to critical information and to stymie
efforts to protect health, safety, and the environment. . . . 
In its own IQA Guidelines, EPA described the extensive pre-existing procedures it had in
place to ensure information quality.  EPA’s eight-step Agency-wide Quality System “helps
ensure that EPA organizations maximize the quality of environmental information, including
information disseminated by the Agency.”  This system extends to EPA contractors and other
government agencies receiving assistance from EPA through interagency agreements. 
Furthermore, to ensure that their scientific assessments are competent, EPA and other agencies
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already had mechanisms in place for both internal and external peer review. . . .  EPA also has an
established mechanism for error correction.  Through this mechanism, called the Integrated Error
Correction Process, members of the public can notify EPA of potential errors in data
disseminated by the agency, including data on EPA’s website.  This process appears to be
working well, and has received few reported errors in agency information. . . . 
In addition to the fact that there existing mechanisms in place for the correction of
information, there is very little evidence that poor-quality science has been used to support
regulation.  According to Professor [Wendy] Wagner, “despite the thousands of public health
and safety regulations promulgated annually, there are surprisingly few examples of EPA using
unreliable science or using science inappropriately to support a final regulation.”  Studies
commissioned by the EPA over the last decade including Strengthening Science at the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, have identified very few problems with the quality of agency
science. . . .
Finally, agency decision-making with respect to rulemaking has since 1946 been
governed by procedures set in place by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).  Under the
APA, agencies are required to provide the basis for proposed rules, including any scientific
basis, to provide notice and an opportunity for comment, and to respond to those comments
when a final rule is adopted.  The involvement of the courts in reviewing rulemakings and
ensuring that the public has an opportunity to comment adds an additional layer of oversight of
agency dissemination of information.  As CPR Scholar [and Professor] Sidney Shapiro . . .
explains, with these protections in place for regulatory information used in the rulemaking
process, the IQA is redundant. . . .
OMB’s Grand Implementation Scheme
In the two years since IQA petitions began to stream into federal agencies, industry and
trade organizations have expansively interpreted the rider, arguing that it provides an open-ended
remedy to them for government information that they believe to be of insufficient quality. 
Indeed, industry groups have used the new procedures in a strategic manner to slow, or even
stop, the release of information that is embarrassing or politically inconvenient to them.  The
vague nature of the legislation and OMB’s efforts to fill that void with its guidelines invite such
challenges.  As a result, the Act has become a vehicle for industry and their allies to circumvent
the mandates set forth in our substantive environmental, health, and safety laws and to challenge
basic assumptions about protection and precaution that are established in those statutes.  Rather
than seeking the correction of factual information, the majority of petitioners are seeking to
challenge policy decisions and judgements. . . .
The guidelines issued by OMB under the IQA in February 2002 are much broader than
the language of the statute allows.  Even more disturbing, the guidelines create mandates on
federal agencies that are found nowhere in the language of the Act, nor could they be found in
the non-existent legislative history for the Act.  Moreover, OMB has used the IQA as the basis
for mandating government-wide peer review procedures, despite the fact that the IQA makes no
mention of peer review.  Indeed, Congress has explicitly rejected attempts to pass legislation
mandating government-wide peer review.
Ch 5 -58
Broad Definitions
The OMB guidelines set out to define many of the terms that are used, but not defined, in
the Act itself.  The Guidelines define “information” in a way that includes almost anything
disseminated by the agency except for “someone’s opinion[s],” thus taking a broad interpretation
that extends well beyond data and facts.
Borrowing Restrictive Language
In its guidelines, OMB established additional data quality requirements for information
determined by the agency to be “influential,” meaning that the information “will have or does
have a clear and substantial impact on important public policies or important private sector
decisions.”  With respect to this “influential” category of information, the guidelines require that
the information be presented with sufficient transparency to ensure that qualified third parties
can reproduce it.  In addition, OMB established more onerous and detailed requirements for
analyses of risks to human health, safety and the environment maintained or disseminated by
agencies.  With respect to this category of risk information, the OMB guidelines require that
agencies “adopt or adapt the quality principle applied by Congress to risk information used and
disseminated pursuant to the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996.”  Nowhere does
the IQA suggest or require that such separate categories of information be established, or that
such categories be subjected to more rigorous data quality requirements.  Nevertheless, this
requirement for risk information had been on [OMB Director] John Graham’s agenda since the
beginning of his tenure with the Bush Administration, and the IQA became the vehicle that
Graham could eventually use to impose such a requirement.  In a September 20, 2001
Memorandum from Graham to the President’s Management Council, Graham recommended
“that each agency consider adopting or adapting [SDWA] standards for judging the quality of
scientific information about risk it uses and disseminates.”  Graham ultimately used the IQA
guidelines as the vehicle for making this recommendation mandatory despite the lack of
Congressional authority for such a requirement in the IQA itself.
Peer Review
The OMB Guidelines also provide a rebuttable presumption that information that has
been subjected to formal, independent, external peer review will “generally be presumed to be of
acceptable objectivity.”  Using its IQA Guidelines, OMB issued in September 2003 a set of
prescriptive procedures for the conduct of peer review by federal agencies that would require an
additional layer of review for a broad range of scientific information and assessments.  The
proposal was revised in April 2004 in response to criticism by environmental and public health
advocates as well as scientific organizations.  The Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer
Review, issued in December 2004, remains a concern because of its breadth and potential to
delay the regulatory process.  The IQA says nothing about peer review, and efforts to impose
such broad requirements across federal agencies have repeatedly failed in Congress throughout
the last decade.  Nonetheless, through its IQA Guidelines and associated bulletins, OMB has
created this additional and potentially onerous burden for broad categories of scientific
information disseminated by federal agencies.  While peer review of scientific and technical
information supporting regulation is a part of our regulatory process in certain circumstances,
Ch 5 -59
including for example, EPA’s Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee which reviews EPA’s
National Ambient Air Quality Standards under the Clean Air Act, OMB’s broad mandate would
seek to impose these processes in a manner that could result in delays for efforts to protect health
and the environment.
Several petitions have already sought to invoke the peer review guidelines recently
proposed by OMB.  CRE’s recent petition challenging the proposed listing of diisononyl
phthalate, a chemical used in plastics, on the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) invokes the peer
review guidelines and requests external peer review of the technical review underlying the
proposal.  In response, EPA indicated that as part of an ongoing revision of the hazard
assessment process (initiated before receipt of the petition), it had conducted an internal peer
review and planned to subject the revised hazard risk assessment for the chemical to external
peer review in accordance with its peer review policy and the Information Quality Guidelines. 
Similarly, a recent petition filed by a law firm representing the National Paint and Coatings
Association and Sherwin-Williams challenging information underlying a Model Rule for
Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) in industrial coatings was accompanied by a separate
request that the Model Rule be subjected to the specific peer review process prescribed in
OMB’s recent bulletin.
__________________
Notes and Questions
1.  Assume you are an attorney in the EPA’s Office of General Council.  Prepare a
checklist of legal requirements and procedural steps involved in promulgating a regulation under
Executive Order 13,422 and the IQA Guidelines.
 2. Looking carefully at the language of the statute above, do you think the IQA creates a
right to correct information?
Consider the following example.  In May 2003, the Salt Institute and the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States filed a petition under the Information Quality Act with the
National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (NHLBI) seeking correction of information which
stated that reduced sodium consumption will result in lower blood pressure in all individuals. 
NHLBI published the findings of two studies (funded in part by NHLBI grants) in news releases,
on its website, and in at least one report. The petition for correction asserted that the studies’
findings do not meet the standards for data quality set out in the IQA and claimed that, to meet
the IQA’s standards, those findings had to be qualified according to such factors as race, history
of hypertension, sex, age, body-mass index, and education level.  The Salt Institute and Chamber
of Commerce maintained that lowering sodium intake reduces blood pressure for only certain
groups of Americans, not for all Americans.  The petition requested that NHLBI make publicly
available the raw data that supported the studies’ findings in order to allow appellants to test
their validity for different groups of individuals.  The Secretary of Health and Human Services
concluded that appellants had no such right under the IQA and denied the petition seeking
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information and correction.  Did the Secretary act properly in doing so?  See Salt Institute v.
Leavitt, 440 F.3d 156, 159 (4  Cir. 2006). th
__________________
3.  A Judicial Realignment
The first steps toward a remaking of the federal judiciary were taken in the 1980s and the
results became manifest in the 1990s.  Conservative judicial appointments by Presidents Reagan
and George H. W. Bush replaced federal judges sympathetic to environmental concerns with
judges hostile toward environmental laws.  The following selection describes the consequences.
The Changing Nature of the Federal Judiciary
RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 132-137 (2004)
The most portentous of the judicial rulings of the 1990s were those of the U.S. Supreme
Court.  In a series of decisions arising in a host of constitutional contexts, a bare majority of five
justices actively promoted a view of the federal constitution that systematically unsettled the
constitutional foundations of many of modern environmental law’s most distinctive features.  In
form, environmental law is classic New Deal regulatory legislation – it rests on expansive
notions of congressional power under the Commerce Clause, presumes the need for significant
governmental restrictions on market transactions and private property rights, and anticipates the
need for judicial review.  Modern environmental law, like many of those New Deal laws that
preceded it, also presumes a dominant preemptive role for federal law at the expanse of
substantial state autonomy over public welfare, including enlisting the machinery of state
government in furtherance of federal programs.
. . . [E]ach of these features is endemic to environmental law.  Each is a direct, not
incidental, expression of the nature of the problem environmental law seeks to address.  The
physical nature of the problem promotes a national, rather than state-by-state, approach to
solutions, yet the dual-sovereign framework contemplated by the Constitution makes the federal
government dependent upon partnerships with the states for full implementation and
enforcement.  The Fifth Amendment provides that private property may not be taken for public
use without just compensation, but environmental law unavoidably and constantly limits private
property rights to address problems seen only in broad temporal and spatial spillovers.  Finally,
Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to lawsuits where plaintiffs
can allege imminent and concrete injury, but the complexity of ecological cause and effect
frequently makes it difficult for environmental plaintiffs to make such showings.
In earlier decades, the Supreme Court appeared to avoid rigid application of
constitutional doctrines that would stand as obstacles to comprehensive federal environmental
law, environmental restrictions on private property, or broad citizen suit standing in
environmental litigation.  The 1990s were decidedly different.  Both in environmental and
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nonenvironmental cases, the Supreme Court began to rethink certain presumptions of U.S.
constitutional law and thereby unsettled some precepts upon which modern U.S. law rested.
In 1992, the Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Costal Council ruled in favor of a
landowner who claimed that environmental restrictions on his use of coastal property without
compensation amounted to an unconstitutional taking.  It was not so much the result in that
particular case as the Court’s reasoning that called into question environmental restrictions.  The
Court in Lucas held that land use restrictions that deprived land of all economic value as the
determinative touchstone of a law’s constitutionality was troubling because it seemed to accept
too easily the precept that the economically profitable exploitation of a natural resource is
somehow constitutionally guaranteed or at least preferable.  The teaching of the modern
environmental statutes regarding the propriety of government’s restricting uses of natural
resources based on the related spatial and temporal spillovers – “the economy of nature” – was
rendered a second-class concern.  So too was the importance of nondevelopmental values of
preserving natural resources that are not readily translated into market or economic value.
At least as troubling was the Lucas Court’s ruling that the only exception to the per se
taking rule occurs when the environmental restriction merely codifies “background principles of
law,” such as the common law of nuisance.  The premise of much modern environmental law has
been that such common law doctrines, especially nuisance law, have failed to deal with
environmental issues.  A nuisance standard that makes the lawfulness of an activity turn on its
“reasonableness” does not give a court any meaningful guidance in resolving the multiplicity of
complex factors that must be weighed in deciding how much environmental law evolved beyond
those principles to fill the gap with detailed standards and regulatory controls.  Therefore, to
have the constitutionality of environmental restrictions turn on the extent to which those
restrictions merely codify preexisting law places a constitutional obstacle in the path of the law’s
evolution that environmentalists would argue is both necessary and proper. . . .
The Court’s decisions regarding the proper sphere of federal legislation were even more
unsettling for their implications for environmental law.  The federal environmental statutes rest
on decades of judicial precedent that endorsed expansive notions of congressional Commerce
Clause power.  The Court’s long-standing test of Commerce Clause authority had been strikingly
broad: as long as the activity being regulated bore some, even minimal, relation to interstate
commerce, it fell within Congress’s Commerce Clause regulatory authority, even if the activity
was noncommercial and occurred wholly within a single state.
Largely prompted by Congress’s insatiable appetite for expanding federal criminal
jurisdiction (and thus the workload of the federal judiciary), the Court finally rebelled during the
1990s by announcing a more restricted scope of congressional Commerce Clause authority.  The
new test seemingly required that the activity being regulated be “economic” in character and
bear a substantial relationship to interstate commerce.  The problem for environmental law was
that the jurisdictional bases for environmental regulation in existing federal statutes did not
anticipate that new test’s analytic framework and therefore did not neatly reflect it.
To be sure, much environmental regulation does, in fact, apply to economic activity that
bears a substantial relationship to interstate commerce.  Virtually any industrial activity, such as
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those involved in the production and sale of paper, steel, and agricultural products, would
constitute a class of “economic activity.”  But that fact does not, by itself, necessarily satisfy the
Court’s constitutional test.  The constitutional inquiry seems under the Court’s current
formulation to turn on how the statute itself defines its jurisdiction, not how the statute might be
amended to define its jurisdictional bases.  The jurisdictional provisions of the federal
environmental statutes, however, are not uniformly couched in terms of the economic nature of
the activity to be regulated.
For example, the actual terms of federal environmental statutes such as the Clean Air,
Clean Water, and Endangered Species Acts do not turn at all on whether a particular activity to
be regulated is economic in nature or possesses some interstate commercial nexus.  They turn
exclusively on a finding that the activity pollutes the air or the water or harms an endangered
species or its habitat.  Such activity need not be commercial in origin and can occur within a
single state’s boundaries.  These are laws that, at bottom, seek their justification not in their
relationship to commerce, but in their promotion of a system of values in which commerce is no
longer government’s principal, let along exclusive, legitimate end.  This is particularly true of
the Endangered Species Act, which would seem to be especially vulnerable to the new
constitutional standard.  Although it might be fairly easy in theory to recast those jurisdictional
provisions of the Endangered Species Act to focus on the commercial character of the regulated
activities, the political hurdles to passage of such curative legislation would likely be substantial. 
At the very least, environmentalists would have to be prepared to agree to the significant
substantive compromises that would be called for in forging the political alliances necessary to
achieve such legislation.
As the 1990s came to a close, the extent to which a majority of the justices would be
willing to take the logic of their Commerce Clause precedent outside of the criminal law arena to
strike down major public welfare laws, such as environmental laws, remained unclear.  It was
clear, however, that those in the federal government and the environmental community who
defended the constitutionality of Congress’s passing environmental laws could no longer
confidently rely on the single fact that pollution and its reduction have substantial implications
for the national economy.  Those defenders would instead have to try to develop legal arguments
that coincided with the Court’s new analytic framework.  The opportunity to develop those
arguments soon presented itself when a series of plaintiffs, prompted by the Supreme Court’s
recent pronouncements, attacked in the lower courts the constitutionality of several
environmental statutes based on legal theories that would have been completely unthinkable in
either the 1970s or 1980s.
The shift in judicial attitude was not, however, confined to the Supreme Court.  The
lower federal courts do not respond only to the Supreme Court’s precise holdings.  Federal
district court and court of appeals judges also read beyond those holdings and frequently
anticipate in their own decisions where they believe the Court is going.  The lower courts,
accordingly, more regularly denied standing to environmental plaintiffs and the federal
government lost more cases in which it was defending its authority to promulgate and enforce
strict environmental protection requirements, especially under the Superfund law.
The 1990s, in short, witnessed an extraordinary shift in the federal judiciary’s treatment
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of environmental law.  In the 1970s, federal judge Skelly Wright famously wrote in . . . [Calvert
Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. AEC, excerpted in Chapter 2, Section D. 1] that it was the
court’s “duty . . . to see that important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, are
not lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy.”  In the 1990s, Supreme
Court justice Antonin Scalia directly challenged Wright’s characterization of the judicial
function.  Writing even before his appointment to the Court [in the Suffolk University Law
Review], Scalia decried the judiciary’s apparent “long love affair with environmental litigation.” 
And taking direct issue with Judge Wright, Scalia made quite explicit his view that “it would be
a good thing, too” to have policies such as those furthered by federal environmental protection
laws get “lost and misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal bureaucracy. . . .  The ability to
lose or misdirect laws can be said to be one of the prime engines of social change.”  By the end
of the decade, the constitutional foundations of environmental law may have been far from
eroded, but those foundations were certainly destabilized.
__________________
Section D.  “Reform” and Gridlock in Congress
In the years immediately following the “environmental decade” of the 1970s, Congress
did not undertake any new initiatives in environmental policy.  In fact, the major federal
programs were kept in place only through continuing appropriations measures and short-term
extensions of the existing acts.  For the most part, there was not sufficient agreement in Congress
to formally reauthorize them.  During the 97  Congress, for example, eight comprehensiveth
environmental programs were due for reauthorization; only two of them were. 
The Democrats regained control of the Senate following the 1986 election, and the newly
elected members of both the House and Senate were more environmentally-oriented.  Yet
despite a highly productive new Congress, several major pieces of environmental legislation
failed not only in the 99  Congress (1984-86) but in the 100  Congress (1987-89) as well.  Theseth th
measures included renewal of the Clean Air Act and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) – the principal pesticide control act – as well as new legislation to
control acid deposition.  On the whole, environmentalists were disappointed by this limited
progress.
Congress’s inactivity on environmental issues continued in the 101  and 102st nd
Congresses (1989-92) during the first President Bush’s administration, with some important
exceptions.  Congress and George H. W. Bush were able to agree on the momentous Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990.  This success was particularly significant because for thirteen years
the CAA symbolized Congress’s inability to reauthorize controversial environmental programs. 
Congress was able to approve the 1990 amendments to the act for several reasons: improved
scientific research, reports of worsening ozone in urban areas – which helped to reduce
opposition by key interest groups such as the Chemical Manufacturers Association – and a
realization by members of Congress that the public would tolerate no further delays in acting on
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air quality problems.  Congress and the senior President Bush also reached agreement on the
Energy Policy Act of 1992, a notable, if modest, step that promoted energy conservation and
restructured the electric utility industry to encourage greater competition and efficiency.
Unfortunately, enactment of the 1990 CAA Amendments was not an indication that a
new era of cooperative and bipartisan policymaking on the environment was at hand.  Bill
Clinton’s election in 1992 also saw control of both houses of Congress returned to the
Democrats.  Most of the major federal environmental statutes were again up for reauthorization. 
Despite an emerging consensus on renewing the Clean Water Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act,
CERCLA, FIFRA, and others, the 103d Congress remained far too divided to act on these
measures.
The 1994 Congressional election, however, ushered in a sea change in environmental
lawmaking, as discussed in the following selection.
The 104  Congressth
Michael E. Kraft, Environmental Policy in Congress: From Consensus to Gridlock
in NORMAN J. VIG AND MICHAEL E. KRAFT, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY:
NEW DIRECTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 129-130, 134-135 (4th ed. 2000)
Few analysts had predicted the astonishing outcomes of the 1994 midterm elections, even
after one of the most expensive, negative, and anti-Washington campaigns in modern times. 
Republicans captured both houses of Congress, picking up an additional fifty-two seats in the
House and eight in the Senate.  They also did well in other elections across the country,
contributing to their belief that voters had endorsed the Contract with America, which
symbolized the new Republican agenda.
The contract had promised a rolling back of government regulations and a shrinking of
the federal government’s role.  There was no specific mention of environmental policy, however,
and the document’s language was carefully constructed for broad appeal to a disgruntled
electorate.  For its policy recommendations, the contract drew heavily from the work of
conservative and probusiness think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation, Cato Institute, and
Competitive Enterprise Institute.  For years they had waged a multifaceted campaign to discredit
environmentalist thinking and policies and to shift public opinion on these issues.  Those efforts
merged with a carefully developed GOP plan to gain control of Congress to further a
conservative political agenda.
There is little persuasive evidence, however, that the Republican victory in November
conveyed a public mandate to act on the contract’s provisions related to environmental
programs.  Surveys indicated that voters were largely unaware of the contract and its provisions
even as late at April 1995, and studies of voting behavior in the November election found no
substantial basis for a voter mandate on the issues. . . . [V]oters continue to prefer a strong
governmental role in environmental protection.  Thus at best, one could read into the election
results a general preference for less government and less regulation.
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Whatever might be said about the meaning of the 1994 election, the political result was
clear enough.  It put Republicans in charge of the House for the first time in four decades and set
the stage for an extraordinary period of legislative action on environmental policy characterized
by exceptionally bitter relations between the two parties.  Republican members were so
accustomed to serving in a minority party capacity that initially they adopted an aggressive
“take-no-prisoners” strategy that rejected political compromise with their ideological foes.  Led
by a determined Speaker, Newt Gingrich, and with many new members arriving on Capitol Hill
without prior legislative experience, Republicans would struggle during the 104  Congress toth
learn the skills required for building broad support and governing Congress.  Deep conflicts
within the party between conservatives and moderates, on other issues as well as environmental
protection, exacerbated that challenge.
The resulting environmental policy gridlock should have come as no surprise. . . .
Regulatory Reform
Regulatory reform has been a central theme in U.S. environmental policy since the late
1970's, and it was of special interest during Ronald Reagan’s presidency.  There is no real
dispute among students of environmental policy on the need to reform agency rulemaking that
has been widely faulted for being too inflexible, intrusive, cumbersome, and adversarial, and
sometimes based on insufficient consideration of science and economics.  Much disagreement
exists, however, over precisely what elements of the regulatory process need to be reformed and
the most legitimate way to institute such changes to be sure that they work as intended.
The Republican majority favored separate, “omnibus” regulatory reform legislation that
would affect all environmental policies by imposing broad and stringent mandates on
bureaucratic agencies, especially for the conduct and use of cost-benefit analysis and risk
assessment.  They also wanted to open agency technical studies and rulemaking to additional
legal challenges to help protect the business community against what they viewed as
unjustifiable regulatory action.  Opponents argued that such impositions and opportunities for
lawsuits would wreak havoc within agencies such as the EPA that already faced imposing
procedural hurdles in developing regulations and frequent legal disputes over them.  They
preferred more limited changes that would be considered as each statute came up for renewal. 
They also sought to give agency professionals more discretion in considering how to weigh
pertinent evidence and set program priorities.
The most notable attempt at regulatory reform occurred in the house early in 1995, with
similar legislation considered in each subsequent year.  Members were eager, in the words of the
Contract with America, to “free Americans from bureaucratic red tape,” which they saw in
environmental, health, and safety regulations, and to spur economic growth.  They also objected
philosophically to a strong government role in regulation.
In pursuit of such goals, the contract’s authors wanted to require “every new regulation to
stand a new test: Does it provide benefits worth the costs?”  Those ideas found expression in the
Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act of 1995, which mandated extensive cost-benefit
analysis and risk assessments as part of the regulatory processes used by agencies such as the
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EPA to implement environmental policies.  The act also would likely have thrown many
contested decisions into the already crowded federal courts.
The final legislative package, HR 9, also included a “takings” provision that required
compensation to landowners when regulations under certain laws reduced property values by 20
percent or more.  In a telling comment about legislative politics in 1995, debate on the bill’s
provisions appeared to be anchored far more in colorful anecdotes of alleged regulatory abuses
and pleas for relief for the business community than in scientific or economic facts.
This act and its counterpart in the Senate, strongly supported by Bob Dole, R-Kan., then
the Senate majority leader [and the Republican presidential nominee in 1996], reflected intense
lobbying by business groups that sought to reduce the cost of complying with environmental,
health, and safety regulation.  The business community’s concerns were genuine, yet their
political tactics were controversial and unlikely to succeed.  Short-term economic relief might be
gained, as it was in the Reagan administration, but at the expense of the more important goal of
long-term reform of environmental statutes.
Despite serious misgivings about the bill by economists, scientists, policy analysts, and
administration officials who favored some economic analysis of environmental proposals, the
House overwhelmingly approved HR 9 by a vote of 277 to 141 in March 1995.  But parallel
measures in the Senate fared poorly.  Senator Dole tried three times to bring a companion bill to
the Senate floor, but he failed to gain sufficient votes to end a filibuster by opponents who
thought the legislation would jeopardize public health, safety, and the environment.  In July
1995, Dole pulled the key bill from the Senate floor, signaling the GOP’s retreat on sweeping
regulatory reform legislation.
GOP leaders were successful, however, in gaining approval of several less ambitious
reform measures.  One of those was the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, which
Congress approved and the president signed in early 1995.  The act erected new procedural
barriers to keep Congress from approving statutes likely to imposed unfunded federal mandates
(requirements for action) of $50 million a year or more on state and local governments.
On other regulatory reform issues, Republicans remained too divided to act.  The
business community also was split, although at least some leaders signaled a strategic shift that
recognized popular support for environmental protection.  Those who worked closely with the
President’s Council on Sustainable Development announced that modest reforms of existing
statutes might be better after all than the drastic changes they sought in 1995.
In the 105  Congress in 1997, Senators Fred Thompson, R-Tenn., and Carl Levin, D-th
Mich., teamed up to draft a comprehensive regulatory reform measure (S. 981) that was less
radical than the one rejected in 1996, but with similar goals of mandating cost-benefit analysis
and risk assessment and expanding judicial review of agency actions.  These efforts drew
support from both parties and a broad coalition of business groups.  But they were opposed by
labor unions, environmentalists, consumer groups, and the Clinton administration, who argued
that they would undermine critical environmental, health, and safety protections.  Conservative
Republicans, led by Senate majority leader Trent Lott, R-Miss., objected that the measure did
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not go far enough in placing limits on regulatory agencies; they still favored the approach that
was rejected in 1995.  These disagreements prevented adoption of any regulatory reform package
in the 105  Congress.  The Thompson-Levin bill was reported out of committee but neverth
reached the Senate floor.  Several minor and more targeted regulatory reform initiatives also
were introduced in the 105  Congress, but they failed to gain sufficient support to move forward.th
Appropriation Politics: Riders and Budget Cuts
Perhaps the most striking element of the Republican strategy in the 104  and 105th th
Congresses was its use of the budget process to institute changes in policy as an alternative to
enactment of new statutes.  The Reagan administration used a similar approach in the 1980's
with considerable short-term success.  One of the most avid revolutionaries in the GOP freshman
class, Rep. David McIntosh, R-Ind., explained the approach’s logic: “The laws would remain on
the books, but there would be no money to carry them out.  It’s a signal to the agencies to stop
wasting time on these regulations.”
Appropriation Riders.  The specific action to which McIntosh referred was the use of 
“riders” – legislative stipulations attached to appropriation bills – to achieve policy goals such as
restricting, remaking, or even eliminating federal programs.  In the 104  Congress, more thanth
fifty antienvironmental riders were included in seven different budget bills, largely with the
purpose of slowing or halting enforcement of laws by the EPA, the Interior Department, and
other agencies until Congress could revise them.  In one of the most controversial cases,
seventeen riders were appended to the EPA appropriations bill in 1995 in an attempt to prohibit
the agency from enforcing certain drinking-water and water quality standards and to keep it from
regulating commercial development in wetlands and toxic air emissions from oil and gas
refineries, among many other provisions.  The EPA was told flatly that it could not spend any
money on these activities.
Such a legislative strategy is attractive to its proponents because appropriation bills,
unlike authorizing legislation, typically move quickly and Congress must enact them each year. 
Many Republicans and business lobbyists also argue that use of riders is one of the few ways
they have to rope in a bureaucracy that they believe needs additional constraints.  This is because
they are unable to address their concerns through changing the authorizing statutes themselves, a
far more controversial and uncertain path to follow. . . . 
Cutting Environmental Budgets.  Despite the setback on appropriation riders, GOP
leaders tried in 1995 and 1996 to capitalize on the momentum of their electoral success by
representing the steep reductions they proposed for environmental spending as part of their
larger – and broadly supported – effort to balance the federal budget.  Their opponents argued
that the depth of the cuts and the way they were targeted on enforcement actions suggested a
quite different purpose.  Indeed, House Budget Committee chair John Kasich, R-Ohio, a leading
player in the new budget politics, acknowledged as much: “We’re going to fund programs that
we think are important and not fund the programs that we think are not important.”
Initial actions on the budget in the House in 1995 were surprising in light of public
support for environmental policy.  For fiscal year 1996 House members voted to cut the
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president’s recommended EPA budget by 34 percent overall, proportionately the largest
reduction for any major federal agency.  The appropriations subcommittee that recommended the
cuts explained why it favored deregulating the environment in this way: “The agency was
headed in the wrong direction, for the wrong reasons, and in a manner that can impose
unnecessary costs on American industry.”
The Senate was less drastic than the House but still harsh on the EPA.  A House-Senate
conference committee moved closer to the Senate’s position.  It reduced the EPA’s overall
budget by 22 percent, safe drinking-water grants to states and localities by 45 percent, and
EPA’s enforcement programs by 24 percent.  As he had threatened, President Clinton vetoed the
bill in mid-December 1995, saying the cuts were unacceptably large.  Proposed reductions in
other environmental agency budgets were generally smaller but nonetheless significant.
Irreconcilable differences between budgets that the president and the GOP Congress were
willing to accept led to a period of prolonged stalemate in late 1995 and early 1996 and to two
partial government shutdowns as money to operate agency programs ran out.  The Republicans
received the brunt of the public’s wrath for the budget wars, which voters saw as yet another
illustration of irresponsible gridlock in government.
By early 1996 Congress began to backtrack on its fiscal demands, and by late April 1996
it agreed to reinstate many of its earlier cuts in the EPA’s budget as part of a broader
compromise with the White House on the fiscal year 1996 budget.  Although conflict continued
in the 105  Congress over budget riders, spending levels were no longer targeted as they were inth
the previous Congress.  There were some notable exceptions, such as the elimination of U.S.
funding for the United Nations Population Fund in the fiscal year 1999 budget, which reflected a
continuing conflict between the parties on population policy.  Yet in 1998 the Clinton
administration managed to gain full funding for its $1.7 billion Clean Water Action Plan (a five-
year initiative to deal with polluted runoff from cities and farms), a 23 percent boost for
programs to protect rare and endangered species, and a big jump in spending on global climate
change research.
Reauthorizing Environmental Statutes
For most of the 104  Congress members were absorbed in regulatory reform andth
budgetary battle and made little progress on the legislative front.  Severe disagreements over the
direction of environmental policy contributed to the lack of action.  Partisan divisions were
especially strong.  The League of Conservation Voters (LCV) reported that for 1995, for
example, votes on the environment showed the greatest disparity ever between the two parties. 
House Republicans averaged 15 percent on the league scorecard (supporting the LCV position
on the selected votes 15 percent of the time) while Democrats averaged 76 percent. The ratios
were similar in the Senate – 11 percent and 89 percent, respectively, for Republicans and
Democrats.  For the 105  Congress, the partisan differences remained much the same.th
Partly because of such disagreement between the two parties, Congress was unable to act
on renewal of the Clean Water Act, Endangered Species Act, Superfund, or Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act.  Where the House was prepared to move ahead, the Senate
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often blocked legislation that weakened environmental protection.  For example, in May 1995
the House passed a revision of the Clean Water Act that the press and environmentalists
promptly labeled the “dirty water act” for provisions that significantly weakened protection of
wetlands and eased or revoked some of the law’s requirements.  The Senate’s Environment
Committed, chaired by John Chafee, R-R.I., chose not to move on similar proposals in the
Senate.
The same outcome characterized action on most of the major environmental laws.  In
October 1995 the House Resources Committee approved a rewrite of the Endangered Species
Act (ESA) backed by Rep. Don Young, R-Alaska, the committee’s chair, and Rep. Richard W.
Pombo, R-Calif.  The Young-Pombo bill required greater consideration of property owners and
economic impacts.  Opponents argued that the bill would gut the ESA to appease small
landowners and corporate developers, and they vowed to fight it.  As a result of these conflicts,
neither house approved a final bill in the 104  Congress.  Deadlock continued in the 105th th
Congress even though broad bipartisan agreement was reached on an ESA bill in the Senate,
sponsored by Senators Dirk Kempthorne, R-Idaho, and Chafee; that bill also was endorsed by
the Clinton White House.
In both the 104  and 105  Congresses, members were unable to build consensus forth th
revision the Superfund hazardous waste cleanup program despite long-standing concerns about
its cost and effectiveness. The Senate Environment and Public Works Committee completed
work on a bill in March 1998, but the committee split along party lines and the measure went no
further.  Two different bills were considered in the House, but neither made it out of committee. 
Environmentalists, most Democrats, and the Clinton White House objected that the measures
would let polluters off the hook and weaken cleanup standards.
__________________
Section E.  Alternatives to Conventional Regulation
Dissatisfaction with traditional "command and control" environmental programs, such as
those under the Clean Air Act, generated proposals for new ways of protecting the environment
that allowed more flexibility, particularly for the regulated business community. By far the most
celebrated of these alternative approaches is found in the 1990 amendments to the CAA which
address the problem of acid rain.
This section describes, first, the concept of emission trading and how it operates in the
CAA's acid rain program.  Then the section provides and overview of the "reinvention" of
environmental programs undertaken during the Clinton Administration.
Consequences of Acid Rain
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Acid Rain
(www.epa.gov/acidrain/what/index.html visited October 11, 2007)
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“Acid rain” is a broad term referring to a mixture of wet and dry deposition (deposited
material) from the atmosphere containing higher than normal amounts of nitric and sulfuric
acids.  The precursors, or chemical forerunners, of acid rain formation result from both natural
sources, such as volcanoes and decaying vegetation, and man-made sources, primarily emissions
2 xof sulfur dioxide (SO ) and nitrogen oxides (NO ) resulting from fossil fuel combustion.  In the
2 xUnited States, roughly 2/3 of all SO  and 1/4 of all NO  come from electric power generation
that relies on burning fossil fuels, like coal.  Acid rain occurs when these gases react in the
atmosphere with water, oxygen, and other chemicals to form various acidic compounds.  The
result is a mild solution of sulfuric acid and nitric acid.  When sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides
are released from power plants and other sources, prevailing winds blow these compounds across
state and national borders, sometimes over hundreds of miles.
Wet deposition refers to acidic rain, fog, and snow.  If the acid chemicals in the air are
blown into areas where the weather is wet, the acids can fall to the ground in the form of rain,
snow, fog, or mist. . . .  The strength of the effects depends on several factors, including how
acidic the water is; the chemistry and buffering capacity of the soils involved; and the types of
fish, trees, and other living things that rely on the water.
In areas where the weather is dry, the acid chemicals may become incorporated into dust
or smoke and fall to the ground through dry deposition, sticking to the ground, buildings, homes,
cars, and trees.  Dry deposited gases and particles can be washed from these surfaces by
rainstorms, leading to increased runoff.  This runoff water makes the resulting mixture more
acidic.  About half of the acidity in the atmosphere falls back to earth through dry deposition.
Acid rain causes acidification of lakes and streams and contributes to the damage of trees
at high elevations (for example, red spruce trees above 2,000 feet) and many sensitive forest
soils.  In addition, acid rain accelerates the decay of building materials and paints, including
irreplaceable buildings, statues, and sculptures that are part of our nation’s cultural heritage. 
2 xPrior to falling to the earth, sulfur dioxide (SO ) and nitrogen oxide (NO ) gases and their
particulate matter derivatives – sulfates and nitrates – contribute to visibility degradation and
harm public health.
The ecological effects of acid rain are most clearly seen in the aquatic, or water,
environments, such as streams, lakes, and marshes.  Acid rain flows into streams, lakes, and
marshes after falling on forests, fields, buildings, and roads.  Acid rain also falls directly on
aquatic habitats.  Most lakes and streams have a pH between 6 and 8, although some lakes are
naturally acidic even without the effects of acid rain.  Acid rain primarily affects sensitive bodies
of water, which are located in watersheds whose soils have a limited ability to neutralize acidic
compounds (called “buffering capacity”).  Lakes and streams become acidic (i.e., the pH value
goes down) when the water itself and its surrounding soil cannot buffer the acid rain enough to
neutralize it.  In areas where buffering capacity is low, acid rain releases aluminum from soils
into lakes and streams; aluminum is highly toxic to many species of aquatic organisms.
Many lakes and streams examined in a National Surface Water Survey (NSWS) suffer
from chronic acidity, a condition in which water has a constant low pH level.  The survey
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investigated the effects of acidic deposition in over 1,000 lakes larger than 10 acres and in
thousands of miles of streams believed to be sensitive to acidification.  Of the lakes and streams
surveyed, acid rain caused acidity in 75 percent of the acidic lakes and about 50 percent of the
acidic streams.  Several regions in the U.S. were identified as containing many of the surface
waters sensitive to acidification.  They include the Adirondacks and Catskill Mountains in New
York state, the mid-Appalachian highlands along the east coast, the upper Midwest, and
mountainous areas of the Western United States.  In areas like the Northeastern United States,
where soil-buffering capacity is poor, some lakes now have a pH value of less than 5.  One of the
most acidic lakes reported is Little Echo Pond in Franklin, New York.  Little Echo Pond has a
pH of 4.2.
Streams flowing over soil with low buffering capacity are as susceptible to damage from
acid rain as lakes.  Approximately 580 of the streams in the Mid-Atlantic Coastal Plain are acidic
primarily due to acidic deposition.  In the New Jersey Pine Barrens, for example, over 90 percent
of the streams are acidic, which is the highest rate of acidic streams in the nation.  Over 1,350 of
the streams in the Mid-Atlantic Highlands (mid-Appalachia) are acidic, primarily due to acidic
deposition. . . .
Emissions from U.S. sources also contribute to acidic deposition in eastern Canada,
where the soil is very similar to the soil of the Adirondack Mountains, and the lakes are
consequently extremely vulnerable to chronic acidification problems.  The Canadian government
has estimated that 14,000 lakes in eastern Canada are acidic.
Acid rain causes a cascade of effects that harm or kill individual fish, reduce fish
population numbers, completely eliminate fish species from a waterbody, and decrease
biodiversity.  As acid rain flows through soils in a watershed, aluminum is released from soils
into the lakes and streams located in that watershed.  So, as pH in a lake or stream decreases,
aluminum levels increase.  Both low pH and increased aluminum levels are directly toxic to fish. 
In addition, low pH and increased aluminum levels cause chronic stress that may not kill
individual fish, but leads to lower body weight and small size and makes fish less able to
compete for food and habitat.
Some types of plants and animals are able to tolerate acidic waters.  Others, however, are
acid-sensitive and will be lost as the pH declines.  Generally, the young of most species are more
sensitive to environmental conditions than adults.  At pH 5, most fish eggs cannot hatch.  At
lower pH levels, some adult fish die.  Some acid lakes have no fish. . . . 
. . . [R]esearchers now know that acid rain causes slower growth, injury, or death of
forests.  Acid rain has been implicated in forest and soil degradation in many areas of the eastern
U.S., particularly high elevation forests of the Appalachian Mountains from Maine to Georgia
that include areas such as the Shenandoah and Great Smoky Mountain National Parks.  Of
course, acid rain is not the only cause of such conditions.  Other factors contribute to the overall
stress of these areas, including air pollutants, insects, disease, drought, or very cold weather.  In
most cases, in fact, the impacts of acid rain on trees are due to the combined effects of acid rain
and these other environmental stressors. . . .
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Early Efforts to Address Acid Rain
Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., State and Federal Command-and-Control Regulation
of Emissions from Fossil-Fuel Electric Power Generating Plants 
32 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 369, 402-407 (2002)
Use of Dispersion Techniques to Meet CAA Standards
Under the CAA of 1970, EPA permitted states to allow the use of tall stacks and other
dispersion techniques in lieu of emission limitations.  The EPA’s policies concerning
smokestack parameters encouraged long distance transport of acid-producing chemicals emitted
from stationary sources. . . .  In Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., [421 U.S. 60
(1975)], one of the first air pollution cases to reach the United States Supreme Court, the Court
allowed each state to select whatever mix of controls it desired and held that a state has
considerable freedom to design a [State Implementation Plan] SIP as long as it provides for
attaining . . . [air quality standards].  The Court, however, was ambiguous on the use of
dispersion techniques, such as tall smokestacks. . . .
On January 6, 1976, EPA promulgated guidelines on the role of tall smokestacks,
allowing their use where [Best Available Control Technology] BACT was used or where not
using tall smokestacks would be economically unreasonable or technologically unsound. 
Industry had already opted to construct tall smokestacks to avoid the need to install more
effective, but more expensive, air pollution controls.  In 1970, there were only two smokestacks
in the United States higher than five hundred feet.  By 1985, there were more than 150, with 23
over 1000 feet in height.  Moreover, industry adopted the practice of venting more than one
combustion unit to a smokestack, which increased the exhaust gas temperature and
consequently, the height of the stack plume.
In 1977, Congress expressed antipathy to . . . the use of high smokestacks. . . .  For
purposes of SIP development, high smokestacks were not banned, but a new section 123 limited
the height of a smokestack to a height consistent with “good engineering practice” and
prohibited crediting SIPs with benefits derived from dispersion techniques. . . .
EPA issued . . . final regulations on February 8, 1982.  The National Resources Defense
Council (NRDC) and the Sierra Club challenged these regulations.  The D.C. Circuit held that,
based on the legislative history of the CAA, Congress had limited the . . . credit for excessive
stack height and dispersion techniques.  Three reasons were set forth:
First, dispersion techniques do not reduce the amount of pollution . . . but merely
spread it . . . to other areas . . . .  Second, the long-range transport of certain
pollutants was . . . limited to the formation of “acid rain” . . . .  Third, intermittent
control systems, which are dependent on synchronizing plant operation with
weather conditions, were thought to be unreliable and virtually impossible to
enforce.
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. . .  The court upheld some provisions of the stack height regulations, but reversed
others, and remanded still other provisions to EPA for further action.  The end result was that the
tall stacks constructed before the change in the law avoided meaningful regulation.
On July 8, 1985, EPA promulgated new final regulations for CAA section 123. 
Seventeen years after CAA section 110 presented issues concerning the use of tall stacks to
avoid air pollution controls, and more than ten years after CAA section 123 was enacted, NRDC
sued again.  Once again, some aspects of the regulations were remanded, although most of the
rule was upheld. . . .
The use of tall smokestacks, which resulted in an increase in the adverse affects of air
pollution, should never have been approved by EPA.  Congress tried to curb the use of tall stacks
in 1977, but a decade later the regulations were still tied up in litigation.  The importance of
stack heights has been reduced by the 1990 CAA Amendments, especially CAA subchapter IV. 
Controls are now to be imposed on all sulfur emissions from electric power plants.  As a result,
EPA has not promulgated new regulations.
International Air Pollution
Tall stacks led to the long distance transport of air pollutants, which has an adverse effect
on Canada.  CAA section 115 deals with international air pollution.  If the EPA Administrator
finds that air pollution may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare in a
foreign country, and the Administrator determines that the foreign country has essentially the
same air pollution limits as are applicable in the United States, then EPA must promulgate rules
to prevent the harm. 
In 1985, Northeastern states and national groups sued in D.C. district court to prevent
emissions that caused acid rain in Canada, basing their suit on CAA section 115.  In New York v.
Thomas (Thomas I) the court granted summary judgment and ordered EPA to issue SIP revision
notices to force states to act to protect Canada from the effects of acid rain.  The D.C. Circuit
upheld the lower court decision.  However, the district court had said EPA could make a new
determination of reciprocity.  In October 1985, EPA’s Administrator Lee M. Thomas found that
reciprocity continued to exist.  The D.C. Circuit reversed, holding that the original findings of
endangerment and reciprocity by the prior Administrator, Douglas Costle, were rules under 5
U.S.C. section 551(4) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and, therefore, notice and
comment procedures were required to change them.  The D.C. Circuit required the plaintiffs to
file rulemaking petitions with EPA before they could bring a lawsuit to compel EPA to reduce
emissions.  A petition for rulemaking was filed with EPA in April 1988 and was denied in
October 1988.  EPA based its denial on a claimed lack of knowledge as to whether U.S.
emissions are causing acid rain in Canada.  Nine states, the province of Ontario, and
environmental groups brought suit in federal court in November 1988 seeking to remove EPA’s
decision.
In 1990, the D.C. Circuit once again upheld EPA’s unwillingness to protect Canada,
saying that EPA was not obliged to promulgate endangerment and reciprocity findings until it
was able to determine specific pollution sources.  The court was willing to accept EPA’s claim
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that the endangerment could not be correlated to sources of pollution. . . . 
__________________
Emissions Trading in the U.S.
A. DENNY ELLERMAN, PAUL. JOSKOW, AND DAVID HARRISON, JR.,
EMISSIONS TRADING IN THE U.S.:  EXPERIENCE, LESSONS, AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR 
GREENHOUSE GASES (Pew Center on Global Climate Change) 1-6, 8-12 (May 2003)
Overview of the Concept of Emissions Trading
The basic rationale for emissions trading is straightforward.  By giving firms the
flexibility to reallocate (trade) emissions credits or allowances among themselves, trading can
reduce the compliance costs of achieving the emissions target.
A simple numerical example illustrates how emissions trading can reduce control costs
relative to a traditional approach that is based upon setting uniform emissions standards (i.e.,
traditional command-and control). . . .[The following example is] a typical situation that could
face facilities complying with a single uniform emission standard.  In reducing emissions to meet
the standard, [Plant I] incurs a cost of $500 for a ton of emissions reduced, while [Plant 2]
spends $3,000 for a ton reduced.  These two facilities might be different plants within the same
company, plants owned by different companies in the same sector, or plants in completely
different sectors.  The particular emissions standards that are compared to the trading approach
might be based upon a common regulatory standard or on completely separate regulations.
Clearly, the same overall reduction in emissions could be achieved at lower compliance
costs by tightening controls at Plant I and relaxing them at Plant II.  Initially, loosening controls
at Plant II by one ton saves $3,000, whereas tightening controls by one ton at Plant I would raise
cost by only $500, for a net savings in compliance costs of $2,500 per ton to achieve the same
level of emissions.  One way to achieve the cost savings would be to set different standards for
the two sources, but such adjustments would be controversial (particularly if the facilities wee
competitors).  Moreover, setting facility-specific standards would require that the government
develop enormous amounts of facility-specific information to determine the cost-minimizing
emissions reduction levels.  These decisions are best left to the firms that operate these facilities,
since they presumably have the best information about the cost of control alternatives and can
use that information most effectively.
Emissions trading provides a means of achieving these cost savings without the need for
regulators to collect such detailed compliance cost information for different sources.  The two
sources, knowing their own individual compliance costs, could trade emissions credits or
allowances among themselves at the market price and determine whether it is profitable to
control more and sell allowances to others or to control less and buy allowances to cover the
additional emissions.  The trading mechanism allocates emissions reductions among sources in
the most cost-effective manner, relying on individual information and self-interest – rather than
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administrative regulation – to determine compliance decisions by each individual source.
Suppose in the previous numerical example that the market price of an emissions credit
or allowance was $2,000 per ton, and that the two facilities were initially allocated allowances
consistent with the individual emissions levels required under the emissions standard. . . .[E]ach
of the sources would gain from the market.  Plant I (low-cost seller) gains by reducing its
emissions further than the standard requires and selling the allowances it no longer needs to
Plant II; it receives $2,000 for the allowance but pays only $500 to achieve the reduction, for a
net gain of $1,500.  On the other side of the transaction, Plant II (high-cost buyer) is able to buy
the allowance for $2,000 and reduce its compliance cost by $3,000, for a net savings of $1,000. 
Thus the total savings in compliance costs of $2,500 per ton is split between the buyer and the
seller, with both gaining from trading.
This simple example illustrates both how emissions trading operates – through exchanges
between buyers and sellers of the right to emit a ton – and the major cost-savings achieved. . . .
Three Basic Types of Emissions Trading Programs
Three broad types of emissions trading programs have emerged: reduction credit,
averaging, and cap-and-trade programs.  Although all share the feature of tradability, the three
differ in important respects.
Reduction credit programs provide tradable credits to facilities that reduce emissions
more than required by some pre-existing regulation (or other baseline) and allow those credits to
be counted towards compliance by other facilities that would face high costs or other difficulties
in meeting the regulatory requirements.  (These programs sometimes are referred to simply as
Acredit-based.@) Reduction credits are created through an administrative process in which the
credits must be pre-certified before they can be traded.
Averaging programs also involve the offsetting of emissions from higher-emitting
sources with lower emissions from other sources, so that the average emission rate achieves a
predetermined level.  Like reduction credit programs, averaging programs provide flexibility to
individual sources to meet emissions constraints by allowing differences from source-specific
standards to be traded between sources.  The primary difference between averaging and
reduction credit programs is that reduction credits are created (or Acertified@) through an
administrative process, whereas the certification is automatic in averaging programs.
Cap-and-trade programs operate on somewhat different principles.  Under a cap-and-
trade program, an aggregate cap on emissions is set that defines the total number of emissions
Aallowances, A each of which provides its holder with the right to emit a unit (typically a ton) of
emissions.  The permits are initially allocated in some way, typically among existing sources. 
Each source covered by the program must hold permits to cover its emissions, with sources free
to buy and sell permits from each other.  In contrast to reduction credit programs – but similar to
averaging programs – cap and trade programs do not require pre-certification of allowances; the
allowances are certified when they are distributed initially.  Also, cap-and-trade programs limit
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total emissions, a contrast to reduction credit and averaging programs that are not designed to
cap emissions.
A trading program might include more than one type of trading mechanism.  As
discussed below, the Acid Rain trading program. . . include[s] reduction credit supplements to
the basic cap-and-trade program.  In addition, a cap-and-trade program might provide for early
reduction credits, which allow firms to get credits for voluntarily reducing emissions prior to the
introduction of a cap-and-trade program.  The credits allocated can be used to meet requirements
once the cap-and-trade program goes into force.
All three types of emissions trading rely on certain factors that constitute preconditions
for a successful program.  First and most importantly, all three forms assume that an emissions
control requirement has been put in place that requires emissions to be reduced to levels below
what they otherwise would be.  For credit and averaging programs, the requirement will
typically be a source-specific standard (e.g., a maximum emissions rate).  In a cap-and-trade
program the requirement will take the form of an aggregate cap on emissions combined with the
provision that each source surrender allowances equal to its emissions.  Second, the cost savings
achieved by all three forms of trading depend upon variability in the costs of reducing emissions
among emissions sources.  Differences in emission control costs across emissions sources create
the opportunity to reduce costs through trading.  Finally, in all three types of trading programs,
the requirements must be both enforceable and enforced.  A corollary to this precondition is that
there must be accurate measurement of actual emissions or emissions rates - otherwise it would
be impossible to enforce the requirements because it would be impossible to determine whether
sources were in compliance.
Other Features of Emissions Trading Programs
There are many features that must be specified in an emissions trading program, some of
which do not apply to all of the three basic emissions trading types.  The following is a list. . .
that categorizes the major features of emissions trading programs into two major categories:
design issues and implementation issues.
Design Issues.  These include the decisions that arise as the program is designed and
turned into a specific regulatory program
Allocation of initial allowances.  This issue is only relevant in cap-and-trade programs. 
Some method is required to distribute the initial allowances.  Basic methods include various
formulas to distribute initial allowance to participants on the basis of historical information
(Agrandfathering@) or on the basis of updated information (Aupdating@) as well as auctioning of
the initial allowances.
Geographic or temporal flexibility or restrictions.  This includes the possibility of
restricting trades among different parts of the geographic range of the program.  It also includes
the possibility of banking (i.e. reducing emissions more than required in a given year and
Abanking@ the surplus for future internal use or sale) or borrowing (i.e., reducing less than
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required in a given year and thus Aborrowing,@ with the borrowed amount made up by reducing
more than required in subsequent years).
Emissions sources that are required or allowed to participate.  This includes
specification of the universe of sources that must participate in the trading program.  It also
includes the possibility of allowing additional sources to opt-in to the program.
Institutions established to facilitate trading.  This includes the possibility of encouraging
third parties (e.g., brokers) to participate in trading as well as the possibility of setting up an
ongoing auction or other institutions to increase liquidity and establish market prices.
Implementation Issues.  A number of decisions come into play as the program is
implemented.
Certification of permits.  This decision applies to reduction credit programs, which
require that emission reductions be certified before they can be traded.
Monitoring and reporting of emissions.  Methods must be designed to monitor and report
emissions from each participating source.
Determining compliance and enforcing the trading program.  Theses decisions relate to
the means of determining whether sources are in compliance and enforcing the program if
sources are out of compliance.
Maintaining and encouraging participation.  This relates to decisions made to keep
sources in the program and encourage participation of sources whose participation is optional
(e.g., those given the opportunity to opt-in). . . .
EPA Emissions Trading Programs (EPA ET)
Starting in the mid-1970s, the U.S. EPA and the states developed four limited emissions
trading programs to increase flexibility and reduce the cost of compliance with air emissions
standards for stationary sources under the Clean Air Act.
1.  Netting.  Netting allows large new sources and major modifications of existing
sources to be exempted from otherwise applicable review procedures if existing emissions
elsewhere in the same facility are reduced by a sufficient amount.
2.  Offsets.  The offset policy allows a major new source to locate in an area that does not
attain a given National Ambient Air Quality Standard – a non-attainment area – if emissions
from an existing source reduced by at least as much as the new source would contribute (after
installation of stringent controls).
3.  Bubble.  The bubble policy allows a firm to combine the limits for several different
sources into one combined limit and to determine compliance based on the aggregate limit
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instead of from each source individually.  The name alludes to an imaginary Abubble@ placed
over the several sources. 
 
4.  Banking.  Under banking, firms that take actions to reduce emissions below the
relevant standard can accumulate credits for future internal use or sale.
These four programs – collectively referred to as EPA Emissions Trading or EPA ET –
are related by the common objective of providing sources with flexibility to comply with
traditional source-specific command-and-control standards while maintaining environmental
objectives focused primarily on local air quality.
Reliance on these early EPA ET programs has been limited mostly as a result of
implementing burdensome regulations that take up 47 pages of multi-column fine print in the
Federal Register.  In general, the regulations have restricted substantially the applicability of the
programs in response to regulatory concerns that the programs would compromise
environmental objectives by encouraging Apaper credits@ or Aanyway tons@ – credits for
emissions reductions that would have been made without the incentives provided by the
emissions trading program.  Credits must meet detailed criteria to be certified as eligible for
trading.  Offsets can only be used in certain geographic areas and any Atrades@ using them are not
one-for-one, since the regulations require emissions reductions at the source proving the credit to
be greater than the expected increase in emissions by the source using the credit.  Potential
applications of the bubble policy initially faced even greater hurdles because proposed bubbles
had approved as revisions to an applicable State Implementation Plan (SIP), lengthy
administrative process that discouraged their use.  These and other EPA regulations made efforts
to identify and create trading opportunities expensive and uncertain.
The result of this process for creating and approving tradable credits, often called
certifications, is that the EPA ET programs have yielded relatively few trades and low cost
savings relative to their potential.  The combination of pre-approval requirements and need to
construct customized arrangements for each trade has created substantial transactions costs-often
exceeding the market value of the credits.  These  transaction costs – in effect the result of the
lack of a well-defined and standardized commodity to be traded – have been the primary
obstacle to more widespread participation in these programs. . . . [Two of the programs are noted
below.]
Lead-in-Gasoline Program
The averaging program used to regulate lead in gasoline during the mid 1980s provides
an example of a much more successful trading program than the early EPA ET programs.  The
averaging program for lead grew out of EPA=s efforts to reduce the lean content of gasoline
starting in the early 1970s.  Through 1982, lead limits were enforced on a refinery-by-refinery
basis, with each refinery allowed to average lead concentration across its total gasoline
production.  In 1982, the rules were changed to allow trading across refineries and refining
firms.  Under the new rules, a refinery could use lead in its gasoline above its usual limit if it
purchased an equivalent number of rights from other refineries that had reduced their own lead
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content below their usual limits.  It was possible to implement nationwide trading because the
wide geographic distributions of gasoline from any given refinery removed the local concerns
that had limited the scope of trading in the early EPA ET programs.  In 1985 EPA promulgated a
new rule to reduce the lead limit more than ten-fold in two phases: in mid-1985, from 1.1 grams
per leaded gallon (gplg) to 0.5 gplg, and then, in January 1986, to 0.1 gplg.  As part of this new
phase-down rule, EPA allowed refiners to Abank@ lead reductions: If they reduced ahead of
schedule during 1985, they could save the excess rights for use or sale in 1986 and 1987.
The 1980s lead program is widely regarded as a success with respect to the initial trading
opportunities permitted in the 1983-85 period and the addition of banking in the 1985-87 period.
. . . From mid-1983 (when the new rules took effect) until early 1985 (when further phase-down
began), an increasingly vigorous market in rights developed.  In a typical quarter, over half of all
refineries participated in the market, and up to one-fifth of the lead rights were traded.  In 1985
when provisions for banking were added and the restrictions were tightened, an even larger
fraction of lead was bought and sold on the market.
The banking components of the Lead Trading Program appear to have been particularly
successful.  The EPA had predicted that refiners would bank seven to nine thousand tons of lead.
. . . [T]he level of banking was even higher than predicted: refineries banked a total of 10.6
thousand tons, almost 17 percent higher than the upper end of the predicted range.  Thus, it
seems likely that the actual [dollar] savings were higher than the EPA estimate.  In addition, the
use of banking led to a faster reduction in lead emissions than might otherwise have occurred.
The Lead Trading Program also marked an innovation in regulation by using the
refinery-specific limit as the baseline for establishing credits without worrying about whether the
lead content of gasoline from a specific refinery might have been lower anyway.  This
innovation avoided the need for case-by-case review to certify tradable credits.  Differences
between the refinery-specific average limits and the refinery=s average lead content – and thus
credits and debits – could be calculated easily.  Monitoring for purposes of calculating credits
and debits involved no additional costs beyond those required to enforce command-and-control
requirements.  This streamlining of the process for measuring compliance and certifying tradable
credits had characterized all of the successful trading programs.  In effect, the owner of refineries
that reduced lead content below the average were automatically issued credits that could be used
at other facilities. . . .
Acid Rain Trading Program
The largest best known and most successful experience with emissions trading is the
2sulfur dioxide (SO ) cap-and-trade program created by Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendment. . . . Because of its large scale and high profile, the success of the Acid Rain
Program has contributed more than anything else to the change in attitude towards emissions
trading in the 1990s, and it is often cited as an example for other applications, including GHG
emission reductions.
__________________
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The Current Acid Rain Program
Debra Jezouit, The Acid Rain Program, 
in ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, JR. AND DAVID P. NOVELLO, EDS., 
THE CLEAR AIR ACT HANDBOOK
423-428, 436-437, 440 (2d ed. American Bar Assoc. 2004)
Title IV of the Clean Air Act (CAA) was enacted to reduce atmospheric loading of sulfur
2dioxide (SO ) and nitrogen oxides (NOx), the two principal precursors of acid rain by restricting
emissions of these pollutants from electric utilities. . . .
At the same time, Title IV represents an attempt to employ market-based principles to
achieve these emission reductions.  The title also was intended to encourage the use of energy
conservation, renewable energy, and alternative technologies for emissions reductions.
2The CAA provides for a 10-million ton reduction in SO  emissions from electric utilities
from 1980 levels.  Title IV implements this goal in two stages, referred to as Phase I and Phase II
in the CAA.  Phase I, which began on January 1, 1995, required the biggest and dirtiest
2(primarily coal-fired) utilities to make a preliminary reduction in SO  emissions.  In Phase II,
which began on January 1, 2000, the Phase I units were required to make further reductions in
2SO  emissions, and all remaining affected units, including new units, were required to comply
2with the Phase II limits, which are designed to cap annual utility SO  emissions at approximately
8.95 million tons.
Due to the use of a market-based program, it is possible for some affected units to
2 2comply with the SO  limits without actually reducing emissions.  To achieve the SO  reductions,
Title IV authorizes the EPA administrator to allocate “allowances,” a major feature of the
2legislation.  One allowance entitles the holder to emit one ton of SO .  The CAA specifies the
number of allowances that the EPA administrator is to allocate to each utility unit on an annual
basis.  The number is based on the amount of emissions that would result from each unit if it
operated at a certain baseline fuel consumption and a specified rate.  In the case of Phase I
allowances, the number of allowances was identified in a statutory list, and for Phase II, the
number of allowances were determined by various equations.  As long as a utility unit has
enough allowances to cover its emissions, it is in compliance with the CAA.  The program
allows utility units to trade allowances so that a utility unit may purchase extra allowances to
cover its emissions rather than reducing its emissions to meet its statutory allowance allocation. 
In contrast, utility units with extra allowances may sell them or bank them for use in future
years. 
A utility unit is likely to purchase extra allowances if it costs less to buy the extra
allowances than to install emission controls.  Since the EPA administrator allocates a finite
number of allowances each year, extra allowances are available only if another unit is emitting at
a level below what is permissible under the CAA, or has banked allowances from previous years. 
2Since Title IV is concerned with overall emissions of SO  and not with regional emissions,
which are addressed by the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), state
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implementation plans (SIPs), and new source review nonattainment and prevention of significant
deterioration (PSD) provisions, the emission reduction requirements of the title are achieved
using the most cost-effective means.
Title IV also provides for a reduction in emissions of NOx by approximately 2 million
tons from 1980 levels by requiring the installation of “low NOx burner technology” (LNBT) on
2coal-fired utility boilers.  Unlike the SO  program, the NOx program does not allocate NOx
allowances to coal-fired boilers.  Instead, under Section 407, all coal-fired utilities must comply
either during Phase I or Phase II, depending on the type of boiler at issue with technology-based
emissions limitations set by the EPA.  These emissions limitations were to be based either on
LNBT, for certain types of boilers, or for other boilers, on the best system of emission reduction
technology identified by the EPA as being comparable in cost to LNBT.  A utility unit that is
unable to meet the applicable emission limitation may apply for an alternative emission
limitation or may average its emissions with commonly owned or operated utility units and meet
the standard on an averaged basis.  The statute also provides incentives for using clean coal
technology.
2The SO  and NOx requirements established by Title IV and by the EPA administrator
through regulations are enforced through a permit program.  In Phase I, the permit program was
run by the administrator but, beginning in Phase II, is being administered by the states.  Acid
rain permits are subject to the requirements of Title IV and also of Title V, the operating permits
program.
Lastly, Title IV requires accurate emissions monitoring and imposes penalties and other
2requirements for noncompliance with the SO  and NOx emission reduction requirements.  Title
IV also provided incentives for the use of energy conservation measures and renewable energy
during Phase I. . . .
Sulfur Dioxide Program
Statutory Provisions
2Sections 403, 404, and 405 of the CAA are the principal provisions establishing the SO
program.  Other provisions are found in Sections 409 (repowering), 410 (opt ins) and 416
(auctions and sales of allowances).  In addition to the creation and allocation of marketable
2allowances, the Title IV SO  provisions provided incentives for the use of alternative
technologies and energy conservation during Phase I. . . .
Applicability
2The SO  program applies to new and existing utility units in the forty-eight contiguous
states and the District of Columbia.  This can be determined, however, only upon a review of
various sections of Title IV.  Section 401 states that the purpose of the title is to reduce
2  emissions of SO  and NOxfrom “affected sources” in the contiguous United States.  As defined
in Section 402, an “affected source” is a source comprised of one or more “affected units.” 
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Affected units are defined as those units that are subject to emission reduction requirements
under Title IV, which are “existing utility units” and “new units.”
A “unit” is a fossil fuel-fired combustion device, and an “existing” unit is one that
commenced commercial operation before November 15, 1990, the date of enactment of the CAA
amendments. . . .  A utility unit is a unit that serves a generator that produces electricity for sale,
2or that did so in 1985, and includes certain cogeneration units.  The SO  program also applies to
units that opt into the program under Section 410.
Allowances
2Title IV imposes limits on SO  emissions through a system of marketable allowances. 
Section 403 contains the basic provisions regarding the allowance system.  Pursuant to this
section, the EPA administrator is to issue allowances to the designated representative of each
existing affected unit.  The designated representative is the individual who represents the owner
or operator of a utility unit in the various activities undertaken under Title IV, such as allowance
transactions, permit applications, and compliance plan submittals.  Most utilities have appointed
an official of the company or a plant manager as the designated representative, but they are not
required to do so. . . .
2The EPA administrator issues one allowance for each ton of SO  that the unit is allowed
to emit, as specified in Sections 404, 405, 406, 409, and 410 of the CAA.  New units do not
receive allowances, except for those that commenced operation before December 31, 1995, as
2specified in Section 405(g), but are required to have allowances to cover their SO  emissions
beginning in Phase II.  New units must therefore purchase allowances for existing units, which in
2turn requires the existing units to reduce their emissions.  This preserves the SO  emissions cap.
The EPA administrator was required to ensure that, by Phase II, no more than 8.9 million
allowances could be allocated per year, with the exception of allowances allocated pursuant to
Section 405(a)(2) (bonus allowances), Section 405(a)(3) (extra allowances for certain big high-
emitting units), Section 409 (allowances for repowering extensions), and Section 410
2(allowances for units that opt into the SO  program).  The administrator was required to reduce
the basic Phase II allowance allocations pro rata to ensure that the limit was not exceeded.
The number of allowances that each Phase I affected unit received during Phase I is listed
in Section 404 of the CAA.  The number of allowances that each affected unit receives in Phase
II was not specified in a list; instead, Section 405 contains numerous formulas for determining
the number of allowances that each unit receives.  Section 403(a) required the administrator to
publish a final list of Phase II allowance allocations by December 31, 1992. . . .
Section 403(b) provides that allowances may be freely transferred among designated
representatives of affected units or any holder of allowances.  (Purchases of allowances are not
restricted to utilities and, in fact, there are allowance brokers).  Transfers become effective upon
the EPA administrator’s receipt and recordation of a written certification of the transfer. 
Allowances may be transferred before they are issued (since utilities know in advance how many
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allowanced they will be allocated each year), but they may not be used before the year for which
they are allocated.  Compliance is always determined at the end of the calendar year, under
Section 403(d)(2), so that emissions may go above or below the allocation for a unit during the
year as long as the unit has enough allowances at the end of the year to cover its emissions.  The
administrator was required to promulgate, pursuant to Section 403(d)(1), a system for issuing,
recording, and tracking of allowances and allowance transactions.
Phase I Requirements
Section 404 identifies the units that became affected units beginning in Phase I and
specified the number of allowances that each unit was to receive.  The list in Table A of Section
2404 includes 110 units, all of which are 100 megawatts or greater and had SO  emission rates
greater than 2.5 pounds per million British thermal units (lb/mmBtu).  In general, the number of
2allowances allocated to each unit was based on an SO  emission rate of 2.5 lb/mmBtu applied to
a baseline amount of fossil fuel consumed by the unit, determined by averaging the annual
amounts of fuel consumed in 1985 to 1987. . . .
Phase I Compliance Options
Although Section 404 identified the specific units that became affected in Phase I and the
number of allowances they were to be allocated, the statute provided several options to allow the
2Phase I units to postpone or reassign their SO  affected unit to receive a two-year “extension” of
the Phase I compliance date if it used a qualifying Phase I technology or transferred its emission
reduction obligations to a unit using such a technology, that is, a technology that would achieve
2a 90 percent reduction in SO  emissions.  A unit granted an “extension” was provided more
2allowances, allowing it to emit more SO  for a two-year period. . . .
2Second, pursuant to Section 404(b), utility units could postpone these SO  emission
2reduction requirements by reassigning their Phase I SO  reduction requirements to another unit
under the control of the same owner or operator. . . .  
2Third, a Phase I unit could comply with the SO  emission reduction requirements during
Phase I by reducing utilization of or shutting down a unit. . . .
Energy Conservation and Renewable Energy
2Under Section 404(g), units could receive allowances for each ton of SO  emissions
avoided through the use of qualified energy conservation measures or qualified renewable
energy.  A qualified energy conservation measure is defined as “a cost effective measure,” as
identified by the EPA administrator in consultation with the secretary of energy, “that increases
the efficiency of the use of electricity provided by an electric utility to its customers.”  Qualified
renewable energy is defined as “energy derived from biomass, solar, geothermal, or wind as
identified by the administrator in consultation with the Secretary of Energy."
Pursuant to Section 404(g), the EPA administrator allocated allowances from a reserve of
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300,000 allowances withheld from Phase II allocations if the utility met various requirements
specified in Section 404(f)(2)(B), including that the utility was paying for the measures; that the
utility had adopted and was implementing a least-cost energy conservation and electric power
plan, and, in the case of qualified energy conservation measures, that the state regulatory
authority with jurisdiction over the utility’s rates had established rates and charges to ensure that
the utility’s net income after implementation of the measures was at least as high as if the
measures had not been implemented. . . .
Phase II Requirements
2Beginning in 2000, all existing utility units became subject to the SO  requirements and
have been allocated allowances, pursuant to Section 405, based on an emission rate of 1.2
lb/mmBtu multiplied by the baseline fuel consumption.  These basic allowances are
supplemented by various bonus allowances, specified in Sections 405(b), (c), (d) and 406, and
taken from a Phase II reserve.  The bonus allowances have been allocated for the first ten years
of Phase II. . . .
Nitrogen Oxides Program
. . . The provisions pertaining to NOx control are contained in Section 407 of the CAA. 
The section established technology-based emission limitations and does not employ the same
2market-based incentives as the SO  provisions.  . . . [The section] applies to coal-fired units only 
. . .
Permits
Statutory Provisions Regarding Permits
Acid rain permits are issued pursuant to Section 408 for a period of five years.  They
were issued by the EPA administrator during Phase I and are being issued by the states during
Phase II. . . .
Each permit application must be accompanied by a compliance plan, which must cover
all the affected units that comprise the affected source.  In general, the compliance plan for most
2units will be very simple.  For the SO  program, since the alternative methods of compliance are
no longer available, all the permit applicant needs to do is check a box on the form to indicate
that the unit will hold sufficient allowances by the allowance transfer deadline to cover the unit’s
2SO  emission for the applicable compliance year.  For the NOx program, the unit must check the
box on the form agreeing to meet the applicable emission limitations, or provide more detailed
information if an emissions averaging plan is chosen for compliance.  More detail also is
required for opt-in sources.  The permit application and compliance plan are binding on the
designated representative and the owner or operator and are enforceable in lieu of a permit until
the permit is issued.
_________________
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Notes and Questions
1.  Explain in your own words how the acid rain program works.
1.  The politics of the CAA Amendments of 1990.  An illuminating account of the
passage of the 1990 legislation is GARY C. BRYNER, BLUE SKIES, GREEN POLITICS: THE CLEAN
AIR ACT OF 1990 AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION 113 (2d ed. 1995):
The free flow of money helped stiffen the opposition of some members to
a more stringent clean air bill.  Members of the House Energy and Commerce
Committee, for example, were the recipients in 1989 (a non-election year) of
nearly $612,000 from political action committees (PACs) formed by industries
interested in the bill.  As many as 154 PACs were identified as having a
“significant stake in the outcome of the clean-air bill.”  About 5 percent of all
money raised by all members of Congress in 1989 came from PACs interested in
securing passage of clean air legislation – an average of $14,570 per member. 
Republican members averaged more than $17,278 in contributions; Democrats
averaged $12,729.  The PAC money from clean air interests constituted as much
as one-third of all PAC money received by some members.  The most generous
contributors were the electric utilities, who gave more than $150,000 to members
of the House Energy and Commerce Committee.  They were followed by the oil,
natural gas, automobile, and chemical industries; gas utilities; coal and steel
industries; diversified energy companies; construction; and farm equipment
manufacturing.  Although the amount of PAC money contributed to members
supporting clean air was relatively small in terms of total PAC giving, it is
illustrative of the way campaign spending chases hot legislative issues.  For
members such as Rep. Al Swift (D-Wash.), receiving PAC money was not a
problem:  “There is so damn much money out there that anybody who gives
anybody anything for it is an idiot.”  For industry, PAC contributions have
become a cost of doing business, a prerequisite for ensuring that its voice will be
heard in committee decision making.
Campaign contributions raised fears that industry lobbying might weaken
key provisions of the bill.  In October 1989, the House Subcommittee on Health
and the Environment passed by a 12-10 vote, an amendment to weaken a
provision in the bill mandating the use of alternative fuels, an amendment for
which the auto and oil industries had vigorously lobbied.  The twelve members
who voted in favor of it received an average of $6,021 from oil and auto industry
PACs; the ten members who voted against it took an average of $2,755 from
these PACs.  Some PAC contributions, of course may be nothing more than a
recognition of the already established policy views of members.  But many
observers and participants alike agree that they pose profound problems for the
legislative process.
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__________________
 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) launched its regulatory “reinvention”
efforts in 1995 when President Clinton, Vice President Gore, and EPA Administrator Carol
Browner announced an agenda “to make environmental programs work more fairly, efficiently,
and effectively for the nation.”  It came at a time when many diverse parties with environmental
interests and responsibilities were calling for change – and promptly after the 1994 elections. 
The broader effort was comprised of several programs, including Environmental Performance
Partnerships with the states, a cooperative undertaking with industry called the Common Sense
Initiative, and most prominently Project XL (for “Excellence”).  The following excerpt describes
the development and nature of each.
Reinvention
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 1998 ANNUAL REPORT,
13-14, 26-29, 44-47, 48-50 (1999)
The demand for change [in the environmental regulatory system in the 1990s] can be
traced to a growing and common desire for improvements to the nations’ environmental
protection system.  Over the last three decades, this system, comprised of environmental
programs, regulations, and policies at the federal, state, and local level, is widely recognized as
having dramatically improved conditions throughout the United States.  Today, our air, land, and
water are safer and visibly cleaner even with significant economic expansion and population
growth.  And yet, even with this progress, serious problems, such as polluted runoff to our rivers
and streams and emissions linked to global warming, still exist.  The remaining problems reflect
gaps and limitations within the current system, and they underscore why we must work to
improve it.
Other factors point to the need for change, too.  New scientific and technological
advances make it possible to detect and prevent environmental threats in ways that were simply
not possible when many environmental requirements were first adopted.  Our citizens,
accustomed to living in an information age, want better environmental information.  And as they
become better informed, they also expect a more prominent role in decisionmaking. 
Environmental expertise and management capabilities have grown more sophisticated.  Today,
state and local governments often need less federal assistance and oversight in managing
environmental responsibilities, and American industries typically have their own professional
environmental staffs or consultants.  Finally, the basic concept of environmental protection has
evolved beyond pollution control to include broader objectives, such as pollution prevention,
sustainability, and environmental justice.  All of these factors create pressure for change and
they challenge EPA to constantly rethink how the Agency pursues environmental and public
health protection goals.
To guide our efforts, in 1998, the Agency developed a strategic framework for
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reinvention. . . .  On one level, it calls for EPA to improve functions, such as environmental
permitting, monitoring, or reporting, that represent the core of the nation’s environmental
protection system.  Streamlining environmental reporting and similar improvements to
environmental programs can free businesses, communities, and regulatory agencies from
unnecessary paperwork, allowing them to cut costs and focus on higher priorities and risks.
On another level, the framework calls for EPA to test innovative approaches that can
bridge gaps within the current system and advance protection capabilities to new levels.  We
understand the difficulties and limitations of the current system.  “One-size-fits-all” mandates
don’t always work and some problems aren’t being addressed under the current regulatory
structure.  That is why the Agency is working to find more custom-tailored strategies that better
address today’s problems and that offer more flexibility for those that implement them . . . .
Working with the States
Of all our partnerships, the most critical is our relationship with the states, who share
responsibility for implementing environmental programs.  Under many federal laws, we rely on
states to monitor environmental conditions, issue permits, and enforce requirements.  To
strengthen this partnership, EPA signed an agreement with the states in 1995 to form the
National Environmental Performance Partnership System (NEPPS).
Under this system, states and our 10 Regional offices create tailored Performance
Partnership Agreements (PPAs) to define the goals in each state and how each partner will work
to reach them.  States also may combine some or all of their federal grants into Performance
Partnership Grants (PPGs), giving them additional flexibility in managing and spending federal
dollars.  By the end of 1998, the Agency had PPAs with 33 states, and 43 states had PPGs.
EPA and the states created this new system to focus programs more on environmental
results and to provide more flexibility in how environmental problems are solved.  We also
sought more involvement by the public in planning and priority-setting.  Although such changes
are sometimes difficult, we achieved progress on several fronts during 1998.
Top priority was given to refining a set of core performance measures that would allow
us to jointly evaluate the results from environmental programs.  In the past, federal and state
agencies have typically measured progress in terms of program activities, such as the number of
permits issued or enforcement actions taken.  While these actions are important, they tell us little
about actual conditions.  During 1996 and 1997, we focused on developing more meaningful
measures so we could do a better job of benchmarking progress, reporting results to the public,
and identifying the problem most in need of attention.  These early measures have been
incorporated into PPAs – at the same time we have continued working to refine them. 
Refinements made in 1998 will enable EPA and states to measure and report on progress even
more effectively in the future. . . .
As the Agency has worked more closely with the States in recent years, it has gained a
better understanding of many different issues.  An increasingly important one has been many
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states’ interest in pursuing environmental regulatory innovations.  Because they are on the front
lines implementing many environmental programs, state officials are often in the best position to
see what works well and what does not.  These realizations create interest in finding ways to
achieve desired results more efficiently and effectively.  EPA understands, shares, and strongly
supports this interest.  The challenge is to find ways to innovate without jeopardizing the
national baseline of protection that federal requirements provide.
After more than a year of negotiating how state and federal interests could be
accommodated, in April [1998], EPA and the states agreed on a process that clears the way for
states to pursue regulatory innovations that promise equal or better protection.  The agreement
was signed by Administrator Browner and the Environmental Council of the States (ECOS), the
national organization representing state environmental agencies’ interests.  It is based on seven
shared principles: a willingness to experiment, improved environmental performance, smarter
approaches to solving environmental problems, stakeholder involvement during design and
evaluation, measuring and verifying results against agreed-upon goals and objectives, ensuring
appropriate accountability and enforcement, and promoting state-EPA partnerships.
The agreement allows innovations to be tested in a way that does not compromise
protection provided through federal requirements.  It encourages the states and EPA staff to use
existing options for providing regulatory flexibility to a degree we have never done before, as
long as doing so makes environmental and economic sense.  These options can include
exercising the variances provided under some environmental programs, or writing rules that
allow innovative projects to be tests and perfected under limited circumstances, such as at a
single facility.  EPA developed guidance for its Regions, who will take the lead in working with
the states under this agreement. . . . 
An Industrial Sector Approach to Environmental Protection:
What We Learned from the Common Sense Initiative
One of EPA’s earliest and most ambitious efforts to reinvent environmental protection
began in 1994 when Administrator Browner announced the Common Sense Initiative (CSI). 
This experimental program was designed as an inclusive forum for testing a fundamentally
different approach to environmental protection.  For more than 4 years, diverse interests
representing the Agency, state and local governments, environmental and other public interest
groups, worked to create a more integrated environmental protection system.  Their goal was to
move the current system beyond the compartmentalized structure that has evolved under the
nation’s separate environmental laws and to find ways to make the system work more effectively
for specific industry sectors and other stakeholders.  In all, more than 300 individuals came
together to analyze problems, test solutions, and make recommendations for improving
environmental management capabilities.
Six industry sectors were chosen to represent a broad array of environmental
management challenges facing American industries.  Automobile manufacturing, iron and steel,
and petroleum refining represented three large, highly regulated industries with long, and
sometimes controversial, relationships with EPA.  The metal finishing and printing sectors were
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chosen to represent the challenges facing small businesses.  And the computers and electronics
industry was selected because of its relative newness and rapid growth; many of its processes
were not in existence when environmental laws were written and basic requirements set years
ago.  When CSI was launched, these sectors comprised 11 percent of the U.S. gross national
product; employed more than four million people; and accounted for more than 12 percent of
toxic releases reported by industry.
One of the less tangible, but more important results from CSI was the improved
understanding and cooperation that was gained among participants.  Individuals who were more
accustomed to interacting as adversaries worked together to achieve consensus on complex,
controversial issues.  The process was slow, sometimes tedious, and always challenging.  But it
forced participants to listen to others’ views and to consider others’ special needs and priorities. 
Over time, it opened minds and spawned ideas that will affect the way that we as regulators and
industry do business in the future.  Several examples are discussed below.
Metal Finishing Sector
The most dramatic results from CSI can be seen in the metal finishing industry.  In
January 1998, EPA joined the industry and other stakeholders in launching the National Metal
Finishing Strategic Goals Program, a sector-based environmental stewardship program.  Under
this program, participating facilities voluntarily pledge to meet new environmental performance
goals withing 5 years.  These goals, which will be pursued through innovative pollution
prevention opportunities, include reducing hazardous air emissions by 90 percent, utilizing 98
percent of metals on products (thereby reducing metal wastes), cutting water use by half and
energy use by a quarter.  In addition, the industry pledged to achieve compliance with all
environmental requirements at all of its facilities and to support tough enforcement action
against facilities that routinely fail to meet their regulatory obligations.
EPA, along with other stakeholders who worked with the industry in developing the
program, committed to certain strategic actions to support them in reaching their goals.  For
EPA, these actions included offering special incentives and tools to encourage environmental
improvements and removing regulatory and other barriers that can hinder their improvement
efforts.  For example, we are now taking regulatory action to improve metal finishers’ waste
management options under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.  During CSI
discussion, EPA and other participants learned that current regulations discourage recycling and
inadvertently lead most operations to choose land disposal for disposal needs.  Under a new
proposal just issued in February 1999, metal finishers would be allowed to accumulate waste for
180 days – twice as long as before.  The extension would allow them to generate waste in
volumes sufficient for cost-effective recycling and it would help them avoid expensive costs
associated with transporting and disposing relatively small volumes to an offsite location.
In the Great lakes area, where many metal finishing firms are concentrated,
environmental officials at all levels see this program as a major opportunity to promote recovery
of metals from waste water.  Studies show that the region’s more than 2,000 metal finishing
shops contribute 50 percent of all metal waste flowing into sewage plants for treatment.  As part
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of their commitment under the program, officials in Chicago are working with local stakeholders
to consider tax credits, public recognition, and other incentives for metal finishing firms striving
to meet waste water and other environmental performance goals.
The core of the Strategic Goals Program is the metal finishers’ strong commitment to
pursuing innovative pollution prevention opportunities, matched by regulatory officials and other
stakeholders’ willingness to take action that directly support the industry’s efforts.  As this
flexible, sector-based program expands to include more facilities, states, and localities, it will
provide a replicable model for promoting voluntary stewardship across an entire industry. . . . 
Computer and Electronics Sector
The computer and electronics sector found a solution to a major solid waste management
challenge for its industry – how to handle mounting volumes of outdated computer and
electronics equipment.  In the past, recycling this equipment has been difficult because the
cathode ray tubes used in most display monitors and televisions typically contain lead.  Because
of this content, the components fall under the hazardous waste regulations required by the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.  This means they must be transported and processed
as a hazardous waste.  In June [1998], we committed to change this rule so that the glass can be
recovered and reused as raw material in cathode ray tubing manufacturing.  In addition to cutting
costs and reducing regulatory burden, this change will prevent lead releases into the
environment. . . . 
Project XL Offers Alternatives to Current Regulation
“If you have an idea that offers better results than what would be achieved under current
requirements, then we will work with you and other interested parties to put those ideas to the
test.”  This unprecedented offer, which EPA made to industry in 1995, is breaking new ground
for environmental regulatory reform.  In 1998, we approved innovative tests at two more
companies and a state agency.  To date, 10 projects are being tested, and negotiations on
additional proposals are underway with 20 more potential project sponsors.
One innovative project, and the first with a state sponsor, tests self-certification
procedures as an alternative to traditional environmental permitting.  In Massachusetts, the
Department of Environmental Protection developed the Environmental Results Program to
streamline permitting and reporting requirements for up to 10,000 small businesses in the state. 
This program uses industry-wide performance standards and self-reporting compliance with
specific criteria as an alternative to permits for individual facilities.  Each year, top managers at
each business must certify that their facilities are in compliance; those not in compliance must
specify specific actions and milestones to get there.  By shifting their focus from specific permit
requirements to broader industrywide performance standards, facility managers will be in a
better position to recognize and act upon opportunities for environmental improvement.  As a
result of the new standards, participating industries have already achieved significant
environmental benefits – the photo processors are cutting waste-water discharges of silver by 99
percent while the dry cleaners are reducing their air emissions of perchloroethlyene by 43
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percent.  State officials believe that after an evaluation and revision phase, this permitting
alternative could be transferrable to other industry sectors in Massachusetts and other states.
Another project is investigating how regulatory flexibility might be increased for
facilities with strong environmental management systems (EMS). . . . [A]n EMS provides a
company with a framework for managing all of its environmental responsibilities so they
become more efficient and more integrated into overall business operations.  Lucent
Technologies has a system in place that has been certified by a third party to conform with
international EMS standards.  In June [1998], we signed an agreement under Project XL that will
allow Lucent to use its system as a basis for simplifying permitting, recordkeeping and reporting
requirements at these facilities.  The agreement provides a mechanism for evaluating EMS
features and results and investigating whether certain benefits and incentives should be offered
to facilities that have a high quality EMS in place.
In West Virginia, a project is allowing a specialty chemical manufacturer to test the
environmental benefits that can be gained by giving a facility more flexibility in how
environmental goals are met.  Under the agreement, OSi Specialties, Inc. agreed to install
equipment to control toxic organic air pollutants well ahead of what is required under current
Clean Air Act requirements.  As an incentive, we agreed to defer new controls of toxic organic
air emissions from the facility’s hazardous waste surface impoundments, which are required
under RCPA.  The new installation will allow OSi to eliminate 98 percent (by weight), or
309,000 pounds, of the toxic organic compounds from its productions.  This result is better for
the environment, as similar reductions would not be expected from controlling emissions from
the surface impoundments.
Reengineering Project XL
In 1998, EPA worked to simplify the process for approving innovative testing under
Project XL.  When the Administration announced this precedent setting program in March 1995,
it set a goal of testing 50 projects that would reveal ways to improve environmental regulations. 
But there were no models to draw upon.  All of the parties involved – EPA staff, project
sponsors, states, and stakeholders – had to “learn by doing.”  After gaining experience with
projects, the Agency had a more specific concept of what a quality proposal should contain and
how decisions that affect regulatory flexibility should be made.  Aided by reengineering
expertise from two companies that have participated in Project XL, Union Carbide and Dow
Chemical, we developed a new process that is now faster, more predictable, and more effective
for all parties involved.  The Agency expects this new process should allow agreement to be
reached on most projects in 6 months to a year, compared to 18 months or longer under the old
process.  Evidence of an improved process has already been seen in several projects currently
under development.  The Atlantic Steel project in Atlanta, Georgia, for example, is on track to
have a final project agreement signed 8 months after initial project discussions began.
__________________
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Notes and Questions
1.  Was the Clinton-Gore “reinvention” of environmental regulation just window dressing
or did it have substance?
________________________
Section F.  The Variety of Environmental Movements
While it is common to speak of “the” environmental movement, in reality there is not just
one.  The media typically uses the term "environmentalists" to refer to the mainstream
Washington, D.C.-based organizations.  But people who consider themselves environmentalists
hold a wide range of views and often disagree.  Even within a particular category of
environmental groups – for example, “mainstream,” “grassroots,” or “radical” –  there is great
diversity.  This section provides an overview of this heterogeneity. 
1.  The Mainstream Organizations
A CEO Culture
Robert Gottlieb, FORCING THE SPRING: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN
ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 170-175 (Revised ed. 2005)
. . . [The dynamics among the largest environmental groups at the end of the 1970s]
included the incessant and fierce competition for funds, recognition, and overall political
legitimacy, as well as the lack of cooperation among the heads of the national groups.  Even
though groups had met together before, they had not developed any ongoing relationship or
strategic division of labor concerning issues and organizational resources.  Instead, competition
often created pettiness and, sometimes, personal tension.  Without a forum to create linkages,
disputes between groups and leaders periodically developed and sometimes “festered,” as one of
the leaders put it.  Though increasingly professionalized in their composition and outlook, the
groups had still failed to construct a coherent, movement-wide, institutional framework
commensurate with their role in establishing a policy nexus in Washington.  As leaders of
disparate groups still searching for self-definition, some heads of mainstream organizations had
become more willing to entertain the notion that their relationship needed restructuring, perhaps
in ways similar to their industry antagonists.
One model available was the gathering of corporate chief executive officers that was
established during the 1970s, in part because of environmental issues.  At the national level, this
gathering took place under the aegis of the Business Roundtable; at the regional level, it was
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structured through such groups as the California Business Roundtable and the Western Regional
Council.  Audubon’s Russell Peterson, a former official at DuPont, was especially attracted to
the idea. . . . 
During the next months, the quarterly CEO gatherings continued, with agendas and
chairs rotated among the ten participants.  An air of informality prevailed, though discussion
sometimes focused on particular topics, such as the Clean Air Act.  While several of the CEOs
had wanted the group to remain nameless (and without a specified agenda or set of projects), the
name “Group of Ten” began to be used by both participants and staff members of the groups
involved.  By the end of the group’s first year of meetings, the name had begun to stick,
providing an important identity to this experiment in forming a coordinated institution. . . . 
. . . [One] project involved the . . . ambitious task of identifying a common agenda. . . . 
An Environmental Agenda for the Future was published in 1985, when the Group of Ten was
becoming a much more visible entity.
With the one significant exception of nuclear issues, the areas reviewed by An
Environmental Agenda for the Future duplicated or reinforced earlier ad hoc agendas by
“building upon the strategies of the past two decades,” as the document put it.  What made the
Ten’s efforts most distinctive was the mainstream movement’s dramatic clash with the Reagan
administration that characterized much of Reagan’s first term.
This conflict with the Reaganites, it turned out, also reinforced the movement’s
institutionalization process.  On the one hand, it created a common focus for the Ten, with easily
identifiable targets such as Secretary of the Interior James Watt and the EPA’s director Anne
Gorsuch Burford, dramatizing the conflict with the Reaganites and enhancing the organizational
effectiveness of the Ten.  Audubon, for example, with only limited success in direct-mail
campaigns up to the Reagan period, shifted its appeal to a direct attack on the Reagan
administration and raised more than ten times its largest previous total.  At the same time, while
most groups benefitted enormously from these symbols of confrontation, a few of the Ten, most
notably the Izaak Walton League and the National Wildlife Federation (NWF), had substantial
internal conflicts concerning the battles with the Reaganites.  Watt especially targeted the NWF,
hoping to separate hunting/sportsmen interests from both the traditional conservationists and the
new environmental policy experts.  Though Watt himself largely failed to create such divisions,
perhaps because of his temperament and divisive rhetoric, the NWF leadership under its new
CEO, Jay Hair, maintained an ambivalent posture toward the Reaganite confrontation and the
value of the Group of Ten process. . . . 
By the mid-1980s, as confrontations with the Reaganites began to lessen in intensity, the
Group of Ten became more secure in its defense of – and efforts to extend – existing
environmental policies.  Overtures were made to establish a dialogue with corporate leaders. 
This included a series of meetings with the heads of six chemical companies: DuPont, Exxon
Chemical, Union Carbide, Dow, American Cyanamid, and Monsanto.  The Group of Ten process
was also becoming more routinized, increasingly seen by its participants as a successful effort at
establishing a common frame of reference for the mainstream environmental organizations. 
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Despite Jay Hair’s [ambivalence] and the reluctance of some staff, particularly in groups such as
the Sierra Club and the Environmental Defense Fund, to give much credence or prominence to
the Group of Ten idea, the “CEO gathering” concept continued to suggest ways in which the
groups were tending to converge.  By seeking consensus through its published agenda and
related activities, such as press conferences and other media efforts, the Group of Ten pursued its
search for a common denominator.  The process of attempting to achieve such unity itself
became one more basis for the institutionalization of the movement.  Even when the formal
organization of the Ten collapsed at the end of the decade, due to misgivings about possible
negative associations for such groups as Friends of the Earth and the Sierra Club, the name
“Group of Ten” continued to be used by its critics as the symbol of mainstream
environmentalism.  Strengthened initially by the Reaganite confrontation, forced to locate a
common environmental identity amid potentially differing positions and constituencies, the Ten,
in existence for less than a decade, had effectively redefined mainstream environmentalism less
as a movement and more directly as an adjunct to the policy process.
__________________
Increasing Numbers
Robert Cameron Mitchell, Angela G. Mertig, Riley E. Dunlap, 
Twenty Years of Environmental Mobilization:  Trends Among National Environmental
Organizations, in RILEY E. DUNLAP AND ANGELA MERTIG, EDS., AMERICAN
ENVIRONMENTALISM: THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 1970-1990, 15-16 (1992)
Any lingering doubts about the continuing viability of the environmental cause were
erased when the Reagan administration’s attacks on environmentalism stimulated a new influx
of members in the 1980s. . . .  [T]he organizations most closely identified with [conservation]
reaped the greatest harvest, thanks to the motivational appeal of wildlife and wilderness issues
and the high visibility of James Watt’s alleged misstewardship of the nation’s resources as
President Reagan’s first Secretary of the Interior.  The Wilderness Society grew by a
phenomenal 144% between 1980 and 1983, the Sierra Club by 90%, and the Defenders of
Wildlife and Friends of the Earth by about 40% each.  Subsequent growth [was also] strong, so
that by 1989 these organizations counted a total membership of more than 2,700,000.
The most recent surge in membership occurred at the turn of the decade (1990),
stimulated by the visibility of ecological problems ranging from toxic wastes, beach
contamination, the Exxon Valdez oil spill, ozone destruction, and global warming, as well as by
the substantial mobilization efforts these organizations made in conjunction with the twentieth
Earth Day celebration.  Total membership for these organizations grew substantially from 1989
to 1990, and exceeded 3 million by the twentieth Earth Day anniversary. . . . 
 
Two factors seem to account for the national lobbying organizations’ substantial growth
in memberships.  The first is the high level of public concern about their issue agenda, which
created the potential for mass mobilization on behalf of environmental protection.  Public
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opinion polls have recorded strong support, albeit with some ups and downs, for environmental
protection from 1970 to 1990.  Views that were once shared by a relatively small number of
environmental activists before the first Earth Day have apparently diffused to the public at large. 
Of particular importance is the fact that environmental concern cuts across socioeconomic and
political categories.  The result is that tens of millions of Americans with at least some college
and with upper-middle-class incomes (the optimal target group for environmental direct mail
lists) are sufficiently sympathetic to the organizations’ goals that it is profitable to include them
in “prospect lists” for direct mail campaigns.
__________________
The Environmental Movement in the 1980s
Michael McCloskey, Twenty Years of Change in the Environmental Movement:
 An Insider’s View, in RILEY E. DUNLAP AND ANGELA MERTIG, EDS., AMERICAN
ENVIRONMENTALISM: THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 1970-1990, pages 81-85 (1992)
Strategies
. . . [T]he strong hostility of the Reagan administration, which persisted for 8 years
(although the hard edge was taken off at the end of the first term), stunned the movement.  Not
only did the federal government no longer propose new initiatives, it no longer even tried to
maintain the programs of the past.  Reaganites schemed to undo and dismember pollution and
public lands programs.  Normal diplomatic relations [between environmental groups and] . . .
administration figures virtually ceased.  The movement lost any incentive to temper its criticisms
because it knew that the administration was in the hands of ideological opponents who were not
only unsympathetic but antagonistic.  Adversarial relations became normal.
  
However, the barrage of criticisms that the movement unleashed toward the
administration had unexpected results.  First, the movement came to expect less and less as
normal, which lowered the threshold for acceptable performance.  And second, the criticisms not
only hit the Reagan appointees but the federal government itself.  The anger and frustration over
the federal government’s abandonment of environmental programs spilled over to attach to the
career bureaucracy and allied institutions.  The career people in agencies such as the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) were seen as not having kept the faith and has having
been subverted by notions such as EPA is a risk-assessment agency instead of a pollution-
reduction agency.  Other natural resource agencies were seen as lacking the will to do anything
right anymore and as being in a perpetual state of war with the public they served.  None of the
federal agencies was seen as caring about the views of the constituencies who had created them.
This very frustration also created the tension implicit in the performance gap.  Public
anger over the default of the federal government expressed itself in polls showing incredibly
high levels of demand that something positive be done.  There was a tremendous gap between
what the public wanted and what it was getting.  The public felt so strongly because the federal
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government had turned its back on their demands, injuring its status in the eyes of the public. 
Disillusionment with the federal government may have been exactly what the Reaganites were
seeking to engender, but it posed a problem for a movement that had always placed so much
emphasis on the federal role.  Would its constituents continue to rally to calls for new federal
programs?
In the meantime, a slow reversal had occurred with regard to the roles of state and local
government.  When the movement began, state and local government was [sic] seen as largely in
the hands of those with little sympathy for environmental goals.  However, by the end of the
1970s this had begun to change, with environmentally sympathetic administrations coming to
power in many states and localities.  Now the movement came to see these jurisdictions as places
to innovate and set the pace and to outflank federal intransigence.  Industry, in turn, came to
hope the federal government would preempt the field with weak standards and prevent states
from setting higher standards.  This reversal in attitudes, however, reflected falling expectations
with regard to what could be accomplished at the federal level.
It also highlighted the confusion over where to go to seek solutions.  From the outset the
movement had been caught in the conflict between its philosophy and what was happening in the
world with respect to decentralization.  Its Earth Day era philosophy favored decentralization
and breaking institutions into smaller units, which were more understandable and could be more
responsive.  However, as the world economy became more interconnected and technology
introduced greater complexity, the environmental movement found itself chasing after new sets
of problems, such as global warming and damage to the ozone layer.  Dealing with such
problems called for more centralized planning and international treaties and for ever greater
complexity in the scale of organization.  The scale of the problems demanded commensurate
solutions, but that led away from decentralization, at least in the short run, and took the
movement even further from its grassroots and policies its supporters could relate to.
This problem, moreover, exemplified what was happening as time passed after Earth
Day.  Connections to the philosophy that gave birth to Earth Day were becoming more and more
tenuous, and the broad visions of that time (1970) were seldom articulated anymore.  Few would
see what all the solutions could add up to or where the amelioristic solutions of the pragmatists
were heading.  Indeed, pragmatists found reasons for not projecting too far ahead for fear of
alienating would-be allies on given issues and for fear of being wrong on the scientific basis of
newly emerging problems.  However, by the same token, this lack of utopian vision left the
new recruits, who were mobilized by the anti-Watt wars and the seriousness of the new threats,
unsure of what flag they were following.  They knew that the condition of the environment
should be improved, but they could not tell what kind of society could best provide that
improvement.
Tactics
Over some 20 years, the environmental movement has steadily improved the toolbox of
techniques it can use to influence public policy.
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. . . Computerized membership lists were broken down by Congressional districts; phone
banks routinely prompted calls to Congressional offices; mail-grams to thousands of members
could be generated by an electronic signal.  Waves of constituents were brought in to lobby
Congress, and flyers went out almost with every mail.  If anything, the process became almost
too routine.  Congressional offices were deluged with mail and began to need to see more mail to
feel moved.  Moreover, the mail needed to hit after “their” mail had arrived, and the impact of
mail wore off quickly.  Members of these organizations dragged in for lobbying rounds often felt
like cannon fodder.
So many last-ditch campaigns were run by the Sierra Club that campaigns lost their sense
of being special.  This was especially true with the spate of reauthorizations of pollution laws. 
None of them was final; there would always be another one.  Lobbying campaigns lost their
intensity and sense of drama as history in the making.  Memories of major efforts faded quickly. 
More ominously, few organizations other than the Sierra Club were even trying to mount major
campaigns anymore.  The campaign that involved a large budget, great specialization in terms of
staff roles, mass publicity, and continuing constituency mobilization became rarer and rarer.
Faith began to wane that major lobbying efforts had much payoff anyway.  Surely, the
movement could still get statutes enacted, and it could win lawsuits over government refusal to
implement them.  But could we get them implemented properly in the final analysis?  As in the
adage, we could lead a horse to water, but could we force it to drink?  Litigation and
Congressional oversight could move a recalcitrant executive branch only so far; they could never
force it to implement a law as well.
By the end of the 1980s there was a sense that environmental regulatory programs were a
shambles, with much of the promise of environmental statutes reduced to dead letters. 
Inconvenient environmental language was simply ignored or treated as Congress’s opinion. 
EPA programs seemed to be all input and virtually no output.  What was the point of great
lobbying campaigns in Congress if so little came of the enactments in the end?
How the National Organizations . . . Changed
. . . Fewer and fewer chief executive officers (CEOs) were hired from within
environmental organizations or even out of the ranks of environmental experts.  Most were hired
from the outside because of their abilities in public relations, work with funders and donors, and
management experience.  They had not learned the environmental business on the firing line. 
They have no institutional memory on which to draw (and, with turnover, few are left with this
memory in many organizations).
Such environmental CEOs were loath to question accepted ways of doing business and
have largely been content to keep things going as they have been, at least with regard to
strategies and issues.  As managers, many have put emphasis on putting management procedures
in place, on working through channels, and on staying within the budget.  This has added to the
rigidity of the organizations and has made it harder for them to innovate and to evaluate which
approaches are most productive. . . . 
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[As of 1992], groups with little sense of vision are prospering simply because of the
fund-raising talents of those working for them and because of the receptivity of the market.  The
same direct-mail consultants often have contracts with a number of organizations, and their
copywriters’ skills bring in membership for them all.  But this success does not necessarily mean
that the organizations are running successful environmental programs.  The success speaks more
for the skills of the consultants and the hunger of the public for hope.  A crisis lurks behind this
facade: Do these organizations know how to deliver what the public thinks it is getting – a better
environment?
Many of the organizations are very good at certain things: the Sierra Club in mobilizing
its large cadre of grassroots activists; the Wilderness Society at research and public relations; the
Nature Conservancy at habitat surveys; the National Wildlife Federation in reaching middle-
class and working-class people with an environmental message; the NRDC in mastering the
complexities of federal programs; the Audubon Society in running sanctuaries; and the Sierra
Club Legal Defense Fund [since renamed Earthjustice] in litigating.  Nevertheless, these
strengths do not necessarily add up to success for a movement, particularly as times change. 
None of these organizations, for instance, has shown any great expertise in lobbying
administrative agencies, although NRDC knows how to talk to agency specialists.
_________________
2.  Grassroots Environmentalism and Other Alternatives to the Mainstream
Beginning in the 1970's, a new environmental movement emerged at the local level, one
often highly critical of the concerns and strategies of the mainstream national organizations. 
Though often created as a response to environmental pollution, many of these groups focus on
biodiversity conservation, watershed protection, forest management, and similar issues.
The Antitoxics Movement
ROBERT GOTTLIEB, FORCING THE SPRING: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN
ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 170-175 (Revised ed. 2005)
The first significant indication of the limits of the new waste policies emerged at Love
Canal [New York] shortly after the passage of RCRA and TSCA.  The dramatic events at Love
Canal (which involved such issues as the nature and evaluation of risk and the role and
responsibility of industry and government regulators) became a staging ground for the
development of a new movement that was primarily about community empowerment.  The
sequence of events that took place – the casual dumping of highly toxic industrial chemicals by
Hooker Chemical over several decades, the leasing of the waste site for one dollar for
construction of a school on the site, the discovery of widespread health impacts on local
residents and their continuous battle with agencies such as the State Health Department to
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acknowledge such impacts, and the residents’ ability to mobilize effectively and use certain
forms of confrontation to force public officials to respond – has since become part of the folklore
of the antitoxics movement.  A number of the tactics employed, such as the community-initiated
health survey, the willingness to challenge rather than just lobby politicians, and a flair for the
dramatic symbolized by the hostage-taking of EPA officials, have also become the signature of
the antitoxic groups.
The Love Canal events were also significant in demonstrating that new forms of
environmental leadership were capable of addressing complex technical issues related to the
nature of the contamination and assessment of the risks involved.  The Love Canal
Homeowners’ Association – consisting of nonprofessional lower-middle-class and middle-class
family members, especially women – and its leaders, including Lois Gibbs, who emerged as a
kind of Everywoman in her appearance and style, belied the traditional profile of environmental
organization and advocacy.  The Homeowners’ Association and Gibbs did effectively use
outside scientists and even environmental groups such as the EDF to help situate and buttress
their arguments and familiarize themselves with the language and application of technical
information.  But it was the community residents and their leaders who devised the tactics,
framed the strategies, and established their bottom line – in the case of Love Canal, the group’s
insistence that homes on or adjacent to the dump site had to be purchased by the government,
since the contamination had become too extensive and intrusive in its impacts on daily life.
  
. . . In terms of the people who became involved and the spontaneous agendas they
developed, Love Canal ultimately prefigured a new way of defining what it meant to be an
environmentalist.
Yet the label “environmentalist” did not come easy to this new movement.  Many of the
community groups quickly became wary of the language, style, and agenda of the mainstream
groups.  At the same time, the mainstream groups responded to the Love Canal events not by
seeking to restructure their approach toward toxics policy but by extending existing
environmental policy to deal with the problem of contaminated hazardous waste sites.  But it
was the threat that additional Love Canals were waiting to be discovered and that loud and
intractable community groups were waiting to be formed, more than the lobbying of the
mainstream groups, that pushed Congress to fast-track legislation to establish new cleanup
procedures.  This resulted in the December 1980 passage of the Comprehensive Emergency
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), better known as Superfund.
Instead of drawing community-based groups and mainstream organizations closer
together in terms of its stated intent to clean up waste sites, Superfund only served to accentuate
their differences.  Like RCRA, CERCLA established an elaborate waste management system. 
This included complex organisms for identifying a site, placing it on a National Priorities List,
creating mechanisms to name the parties responsible for the contamination, attempting to secure
payments to help pay for the effort, and eventually selecting the cleanup technology to be used. 
The legislation revealed the environmental policy system at its most technically complex and
unsuccessful.  Each step of the process was subject to challenge, overly bureaucratized, slow to
develop, and unable to meet its objectives.  Superfund also became vulnerable to political
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maneuvering due to its high visibility, high costs, and high-stakes outcomes.  And while many of
the mainstream environmental groups sought to monitor and influence the course of Superfund
and RCRA and other toxics and waste-related legislation passed during the 1980s, a significant
faction of the movement, led by the National Wildlife Federation and the Conservation
Foundation, called for cooperation with industry and the substitution of voluntary initiatives for
the unwieldy regulatory framework that had been established.
For this new community-based antitoxics movement, the focus by the mainstream groups
on the regulatory system and the push for voluntarism reinforced their perception that they were
a movement apart from these kinds of environmental activities and agendas.  As groups sprang
up in places such as Jacksonville, Arkansas, or Nanotches, Louisiana, their focus on the plight of
their own communities and the sense of urgency they brought to their actions let to immediate –
and often dramatic – confrontations that rivaled the Love Canal events.  Lois Gibbs herself
became a central figure in giving shape and definition to that process.  Having relocated to
Arlington, Virginia, after her house was bought out, and after achieving even greater visibility
with the airing of a television movie about the Love Canal events that focused on her role, Gibbs
found herself constantly sought after by local groups for both advice and inspiration.  With a few
of her allies and advisors from the Love Canal fight and an organizer who had been involved
with the Saul Alinksy-initiated Industrial Areas Foundation, Gibbs established the Citizen’s
Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste in 1981 to consolidate and extend her rapidly expanding
networking activities.  Other antitoxics networking groups formed in this period, most
prominently the National Toxics Campaign Fund, and spinoff of Massachusetts Fair Share, a
Nader-like citizen-action organization.  Together, the groups involved with the toxics issue,
including Citizens for a Better Environment (CBE), Clean Water Action, the PIRG groups,
Greenpeace, and hundreds of community-based associations, helped shape the beginnings of a
new social movement.
By the mid-1980s, the number of community groups dealing with toxics and waste-
related issues had increased dramatically.  Their focus extended beyond existing hazardous
waste sites to deal with a range of other waste issues, such as solid waste landfills and new
waste-management facilities, including solid waste, medical waste, and hazardous waste
incineration.
__________________
The Radical Wing
Michael McCloskey, Twenty Years of Change in the Environmental Movement: 
An Insider’s View, in RILEY E. DUNLAP AND ANGELA MERTIG, EDS., AMERICAN
ENVIRONMENTALISM: THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 1970-1990, pages 78-79 (1992)
From about 1972 on, the environmental movement was remarkably free of stress over
ideology.  However, this changed again by the mid-1980s when a new radical wing emerged in
the environmental movement.  This new radical wing was something more than a revival of the
old lifestyle wing.  It had many more strands and was characterized by a strong critique of the
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conventional methods of the pragmatists.  To some extent, this new radicalism embodied a
reaction against the anti-environmental radicalism of the Reagan administration.  It reflected a
determination to go as far as possible in the opposite direction. . . . 
Some of the new radicals were radical in their demands, and others were radical in the
means they used.  The deep ecologists, the bioregionalists, and the residue of the lifestyle camp
wanted sweeping changes in society and living patterns but were largely apolitical.  Their
demands were radical, but their means did not shock people.  Also radical in their demands (but
less so) and not shocking in their means were those organizing green party units, followers of
Barry Commoner, social ecologists, and local radical activists such as groups mobilized around
toxics issues and neighborhood “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) groups.
Some groups had demands that were not at all radical, but they used direct-action
techniques of protest that seemed radical in their confrontational style.  Groups such as
Greenpeace prospered in using these techniques, and smaller groups such as the Rainforest
Action Network did too.  In a sense, this was really a continuation of the approach pioneered by
the nuclear protesters, and indeed, Greenpeace began protesting nuclear explosions.
Finally, groups such as Earth First! and the Sea Shepherd Society actually used radical
means, resorting to sabotage and other illegal techniques, although their demands for changes in
public policy were not always radical.  It is interesting, too, that these groups were still
concerned with public policy and often addressed rather conventional issues of preserving
forests, whales, and other wildlife.
Most of the radicals took pains to distinguish themselves from the mainstream, pragmatic
groups.  They broke the long-standing rule of not speaking ill of their brethren; they did not see
themselves as brethren but as stern critics pointing out the error of the ways of the mainstream
groups.  These latter groups were attacked for being wrongheaded in placing their faith in a
government that had betrayed them.  Many radicals wanted to attack the basic system of
industrialism and consumerism, and the mainstream groups did not.  The mainstream groups
were attacked for not getting the job done – for being complacent, co-opted, bureaucratic,
distant, arrogant, interested only in professional “perks” and money, and for being too
conservative.  Needless to say, these attacks, which were largely not reciprocated, ended any
sense of comity or unity in a common cause. . . . .
Less pronounced, but nonetheless clear, was another split on the other end of the
spectrum.  Fred Krupp, the executive director of the Environmental Defense Fund, had
announced in the mid-1980s that the era of confrontation was over.  He predicted that a new era
was beginning in which industry and environmentalists would work together harmoniously; this
would be a time of accommodation.  These accommodators would look less to the heavy-handed
governmental regulation favored by the reformers and more to market-like mechanisms to
achieve their ends.  This rationale gave more establishment-oriented groups such as the
Conservation Foundation, Resources for the Future, the World Wildlife Fund, the Nature
Conservancy, and the World Resources Institute a nicely articulated ideological niche.
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__________________
3.  Environmental Justice
While definitions of “environmental racism” and “environmental justice” do vary, the
following capture the concerns of the movement:
Environmental racism is racial discrimination in environmental policy-
making.  It is racial discrimination in the enforcement of regulations and laws.  It
is racial discrimination in the deliberate targeting of communities of color for
toxic waste disposal and siting of polluting industries.  It is racial discrimination
in the official sanctioning of the life-threatening presence of poisons and
pollutants in communities of color.  And, it is racial discrimination in the history
of excluding people of color from the mainstream environmental groups,
decisionmaking boards, commissions, and regulatory bodies.
Benjamin F. Chavis, Jr., Forward, in CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES FROM
THE GRASSROOTS 3 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1993).
[A] singular focus on the distribution of pollution harms and risks has
been criticized by environmental justice advocates as missing their point.  To
activists, environmental justice is a much more holistic concept that includes the
right to a safe, healthy, productive, and sustainable environment for all.  In this
context, the “environment” is considered to include the ecological, physical,
social, political, aesthetic, and economic environments.  Environmental justice
thus refers to the conditions in which such a right can be freely exercised,
whereby individual and group identities, needs, and dignities are preserved,
fulfilled, and respected in a way that provides for self-actualization and personal
and community empowerment.
Tseming Yang, Melding Civil Rights and Environmentalism: Finding Environmental Justice’s
Place in Environmental Regulation, 26 HARVARD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW 1, 19 (2002).
The Early Evidence
COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST),
TOXIC WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES xi-xv, 13 (1987)
Issues surrounding the siting of hazardous waste facilities in racial and ethnic
communities gained national prominence in 1982.  The Commission for Racial Justice joined
ranks with residents of predominantly Black and poor Warren County, North Carolina in
opposing the establishment of a polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) disposal landfill.  This
opposition culminated in a nonviolent civil disobedience campaign and more than 500 arrests. 
As a result of the protests in Warren County, the [General Accounting Office, since renamed the
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Government Accountability Office (GAO)] studied the racial and socio-economic status of
communities surrounding four landfills in southeastern United States.  It found that Blacks
comprised the majority of the population in three of the four communities studied.
  
Previous to the Warren County demonstrations, racial and ethnic communities had been
marginally involved with issues of hazardous wastes.  One reason for this can be traced to the
nature of the environmental movement which has historically been white middle and upper-class
in its orientation.  This does not mean, however, that racial and ethnic communities do not care
about the quality of their environment and its effect on their lives.  Throughout the course of the
Commission for the Racial Justice’s involvement with issues of hazardous wastes and
environmental pollution, we have found numerous grassroots racial and ethnic groups actively
seeking to deal with this problem in their communities. . . . 
Having observed these developments, the United Church of Christ Commission for
Racial Justice decided, in 1986, to conduct extensive research on the relationship between the
location of sites containing hazardous wastes and the racial and socio-economic characteristics
of persons living in close proximity to those sites.  The Commission for Racial Justice employed
. . . a New York-based research firm, to assist in these investigations.  It was hoped that these
studies would lead, for the first time, to a comprehensive national analysis of the relationship
between hazardous wastes and racial and ethnic communities.
“Hazardous wastes” is the term used by the EPA to define by-products of industrial
production which present particularly troublesome health and environmental problems.  Newly
generated hazardous wastes must be managed in an approved “facility,” which is defined by the
EPA as any land and structures thereon which are used for treating, storing or disposing of
hazard wastes (TSD facility).  Such facilities may include landfills, surface impoundments or
incinerators.  A “commercial” facility is defined as any facility (public or private) which accepts
hazardous wastes from a third party for a fee or other remuneration.
“Uncontrolled toxic waste sites” refer to closed and abandoned sites on the EPA’s list of
sites which pose a present and potential threat to human health and the environment.  The
problem of human exposure to uncontrolled hazardous wastes is national in its scope.  By 1985,
the EPA had inventoried approximately 20,000 uncontrolled sites containing hazardous wastes
across the nation.  The potential health problems associated with the existence of these sites is
highlighted by the fact that approximately 75 percent of U.S. cities derive their water supplies, in
total or in part, from groundwater.
Major Findings
This report presents findings from two cross-sectional studies on demographic patterns
associated with (1) commercial hazardous waste facilities and (2) uncontrolled toxic waste sites. 
The first was an analytical study which revealed a striking relationship between the location of
commercial hazardous waste facilities and race.  The second was a descriptive study which
documented the widespread presence of uncontrolled toxic waste sites in racial and ethnic
communities throughout the United States.  Among the many findings that emerged from these
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studies, the following are most important:
Demographic Characteristics of Communities with Commercial Hazardous Waste Facilities
• Race proved to be the most significant among variables tested in association with
the location of commercial hazardous waste facilities.  This represented a
consistent national pattern.
• Communities with the greatest number of commercial hazardous waste facilities
had the highest composition of racial and ethnic residents.  In communities with
two or more facilities or one of the nation’s five largest landfills, the average
minority percentage of the population was more than three times that of
communities without facilities (38 percent vs. 12 percent). 
• In communities with one commercial hazardous waste facility, the average
minority percentage of the population was twice the average minority percentage
of the population in communities without such facilities (24 percent vs. 12
percent.)
• Although socio-economic status appeared to play an important role in the location
of commercial hazardous waste facilities, race still proved to be more significant. 
This remained true after the study controlled for urbanization and regional
differences.  Incomes and home values were substantially lower when
communities with commercial facilities were compared to communities in the
surrounding counties without facilities.
• Three out of the five largest commercial hazardous waste landfills in the United
States were located in predominantly Black or Hispanic communities.  These
three landfills accounted for 40 percent of the total estimated commercial landfill
capacity in the nation.
Demographic Characteristics of Communities with Uncontrolled Toxic Waste Sites
• Three out of every Black and Hispanic Americans lived in communities with
uncontrolled toxic waste sites.
•  More than 15 million Blacks lived in communities with one or more uncontrolled
toxic waste sites.
• More than 8 million Hispanics lived in communities with one or more
uncontrolled toxic waste sites.
• Blacks were heavily over-represented in the populations of metropolitan areas
with the largest number of uncontrolled toxic waste sites.  These areas include:
Memphis, TN (173 sites); Cleveland, OH (106 sites); St. Louis, MO (160 sites);
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Chicago, IL (103 sites); Houston, TX (152 sites); and Atlanta, GA (91 sites).
• Los Angeles, California had more Hispanics living in communities with
uncontrolled toxic waste sites than any other metropolitan area in the United
States.
• Approximately half of all Asian/Pacific Islanders and American Indians lived in
communities with uncontrolled toxic waste sites.
• Overall, the presence of uncontrolled toxic waste sites was highly pervasive. 
More than half of the total population in the United States resided in communities
with uncontrolled toxic waste sites.
Major Conclusions and Recommendations
The findings of the analytical study on the location of commercial hazardous waste
facilities suggest the existence of clear patterns which show that communities with greater
minority percentages of the population are more likely to be the sites of such facilities.  The
possibility that these patterns resulted by chance is virtually impossible, strongly suggesting that
some underlying factor or factors, which are related to race played a role in the location of
commercial hazardous waste facilities.  Therefore, the Commission for Racial Justice concludes
that, indeed, race has been a factor in the location of commercial hazardous waste facilities in the
United States.
The findings of the descriptive study on the location of uncontrolled toxic waste sites
suggest an inordinate concentration of such sites in Black and Hispanic communities,
particularly in urban areas.  This situation reveals that the issue of race is an important factor in
describing the problem of the uncontrolled toxic waste sites.  We, therefore, conclude that the
cleanup of uncontrolled toxic waste sites in Black and Hispanic communities in the United
States should be given the highest possible priority.
__________________
The Existence of Environmental Racism
Robert D. Bullard, Anatomy of Environmental Racism and the Environmental Justice Movement,
in ROBERT D. BULLARD, ED., CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM:
VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS 17-19 (1993)
Whether by conscious design or institutional neglect, communities of color in urban
ghettos, in rural “poverty pockets,” or on economically impoverished Native-American
reservations face some of the worst environmental devastation in the nation.  Clearly, racial
discrimination was not legislated out of existence in the 1960s.  While some significant progress
was made during this decade, people of color continue to struggle for equal treatment in many
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areas, including environmental justice.  Agencies at all levels of government, including the
federal EPA, have done a poor job protecting people of color from the ravages of pollution and
industrial encroachment.  It has thus been an up-hill battle convincing white judges, juries,
government officials, and policy makers that racism exists in environmental protection,
enforcement, and policy formulation.
The most polluted urban communities are those with crumbling infrastructure, ongoing
economic disinvestment, deteriorating housing, inadequate schools, chronic unemployment, a
high poverty rate, and an overloaded health-care system.  Riot-torn South Central Los Angeles
typifies this urban neglect.  It is not surprising that the “dirtiest” zip code in California belongs to
the mostly African-American and Latino neighborhood in that part of the city. In the Los
Angeles basin, over 71 percent of the African-Americans and 50 percent of the Latinos live in
areas with the most polluted air, while only 34 percent of the white population does.  This
pattern exists nationally as well.
Income alone does not account for these above-average percentages.  Housing
segregation and development patterns play a key role in determining where people live. 
Moreover, urban development and the “spatial configuration” of communities flow from the
forces and relationships of industrial production which, in turn, are influenced and subsidized by
government policy.  There is widespread agreement that vestiges of race-based decisionmaking
still influence housing, education, employment, and criminal justice.  The same is true for
municipal services such as garbage pickup and disposal, neighborhood sanitation, fire and police
protection, and library services.  Institutional racism influences decisions on local land use,
enforcement of environmental regulations, industrial facility siting, management of economic
vulnerability, and the paths of freeways and highways.
People skeptical of the assertion that poor people and people of color are targeted for
waste-disposal sites should consider the report the Cerrell Associates provided the California
Waste Management Board.  In their 1984 report, Political Difficulties Facing Waste-to-Energy
Conversion Plant Siting, they offered a detailed profile of those neighborhoods most likely to
organize effective resistance against incinerators.  The policy conclusion based on this analysis
is clear.  As the report states:
All socioeconomic groupings tend to resent the nearby siting of major
facilities, but middle and upper socioeconomic strata posses better resources to
effectuate their opposition.  Middle and higher socioeconomic strata
neighborhoods should not fall within the one-mile and five-mile radius of the
proposed site.
Where then will incinerators or other polluting facilities be sited?  For Cerrell Associates,
the answer is low-income, disempowered neighborhoods with a high concentration of nonvoters. 
The ideal site, according [to] their report, has nothing to do with environmental soundness but
everything to do with lack of social power.  Communities of color in California are far more
likely to fit this profile than are their white counterparts.
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Those still skeptical of the existence of environmental racism should also consider the
fact that zoning boards and planning commissions are typically stacked with white developers. 
Generally, the decisions of these bodies reflect the special interests of the individuals who sit on
these boards.  People of color have been systematically excluded from these decisionmaking
boards, commissions, and governmental agencies (or allowed only token representation). 
Grassroots leaders are now demanding a shared role in all the decisions that shape their
communities.  They are challenging the intended or unintended racist assumptions underlying
environmental and industrial policies.
__________________
Underlying Causes
Vicki Been, Locally Undesirable Land Uses
in Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics?
103 YALE LAW JOURNAL 1383, 1384-92, 1406 (1994)
The environmental justice movement contends that people of color and the poor are
exposed to greater environmental risks than are whites and wealthier individuals.  The
movement charges that this disparity is due in part to racism and classes in the siting of
environmental risks, the promulgation of environmental laws and regulations, the enforcement of
environmental laws, and the attention given to the cleanup of polluted areas.  To support the first
charge – that the siting of waste dumps, polluting factories, and other locally undesirable land
uses (LULUs) has been racist and classes – advocates for environmental justice have cited more
than a dozen studies analyzing the relationship between neighborhoods’ socioeconomic
characteristics and the number of LULUs they host.  The studies demonstrate that those
neighborhoods in which LULUs are located have, on average, a higher percentage of racial
minorities and are poorer than non-host communities.  That research does not, however,
establish that the host communities were disproportionately minority or poor at the time the sites
were selected.  Most of the studies compare the current socioeconomic characteristics of
communities that host various LULUs to those of communities that do not host such LULUs. 
This approach leaves open the possibility that the sites for LULUs were chosen fairly, but that
subsequent events produced the current disproportion in the distribution of LULUs.  In other
words, the research fails to prove environmental justice advocates’ claim that the
disproportionate burden poor and minority communities now bear in hosting LULUs is the result
of racism and classes in the siting process itself.
In addition, the research fails to explore an alternative or additional explanation for the
proven correlation between the current demographics of communities and the likelihood that
they host LULUs.  Regardless of whether the LULUs originally were sited fairly, it could well
be that neighborhoods surrounding LULUs became poorer and became home to a greater
percentage of people of color over the years following the sitings.  Such factors as poverty,
housing discrimination, and the location of jobs, transportation, and other public services may
have led the poor and racial minorities to “come to the nuisance” – to move to neighborhoods
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that host LULUs – because those neighborhoods offered the cheapest available housing.  Despite
the plausibility of that scenario, none of the existing research on environmental justice has
examined how the siting of undesirable land uses has subsequently affected the socioeconomic
characteristics of host communities.  Because the research fails to prove that the siting process
causes any of the disproportionate burden the poor and minorities now bear, and because the
research has ignored the possibility that market dynamics may have played some role in the
distribution of that burden, policymakers now have no way of knowing whether the siting
process is “broke” and needs fixing.  Nor can they know whether even an ideal siting system that
ensured a perfectly fair initial distribution of LULUs would result in any long-term benefit to the
poor or to people of color.
[T]he existing research . . . is insufficient to determine whether the siting process placed
LULUs in neighborhoods that were disproportionately minority or poor at the time the facility
was opened, whether the siting of the facility subsequently drove host neighborhoods to become
home to a larger percentage of people of color or the poor than other communities, or whether
both of these phenomena contributed to the current distribution of LULUs. . . .  [M]arket
dynamics may play a significant role in creating the disparity between the racial composition of
host communities and that of non-host communities.  In [one study], LULUs initially were sited
somewhat disproportionately in poor communities and communities of color.  After the sitings,
the levels of poverty and percentages of African-Americans in the host neighborhoods increased,
and the property values in these neighborhoods declined.  Accordingly, the study suggests that
while siting decisions do disproportionately affect minorities and the poor, market dynamics also
play a very significant role in creating the uneven distribution of the burdens LULUs impose. 
Even if siting processes can be improved, therefore, market forces are likely to create a pattern in
which LULUs become surrounded by people of color and the poor, and consequently come to
impose a disproportionate burden upon those groups.  [A] smaller study, on the other hand, finds
a correlation between neighborhood demographics and initial siting decisions, but finds no
evidence that market dynamics are leading the poor or people of color to “come to the nuisance.”
The siting of a LULU can influence the characteristics of the surrounding neighborhood
in two ways.  First, an undesirable land use may cause those who can afford to move to become
dissatisfied and leave the neighborhood.  Second, by making the neighborhood less desirable, the
LULU may decrease the value of the neighborhood’s property, making the housing more
available to lower income households and less attractive to higher income households.  The end
result of both influences is likely to be that the neighborhood becomes poorer that it was before
the siting of the LULU.
The neighborhood also is likely to become home to more people of color.  Racial
discrimination in the sale and rent of housing relegates people of color (especially African-
Americans) to the least desirable neighborhoods, regardless of their income level.  Moreover,
once a neighborhood becomes a community of color, racial discrimination in the promulgation
and enforcement of zoning and environmental protection laws, the provision of municipal
services, and the lending practices of banks may cause neighborhood quality to decline further. 
That additional decline, in turn, will induce those who can leave the neighborhood – the least
poor and those least subject to discrimination – to do so.
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The dynamics of the housing market therefore are likely to cause the poor and people of
color to move to or remain in the neighborhoods in which LULUs are located, regardless of the
demographics of the communities when the LULUs were first sited.  As long as the market
allows the existing distribution of wealth to allocate goods and services, it would be surprising
indeed if, over the long run, LULUs did not impose a disproportionate burden upon the poor. 
And as long as the market discriminates on the basis of race, it would be remarkable if LULUs
did not impose a disproportionate burden upon the poor. . . . 
. . . [I]f the disproportionate distribution of LULUs results from market forces which
drive the poor, regardless of their race, to live in neighborhoods that offer cheaper housing
because they host LULUs, then the fairness of the distribution becomes a question about the
fairness of our market economy.  Some might argue that the disproportionate burden is part and
parcel of a free market economy that is, overall, fairer than alternative schemes, and that the
costs of regulating the market to reduce the disproportionate burden outweigh the benefits of
doing so.  Others might argue that those moving to a host neighborhood are compensated
through the market for the disproportionate burden they bear by lower housing costs, and
therefore that the situation is just.  Similarly, some might contend that while the poor suffer
lower quality neighborhoods, they also suffer lower quality food, housing, and medical care, and
that the systemic problem of poverty is better addressed through income redistribution programs
than through changes in siting processes.
Even if decisionmakers were to agree that it is unfair to allow post-siting market
dynamics to create disproportionate environmental risk for the poor or minorities, the remedy for
that injustice would have to be much more fundamental than the remedy for unjust siting
decisions.  Indeed, if market forces are the primary cause of the correlation between the presence
of LULUs and the current socioeconomic characteristics of a neighborhood, even a siting
process radically revised to ensure that LULUs are distributed equally among all neighborhoods
may have only a short-term effect.  The areas surrounding LULUs distributed equitably will
become less desirable neighborhoods, and this may soon be left to people of color or the poor,
recreating the pattern of inequitable siting.  Accordingly, if a disproportionate burden results
from or is exacerbated by market dynamics, an effective remedy might require such reforms as
stricter enforcement of laws against housing discrimination, more serious efforts to achieve
residential integration, changes in the processes of siting low and moderate income housing,
changes in programs designed to aid the poor in securing decent housing, greater regulatory
protection for those neighborhoods that are chosen to host LULUs, and changes in production
and consumption processes to reduce the number of LULUs needed.
Information about the role market dynamics play in the distribution of LULUs would
promote a better understanding of the nature of the problem of environmental injustice and help
point the way to appropriate solutions for the problem.  Nonetheless, market dynamics have been
largely ignored by the current research on environmental justice.
__________________
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Executive Order 12898
Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations
and Low-Income Populations, 59 FEDERAL REGISTER 7629 (February 11, 1994)
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United
States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1-101.  To the greatest extent practicable and permitted by law, and consistent
with the principles set forth in the report on the National Performance Review, each Federal
agency shall make achieving environmental justice part of its mission by identifying and
addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental
effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations and low-income
populations in the United States and its territories and possessions, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the Commonwealth of the Mariana Islands.
Section 1-102(a).  Within 3 months of the date of this order, the Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency or the Administrator’s designee shall convene an interagency
Federal Working Group on Environmental Justice (“Working Group”). . . . 
Section 1-103(a).  [E]ach Federal agency shall develop an agency-wide environmental
justice strategy . . . that identifies and addresses disproportionately high and adverse human
health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on minority populations
and low-income populations.  The environmental justice strategy shall list programs, policies,
planning and public participation processes, enforcement, and/or rulemakings related to human
health or the environment that should be revised to, at a minimum: (1) promote enforcement of
all health and environmental statutes in areas with minority populations and low-income
populations; (2) ensure greater public participation; (3) improve research and data collection
relating to the health of and environment of minority populations and low-income populations;
and (4) identify differential patterns of consumption of natural resources among minority
populations and low-income populations. . . . 
Section 1-103(e).  Within 12 months of the date of this order, each Federal agency shall
finalize its environmental justice strategy and provide a copy and written description of its
strategy to the Working Group.
Section 2-2.  Each Federal agency shall conduct its programs, policies, and activities that
substantially affect human health or the environment, in a manner that ensures that such
programs, policies, and activities do not have the effect of excluding persons (including
populations) from participation in, denying persons (including populations) the benefits of, or
subjecting persons (including populations) to discrimination under, such programs, policies, and
activities, because of their race, color, or national origin. . . .
Section 3-301(a).  Environmental human health research, whenever practicable and
appropriate, shall include diverse segments of the population in epidemiological and clinical
studies, including segments at high risk from environmental hazards, such as minority
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populations, low-income populations and workers who may be exposed to substantial
environmental hazards. . . .
Section 5-5(b).  Each Federal agency may, whenever practicable and appropriate,
translate crucial public documents, notices, and hearings relating to human health or the
environment for limited English speaking populations.
Section 6-606.  Each Federal agency responsibility set forth under this order shall apply
equally to Native American programs.  In addition, the Department of the Interior, in
coordination with the Working Group, and, after consultation with tribal leaders, shall coordinate
steps to be taken pursuant to this order that address Federally-recognized Indian Tribes.
Section 6-607.  Unless otherwise provided by law, Federal agencies shall assume the
financial costs of complying with this order.
Section 6-609.  This order is intended only to improve the internal management of the
Executive Branch and is not intended to nor does it create, any right, benefit, or trust
responsibility, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by a party against the
United States, its agencies, its officers, or any person.  This order shall not be construed to create
any right to judicial review involving the compliance or noncompliance of the United States, its
agencies, its officers, or any other person with this order.
__________________
Louisiana Energy Services in 1989 sought a license from the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) to build the Claiborne Enrichment Center (CEC), a nuclear fuel production
facility.  The proposed site lay between the communities of Forest Grove and Center Springs,
with a combined population of 250 – ninety-seven percent of whom are African-American – in
one of the poorest regions of the United States.  Citizens Against Nuclear Trash was permitted to
intervene in the proceeding.  The NRC’s Atomic Safety and Licensing Board concluded that the
proposed facility met all applicable licensing requirements, and in the excerpt below ruled on the
citizens group’s environmental justice claims.
In the Matter of Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. 
(Claiborne Enrichment Center)
No. LBP-97-8 (NRC Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 1997)
Before MOORE, Chairman, COLE, and SHON.
It is the NRC’s position that, as an independent regulatory agency, the NRC is not
mandatorily subject to Executive Order 12898.  Nevertheless, on March 31, 1994, the then
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Chairman of the Commission wrote the President stating that the NRC would carry out the
measures in the Executive Order. . . .  By voluntarily agreeing to implement the President’s
environmental justice directive, the Commission has made it fully applicable to the agency and,
until that commitment is revoked, the President’s order . . . applies to the NRC to the same
extent as if it were an executive agency. . . . 
Racial Discrimination in Site Selection
Executive Order 12898 requires that the NRC conduct its licensing activities in a manner
that “ensures” those activities do not have the effect of subjecting any persons or populations to
discrimination because of their race or color. . . . 
In the circumstances presented in this licensing action, . . . by limiting its consideration to
a facial review of the information in the Applicant’s [environmental report], the [NRC] Staff has
failed to comply with the President’s directive. . . .  [A] thorough Staff investigation is needed
not only to comply with Executive Order 12898, but to avoid the constitutional ramifications of
the agency becoming a participant in any discriminatory conduct through its grant of a license.
Racial discrimination in the facility site selection process cannot be uncovered with only
a cursory review of the description of that process appearing in an Applicant’s environmental
report.  If it were so easily detected, racial discrimination would not be such a persistent and
enduring problem in American society.  Racial discrimination is rarely, if ever, admitted. 
Instead it is often rationalized under some other seemingly racially neutral guise, making it
difficult to ferret out.  Moreover, direct evidence of racial discrimination is seldom found. 
Therefore . . . if the President’s nondiscrimination directive is to have any meaning a much more
thorough investigation must be conducted by the Staff to determine whether racial
discrimination played a role in the CEC site selection process. . . . [T]he Staff must lift some
rocks and look under them. . . .
Substantial evidence presented by the Intervenor . . . demonstrates why it is imperative
that the Staff conduct such a through investigation. . . .  [T]he Intervenor’s evidence . . . is more
than sufficient to raise a reasonable inference that racial considerations played some part in the
site selection process . . . .  A finding that the selection process was tainted by racial bias is far
too serious a determination, with potentially long lasting consequences, to render without the
benefit of a thorough and professional Staff investigation aided by whatever outside experts as
may be necessary. . . . 
Intervenor’s statistical evidence presented by Dr. Bullard . . . shows that as the site
selection process progressed and the focus of the search narrowed, the level of minority
representation in the population rose dramatically. . . .  Of the 78 proposed sites . . . the
aggregate average percentage of black population within a 1-mile radius of each of the sites . . .
is 28.35%.  After the initial site cuts reduced the list to 37 sites . . . the aggregate percentage of
black population rose to 36.78%.  Ultimately, the process culminated in a chosen site with a
black population of 97.1% within a 1-mile radius . . . which is the site with the highest percent
black population of all 78 examined sites.  This statistical evidence very strongly suggests that
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racial considerations played a part in the site selection process. . .
 
Disproportional Impacts
. . .  Executive Order 12898 is [also] concerned with . . . disparate impacts . . . [and]
instructs the [NRC to identify and address] disproportionately high and adverse human health
and environmental effects on minority and low income populations as part of its licensing
activities. . . . 
Intervenor . . . asserts that the [NRC Staff analysis] is deficient because it fails to address
the impacts of closing Parish Road 39, which currently bisects [the proposed Claiborne
Enrichment Center (CEC) site] and joins the communities of Forest Grove and Center Springs. . .
.  According to Dr. Bullard, it is apparent that the Staff did not even consult with any of the
residents of Forest Grove and Center Springs . . . for if it had, the Staff would have found that
Forest Grove Road is a vital and frequently used link between the two communities, with regular
pedestrian traffic. . . .
Staff witnesses . . . asserted that the relocation of Parish Road 39 should not affect . . .
residents who attend church services . . . although driving distances will be slightly increased, . .
. [suggesting] that the road relocation may require residents of the communities to adjust
carpools. . . .  The Staff . . . does not discuss Forest Grove Road’s status as a pedestrian link
between Forest Grove and Center Springs and the impacts of relocation on those who must walk
the distance between the communities on this road. . . .  [T]he staff calculates how much
additional gasoline it will take to drive between the communities when the road is relocated and
the added travel time the road relocation will cause for various trips. . . .
[A] significant number of the residents of these communities have no motor vehicles and
often must walk.  Adding 0.38 mile to the distance between the Forest Grove and Center Springs
communities may be a mere “inconvenience” to those who drive, as the Staff suggests.  Yet,
permanently adding that distance to the 1- or 2-mile walk between these communities for those
who must regularly make the trip on foot may be more than a “very small” impact, especially if
they are old, ill or otherwise infirm. . . . 
Conclusion
[W]e conclude that a thorough Staff investigation of the CEC site selection process is
essential to determine whether racial discrimination played a role in that process. . . . 
Additionally, . . . we conclude that the Staff’s treatment . . . of the impacts of relocating Parish
Road 39 on the communities of Forest Grove and Center Springs is inadequate. . . .
 
[T]he Applicant’s requested authorization for a . . . license is hereby denied.
__________________
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Epilogue.  The full Nuclear Regulatory Commission affirmed the portion of the Atomic
Safety and Licensing Board decision in Louisiana Energy Services directing the NRC staff to
reexamine the disparate impacts on pedestrians.  On the issue of racial discrimination in the site
selection process, however, the NRC reversed the Board’s conclusion that the NRC must staff
engage in a thorough analysis:
What the Board in this case seemed to envision is a free-ranging NRC
Staff inquiry into the motives of [Louisiana Energy Services] (and perhaps state
and local) decisionmakers, with only the broad instruction that the Staff should
“lift some rocks and look under them.”  With no clear legal basis or clearly
discernible objective, the Board’s approach cannot in our view be sustained,
notwithstanding the worthy intentions that motivated it. . . .
[T]he Board’s effort to enforce what it saw as a “nondiscrimination
directive” in the Executive Order was misplaced.  The Executive Order, by its
own terms, established no new rights or remedies.  Its purpose was merely to
“underscore certain provision[s] of existing law that can help ensure that all
communities and persons across this Nation live in a safe and healthful
environment” (emphasis added).
The only “existing law” conceivably pertinent here is NEPA, a statue that
centers on environmental impacts.  The board’s proposed racial discrimination
inquiry goes well beyond what NEPA has traditionally been interpreted to
require.  Despite nearly 30 years of extensive NEPA litigation on countless
putative impacts and effects of federal actions we are unaware of a single judicial
or agency decision that has invoked NEPA to consider a claim of racial
discrimination. . . . 
In the Matter of Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (Claiborne Enrichment Center), 47 N.R.C. 77,
58-65 (April 3, 1998).
__________________
4.  The Present and Future of American Environmentalism
Where Things Stand
PHILIP SCHABECOFF, A FIERCE GREEN FIRE: THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 
138-139 (Revised ed. 2003)
In the more than thirty years that have passed since Earth Day 1970, American society
has been quietly transformed by environmental values.  An impressive body of environmental
law has been enacted, new institutions have been created to carry out those laws, the courts have
been opened to environmental causes, and environmental law has become the fastest growing
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arm of the legal profession.  Environmental laws and regulations have made a significant imprint
on the national economy and altered the attitudes of powerful corporations and unions.  Our
science, medicine, education, mass communications, and even religion have changed in response
to this environmental phenomenon.
Arising out of the transcendental and utilitarian streams of the old conservationism, the
search for a better quality of life by affluent Americans in the post-World War II period, the
demands for social justice that exploded in the 1960s and 1970s, the fear and anger of citizens
whose health and families and property are threatened by pollution or rapacious development,
and out of a slowly changing understanding of the relationship between humans and the natural
world, the new environmentalism is helping create a new society.
But what about the American people?  A social revolution cannot be built only by
reforming laws and institutions – it must have the firm support of the public.  Many well-
informed observers still question the depth of Americans’ commitment to environmentalism. 
They cite the failure of environmentalism to influence electoral politics, particularly at the
presidential level, as a telling indication of how superficially it has been adopted by voters.
My own view as a journalist who has observed environmental politics in the country for
many years is that a large part of the American people, probably a majority, have become
imbued with environmental values.  Those values, however, have yet to make a profound
difference in the political behavior of most Americans.  Until recently I believed that in a
relatively few years, the environment would be one of the top two or three issues that would
decide a presidential election.  That has not happened, and the preferences of voters in recent
years have been moving in the opposite direction.
__________________
New Directions for Pragmatists
Michael McCloskey, Twenty Years of Change in the Environmental Movement:
An Insider’s View, in RILEY E. DUNLAP AND ANGELA MERTIG, EDS.,
AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM: THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 1970-1990
86 - 87 (1992)
. . . [T]here is a need for the mainstream component of the movement to rethink its
assumptions about getting results through government.  Its classic experience with getting the
government to set aside public land reserves out of the public domain may have misled it.  When
it got laws passed to do that, they were almost self-executing.  Timber is almost never put up for
sale within a wilderness area or a national park once it is established, and a lot of oversight is not
needed.  But these simple experiences with natural resource protection look more and more like
the exceptions.  Getting regulatory programs for environmental protection implemented is a
different matter entirely.  They need endless follow-through and can go wrong in a thousand
places.  The relevant bureaucracies have minds of their own and very little loyalty to the ideas of
those who lobbied the programs through.  Although the bureaucracies are somewhat responsive
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to Presidential direction, they are not very responsive to outside lobbying and are subject to no
self-correcting process if they fail to be productive (the market does not put them out of business
when they are unproductive).  Moreover, environmentalists do not seem to be having much
success in getting Presidents into power who share their view of the world, and cannot look to
the presidency to rescue them from unresponsive bureaucracies.  The pragmatic reformers thus
face a crisis in their faith in governmental action.
At the same time, the grassroots are being radicalized by their experiences of receiving
no satisfaction from those in power.  The government is increasingly perceived as the enemy. 
They believe it ignores the laws, suppresses evidence, and tells lies.  And it certainly does not
protect their interests.  Why, they may ask, are we advocating giving it more power so that it can
keep anything useful from happening?  Not only are the local toxics activists feeling this way but
so also increasingly are those dealing with public land issues and wildlife.  Local activists across
the board feel estranged from the agencies they deal with, whether they be county government or
federal agencies.  Agencies such as the Forest Service have admitted in their own internal
planning reviews that they are rarely pleasing any constituency anymore.
The mainstream movement must face this lack of faith in government head-on.  It should
ponder the significance of the Alar case in 1989, when NRDC went on national television to
denounce use of this chemical on apples.  The question about the safety of Alar had been debated
for 15 years within EPA, which could not make up its mind about whether to force its
withdrawal.  After the TV exposé, no customers wanted to buy Alar-treated apples anymore.  No
supermarkets wanted to sell them.  The apple growers pledged to stop using Alar, and the
manufacturer of it announced that production was ceasing because the market had collapsed. 
Even though friends of Alar in industry wanted to continue arguing the case for its safety, the
issue had been decided in the marketplace.  It did not matter whether EPA banned it; society had
decided through other means that its use was unacceptable.
With overwhelming levels of support in public opinion, this kind of action can be
repeated.  Environmentalists can bypass government in the regulatory field wherever a strong
consumer handle exists.  Cases can be taken to the public, which can be urged not to buy
products produced in damaging ways or containing unsafe ingredients.  The most egregious
polluters can be the subject of major campaigns to punish them in the marketplace.  Boycotts and
shareholder actions can become the new stock-in-trade of environmentalists. . . . .
The key to success here is information – information on what is in products, what
happens in the production processes, and what happens to the product as waste.  Fortunately,
with the advent of Title III in the new Superfund law, information is becoming available that
discloses the names of the companies discharging the greatest amounts of toxics into our air and
environment.  This information needs to be combined with the information on the frequency of
violations of pollution and OSHA laws to provide good measures of corporations’ environmental
records.  State laws such as Proposition 65 in California are providing consumers with
information about toxics in products.  Better labeling laws are needed, too, to arm people with
information that will enable them to make their own informed consumer choices.
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Tactics along these lines borrow something from the camps at either end of the
environmental spectrum.  They acknowledge some of the validity of the critiques from the right
with respect to the cumbersomeness of government and the need to use market mechanisms. 
They also acknowledge the frustration of the radicals with respect to government
unresponsiveness and the consequent need for direct action.  But the mainstream organizations
have something to contribute too.  Unlike those on the right, they would encourage the use of
market mechanisms directly rather than indirectly (as through regulatory mechanisms that mimic
markets).  Unlike the radicals, they could organize action in this area so that major resources are
brought to bear in pursuit of a well-orchestrated national strategy.  This could be a serious, long-
term effort with staying power and a systematic focus on consumer education.  It would not be
an impulsive hit-and-run action. . . .
Direct action in the marketplace and at stockholders’ meetings might also help to unify
the movement.  It would be a strategy that draws on the insights and contributions of all camps
and, most importantly, would offer the greatest promise of making major gains in the real world.  
Quite unexpectedly, it might also tend to relieve some of the pressure on overstressed regulatory
agencies such as EPA and FDA.  It would not work well for land management agencies, such as
the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management, but these agencies are now being forced
to find a new modus vivendi with enraged constituencies in the states where they operate.  The
Forest Service admits that it needs to start pleasing somebody, someplace, some of the time; it
cannot remain at war with everyone.
The environmental movement has not lost its commitment or determination, but it is at a
crossroads in terms of knowing how to produce results.  The breakup into competing camps
reflects this uncertainty.  Those at the extremes may care less about getting results than about
feeling that they are right.  However, the pragmatists in between must care about results, or they
have forfeited their reason for existing.  They now must bear the burden of rethinking their
fundamental goals, strategies, and tactics.
Fortunately, there seems to be an answer.  Whether they will see it or find another will
tell us much about he continuing vitality of the movement.
__________________
Deep Ecology
Bill Devall, Deep Ecology and Radical Environmentalism,
in RILEY E. DUNLAP  AND ANGELA MERTIG, EDS., AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM: 
THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 1970-1990, pages 51-56 (1992)
. . . [D]uring the 1970s, critics within the environmental movement saw [the] major
national organizations as less and less responsive to grassroots demands for more rapid change
in public policy, too bureaucratized and centralized, and too “shallow” in ideology.  The major
environmental groups were also criticized for their willingness to settle for reforms in
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government policy without changes in our society’s basic culture, including the myths of
economic growth, progress, belief that technology will save us from environmental problems,
and humanism.
Deep ecology was a label put forward in the early 1970s for a philosophical tendency that
provided both a critique of reform or shallow environmentalism and a critique of industrial
society and the anthropocentric bias of that type of society. . .
The terms deep ecology and deep, long-range ecology movement were originated by
Norwegian philosopher and social activist Arne Naess.  In a 1973 article, Naess asserted that
shallow and deep ecology can be seen as two aspects of the environmental movement.  He
defined shallow ecology as the “fight against pollution and resource depletion.  Central
objective: The health and affluence of people in the developed countries.”  He defined deep
ecology as a normative, ecophilosophical movement that is inspired and fortified in part by our
experience as humans in nature and in part by ecological knowledge.  The literature on the deep-
shallow distinction and on the historical and philosophical antecedents of the deep ecology
movement has been extensively developed since 1973.
The most distinctive aspect of deep ecology is the idea of ecocentric identification, which
Naess calls the “ultimate norm” of self-realization.  Humans are one of myriad self-realizing
beings, and human maturity and self-realization come from broader and wider self-identification. 
Out of identification with forests, rivers, deserts, or mountains comes a kind of solidarity: “I am
the rainforest” or “I am speaking for this mountain because it is a part of me.”
Naess says that Rachel Carson showed this kind of self-identification combined with
ecological understanding. . . . 
A second ultimate norm of deep ecology is biocentrism, or ecocentrism as some call it. 
In contrast with an anthropocentric or human-centered worldview, an ecocentric worldview
suggests that humans are part of the “web of life” – not at the top of creation but equal with the
many other aspects of creation.  Naess calls this a total-field image and suggests that this image
encourages respect for natural biodiversity and evolution.  Speaking as a philosopher, Naess
suggests that in an anthropocentric worldview every action is undertaken to protect present and
future generations of humans.  In an ecocentric worldview, future generations include
generations of all living beings and “beings” are broadly defined to include living rivers as well
as living species.
The supporters of the deep ecology movement, then, seek ways of living that are best for
all living beings.  “Do as little harm as possible” might be a slogan of those seeking a deep
ecology-based lifestyle.  Some taking of life is necessary to satisfy vital human needs, but the
integrity, beauty, and stability of the native landscape is respected. . . . 
Sensing that some kind of platform or general statement was needed to show the unity
among a diversity of deep ecology types of positions, Naess, along with philosopher George
Sessions, formulated “8 points” as a modest suggestion for discussion.  Naess insists that this
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platform is without great pretensions and has the primary function of stimulating dialogue about
philosophy and strategies in politics and personal lifestyle decisions.
(1)  The well-being and flourishing of human and nonhuman life on Earth have value in
themselves.  Theses values are independent of the usefulness of the nonhuman world
for human purposes.
(2) Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these values and
are also values in themselves.
(3) Humans have no right to reduce the richness and diversity except to satisfy human
needs.
(4) The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantial decrease
of the human population.  The flourishing of nonhuman life requires such a
decrease.
(5) Present human interference with the nonhuman world is excessive, and the situation
is rapidly worsening.
(6) Policies must therefore be changed.  The changes in policies affect basic economic,
technological, and ideological structures.  The resulting state of affairs will be
deeply different from the present.
(7) The ideological change is mainly that appreciating life quality (dwelling in situations
of inherent worth) rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living. 
There will be a profound awareness of the difference between big and great.
(8) Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly
to participate in the attempt to implement the necessary changes.
Although a wide variety of lifestyles and social policies are potentially compatible with a
deep ecology position, the literature on deep ecology suggests that many supporters favor what
has been called green consumerism (careful awareness both of the quality and quantity of
products consumed, based on the principle of least harm to living beings and ecocentric
identity), voluntary simplicity of lifestyle that maximizes rich experiences in nature, and
bioregionalism or living in place.  Supporters of deep ecology also tend to encourage the
restoration movement, which seeks to enhance and restore native biodiversity within a
bioregional context, and to favor protection of ancient forests, tropical rainforests, and all other
types of ecosystems on the planet. . . .  Generally speaking, the norm of nonviolence is widely
accepted by deep ecologists. . . .
. . . [T]he deep, long-range ecology movement is a philosophical movement with
implications for personal lifestyles and public policy as suggested in the platform presented by
Naess and Sessions.  Yet, deep ecology has increasingly become associated with radical
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environmental activism, or the use of tactics such as ecotage, sit-ins, guerrilla theater,
demonstrations, and other forms of direct action. . . .
Although radical environmentalism has been stimulated by the failures of reform
environmentalism and by the philosophy and spirituality of deep ecology, ultimately “it is based
on one simple by frightening realization: that our culture is lethal to the ecology that it depends
on.”  At root, then, radical environmentalism is a response to our existential condition.  In a
culture dominated by humanism and technology, radical environmental sensibilities come from a
sense of the peril that all beings face because of human intervention in the biosphere.  The
agenda of radical environmentalism is less and less a reaction to the agenda of reform
environmentalism (or the activities of industry and government) and more and more a reaction to
the demands of our existence.  Its concerns are acid rain, increasing rates of species extinction,
the greenhouse effect, ozone depletion, and on and on.
__________________
Notes and Questions
1.  How much of the “platform” of Deep Ecology do you agree with?  What parts of the
platform seem to be antithetical to the views held by a majority of Americans?
__________________
A Critique of the Movement
MICHAEL SHELLENBERGER AND TED NORDHAUS,
THE DEATH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM 6-11, 32-34 (2004)
Introduction
Those of us who are children of the environmental movement must never forget that we
are standing on the shoulders of all those who came before us.
The clean water we drink, the clean air we breath, and the protected wilderness we
treasure are all, in no small part, thanks to them.  The two of us have worked for most of the
country’s leading environmental organizations as staff or consultants.  We hold a sincere and
abiding respect for our parents and elders in the environmental community.  They have worked
hard and accomplished a great deal.  For that we are deeply grateful.
At the same time, we believe that the best way to honor their achievements is to
acknowledge that modern environmentalism is no longer capable of dealing with the world’s
most serious ecological crisis.
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Over the last 15 years environmental foundations and organizations have invested
hundreds of millions of dollars into combating global warming.
We have strikingly little to show for it.
From the battles over higher efficiency for cars and trucks to the attempts to reduce
carbon emissions through international treaties, environmental groups repeatedly have tried and
failed to win national legislation that would reduce the threat of global warming.  As a result,
people in the environmental movement today find themselves politically less powerful than we
were one and a half decades ago.
Yet in lengthy conversations, the vast majority of leaders from the largest environmental
organizations and foundations in the country insisted to us that we are on the right track.
Nearly all of the more than two-dozen environmentalists we interviewed underscored that
climate change demands that we remake the global economy in ways that will transform the
lives of six billion people.  All recognize that it’s an undertaking of monumental size and
complexity.  And all acknowledged that we must reduce emissions by up to 70 percent as soon
as possible.
But in their public campaigns, not one of America’s environmental leaders is articulating
a vision of the future commensurate with the magnitude of the crisis.  Instead they are promoting
technical policy fixes like pollution controls and higher vehicle mileage standards – proposals
that provide neither the popular inspiration nor the political alliances the community needs to
deal with the problem.
By failing to question their most basic assumptions about the problem and the solution,
environmental leaders are like generals fighting the last war – in particular the war they fought
and won for basic environmental protections more than 30 years ago.  It was then that the
community’s political strategy became defined around using science to define the problem as
“environmental” and crafting technical policy proposals as solutions. . . . 
Environmentalism as a Special Interest
Those of use who were children during the birth of the modern environmental movement
have no idea what it feels like to really win big.
Our parents and elders experienced something during the 1960s and 70s that today seems
like a dream: the passage of a series of powerful environmental laws too numerous to list, from
the Endangered Species Act to the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts to the National
Environmental Policy Act.
Experiencing such epic victories had a searing impact on the minds of the movement’s
founders.  It established a way of thinking about the environment and politics that has lasted
until today.
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It was also then, at the height of the movement’s success, that the seeds of failure were
planted.  The environmental community’s success created a strong confidence – and in some
cases bald arrogance – that the environmental protection frame was enough to succeed at a
policy level.  The environmental community’s belief that their power derives from defining
themselves as defenders of “the environment” has prevented us from winning major legislation
on global warming at the national level.
We believe that the environmental movement’s foundational concepts, its method for
framing legislative proposals, and its very institutions are outmoded.  Today environmentalism is
just another special interest.  Evidence for this can be found in its concepts, its proposals, and its
reasoning.  What stands out is how arbitrary environmental leaders are about what gets counted
and what doesn’t as “environmental.”  Most of the movement’s leading thinkers, funders and
advocates do not question their most basic assumptions about who we are, what we stand for,
and what it is that we should be doing.
Environmentalism is today more about protecting a supposed “thing” – “the
environment” – than advancing the worldview articulated by Sierra Club founder John Muir,
who nearly a century ago observed, “When we try to pick out anything by itself, we find it
hitched to everything else in the Universe.”
Thinking of the environment as a “thing” has had enormous implications for how
environmentalists conduct their politics.  The three-part strategic framework for environmental
policy-making hasn’t changed in 40 years: first, define a problem (e.g. global warming) as
“environmental.”  Second, craft a technical remedy (e.g., cap-and-trade).  Third, sell the
technical proposal to legislators through a variety of tactics, such as lobbying, third-party allies,
research reports, advertising, and public relations.
When we asked environmental leaders how we could accelerate our efforts against global
warming, most pointed to this or that tactic – more analysis, more grassroots organizing, more
PR. . . . 
Even the question of alliances, which goes to the core of political strategy, is treated
within environmental circles as a tactical question – an opportunity to get this or that
constituency – religious leaders! business leaders! celebrities! youth! Latinos! – to take up the
fight against global warming.  The implication is that if only X group were involved in the
global warming fight then things would really start to happen.
The arrogance here is that environmentalists ask not what we can do for non-
environmental constituencies but what non-environmental constituencies can do for
environmentalists.  As a result, while public support for action on global warming is wide it is
also frighteningly shallow.
The environmental movement’s incuriosity about the interests of potential allies depends
on it never challenging the most basic assumptions about what does and doesn’t get counted as
“environmental.”  Because we define environmental problems so narrowly, environmental
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leaders come up with equally narrow solutions.  In the face of perhaps the greatest calamity in
modern history, environmental leaders are sanguine that selling technical solutions like
florescent light bulbs, more efficient appliances, and hybrid cars will be sufficient to muster the
necessary political strength to overcome the alliance of neoconservative ideologues and industry
interests in Washington, D.C.
The entire landscape in which politics plays out has changed radically in the last 30
years, yet the environmental movement acts as though proposals based on “sound science” will
be sufficient to overcome ideological and industry opposition.  Environmentalists are in a culture
war whether we like it or not.  It’s a war over our core values as Americans and over our vision
for the future, and it won’t be won appealing to the rational consideration of our collective self-
interest.
We have become convinced that modern environmentalism, with all of its unexamined
assumptions, outdated concepts and exhausted strategies, must die so that something can 
live. . . .
Environmental Group Think
. . . The institutions that define what environmentalism means boast large professional
staffs and receive tens of millions of dollars every year from foundations and individuals.  Given
these rewards, it’s no surprise that most environmental leaders neither craft nor support
proposals that could be tagged “non-environmental.”  Doing otherwise would do more than
threaten their status; it would undermine their brand.
Environmentalists are particularly upbeat about the direction of public opinion thanks in
large part to the polling they conduct that shows wide support for their proposals.  Yet America
is a vastly more right-wing country than it was three decades ago.  The domination of American
politics by the far-right is a central obstacle to achieving action on global warming.  Yet almost
none of the environmentalists we interviewed thought to mention it.
Part of what’s behind America’s political turn to the right is the skill with which
conservative think tanks, intellectuals and political leaders have crafted proposals that build their
power through setting the terms of the debate.  Their work has paid off.  According to a survey
of 1,500 Americans by the market research firm Environics, the number of Americans who agree
with the statement, “To preserve people’s jobs in this country, we must accept higher levels of
pollution in the future,” increased from 17 percent in 1996 to 26 percent in 2000.  The number of
Americans who agreed that, “Most of the people actively involved in environmental groups are
extremists, not reasonable people,” leapt from 32 percent in 1996 to 41 percent in 2000.
The truth is that for the vast majority of Americans, the environment never makes it into
their top ten list of things to worry about.  Protecting the environment is indeed supported by a
large majority – it’s just not supported very strongly.  Once you understand this, it’s much easier
to understand why it’s been so easy for anti-environmental interests to gut 30 years of
environmental protections. . . . 
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A Path for the Crossing
. . . Issues only matter to the extent that they are positioned in ways linking them to
proposals carrying within them a set of core beliefs, principles, or values.  The role of issues and
proposals is to activate and sometimes change those deeply held values.  And the job of global
warming strategists should be to determine which values we need to activate to bring various
constituencies into a political majority.
For social scientists, values are those core beliefs and principles that motivate behavior –
from who you vote for to which movie to see.  These values determine political positions and
political identities (e.g., environmentalism or not, Republican or Democrat, conservative or
progressive).
The scientists who study values understand that some values are traditional, like so-called
“family values,” others are modern, like “liberal” enlightenment values, and others (like
consumer values) fit into neither category.  These values inform how individuals develop a range
of opinions, on everything from global warming to the war in Iraq to what kind of SUV to buy.
Conservative foundations and think tanks have spent 40 years getting clear about what
they want (their vision) and what they stand for (their values).  The values of smaller
government, fewer taxes, a large military, traditional families, and more power for big business
are only today, after 40 years of being stitched together by conservative intellectuals and
strategists, coherent enough to be listed in a “[C]ontract with America.”  After they got clearer
about their vision and values, conservatives started crafting proposals that would activate
conservative values among their bases and swing voters.
Once in power, conservatives govern on all of their issues – no matter whether their
solutions have majority support.  Liberals tend to approach politics with an eye toward winning
one issue campaign at a time – a Sisyphean task that has contributed to today’s neoconservative
hegemony.
Environmental groups have spent the last 40 years defining themselves against
conservative values like cost-benefit accounting, smaller government, fewer regulations, and free
trade, without ever articulating a coherent morality we can call our own.  Most of the
intellectuals who staff environmental groups are so repelled by the right’s values that we have
assiduously avoided examining our own in a serious way.  Environmentalists and other liberals
tend to see values as a distraction from “the real issues” – environmental problems like global
warming.
If environmentalists hope to become more than a special interest we must start framing
our proposals around core American values and start seeing our own values as central to what
motivates and guides our politics.  Doing so is crucial if we are to build the political momentum
– a sustaining movement – to pass and implement the legislation that will achieve action on
global warming and other issues. . . .
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Environmentalists . . . are so certain about what the problem is, and so committed to their
legislative solutions, that we behave as though all we need is to tell the literal truth in order to
pass our policies.
Environmentalists need to tap into the creative worlds of myth-making, even religion, not
to better sell narrow and technical policy proposals but rather to figure out who we are and who
we need to be.
Above all else, we need to take a hard look at the institutions the movement has built
over the last 30 years.  Are existing environmental institutions up to the task of imagining the
post-global warming world?  Or do we now need a set of new institutions founded around a
more expansive vision and set of values?
__________________
The Possibility of Failure
PHILIP SHABECOFF, A FIERCE GREEN FIRE: 
THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 
307-310 (Revised ed. 2003)
Social justice, political power, economic reform, corporate accountability, and
technological evolution – these are the building blocks of an ecologically sound society in the
United States.  But the edifice cannot be raised without a deeper devotion of the American
people to environmental goals and values.  As former EPA administrator Lee M. Thomas said,
our response to the environmental threats that confront us “must involve a personal commitment
from each of us to live environmentally ethical lives – not because it is a requirement of law but
because it is an essential component of our inherent responsibility to ourselves, our neighbors,
our children and our planet.  In fact, environmental laws will be not be effective unless they are
supported by a widely accepted environmental ethic.”
That time does not yet appear to be at hand.  But perhaps it is approaching.  A restless,
disconnected, increasingly fragmented American people is, I think, groping for new values, a
new center to our lives.  That center has shifted several times over the course of our nation’s
history.  The first Europeans came here to plant a garden in the freedom of a fresh new world. 
That dream was replaced by belief in Manifest Destiny and the optimism and opportunity of the
frontier.  Then came the industrial revolution, which elevated mass production, consumption, the
corporation, and the worship of the machine into a paramount position in our value system.
Consumerism now seems to be growing increasingly stale and dissatisfying as a value
around which to build our lives.  At the same time we are becoming more and more aware of the
peril created by our own works and of how far we have distanced ourselves from nature. 
Environmentalism has shown us that the world need not be this way.  And it is pointing us in a
new direction, toward a new set of values that would lead us to live more gently on and
harmoniously with this planet.
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In Man and Nature [excerpted in Chapter 1, Section C], George Perkins Marsh asked,
“Could this old world, which man has overthrown, be rebuilded, could human cunning rescue its
wasted hillsides and its deserted plans from solitude or mere nomad occupation, from bareness,
from nakedness, and from insalubrity, and restore the ancient fertility and healthfulness . . . ?” 
His answer was that such rebuilding “must await great political and moral revolutions in the
governments and people . . .”
More than a century and a quarter later, those political and moral revolutions have yet to
take place.  But given the grave dangers our current course will impose on our posterity, those
changes may yet materialize, although not necessarily in timely fashion.  The critics of
environmentalism, the Julian Simons and Herman Kahns who contended that we need not fear
ecological disaster because human intelligence, resourcefulness, and ingenuity will find the
solutions, may have been right – but right in a way they did not intend.  Many humans are
responding to the devastation that human works have created.  They are doing it by creating a
new system of values and a new cultural movement called environmentalism.  In the United
States, this movement is advancing – slowly and sporadically – on a broad front.  Its ranks are
open enough to include radical Earth First! tree huggers and patrician big-game hunters, militant
community activists and cool intellectuals cloistered in think tanks, hard-nosed lobbyists and
dreamy bird-watchers.  It has captured the interest and sympathy of a wide segment of the
American public, the pained attention of our business community, and the rhetorical if not actual
support of our public officials.
Despite its potential, the environmental movement has yet to exercise its strength
decisively.  Possibly it may never do so.  The forces that oppose it – a minority, to be sure, but
one that possesses enormous wealth with which it can exercise control over the nation’s political
and economic affairs – have given ample evidence that they will not lightly surrender their
power.  At the beginning of the new century, that power appeared to be driving back many of the
gains made by the environmental revolution.
In a sane world, the values of environmentalism should prevail.  The alternatives are
clearly unacceptable to a rational and democratic society.  If we do not cleanse, replant and
rebuild, we bequeath to our children a bleak and dubious future on a crowded, hungry, poisoned,
and unlovely planet. . . . 
If we are to . . . create not only a cleaner, safer, more pleasant environment but also a
sustainable economy, a more just and democratic society, and a safer world, the environmental
enterprise will have to succeed.  At the beginning of the twenty-first century it confronted the
possibility of failure.
__________________
Notes and Questions
1.  Do you agree with Shellenberger and Nordhaus that environmentalism is “dead”? 
Why or why not?
Ch 5 -127
2.  Is Shabecoff’s assessment correct in your view?  What has to change to avoid failure?
__________________
Ch 5 -128
S:\WPW\CASEBOOK 2008 - Final Ms\Final manuscript - FINAL - Dec 2008\Ch 5 Five - Final
- Dec 13 2008.wpd
